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BETWEEN A DISABILITY AND A HARD PLACE: THE CANCER
SURVIVORS' CATCH-22 OF PROVING DISABILITY
STATUS UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT
BARBARA HOF mAN*
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which
specified that a concern for one's own safety in the face of
dangers that were real and immediate was the process of a
rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he
had to do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no longer
be crazy and would have to fly more missions. Orr would be
crazy to fly more missions and sane if he didn't, but if he was
sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was crazy and
didn't have to; but if he didn't want to he was sane and had
to. Yossarian was moved very deeply by the absolute simplic-
ity of this clause of Catch-22 and let out a respectful whistle.
"That's some catch, that Catch-22," he observed.
"It's the best there is," Doc Daneeka agreed.1
INTRODUCTION
Many cancer survivors2 have found themselves in a similar Catch-
22 when encountering cancer-based employment discrimination. Af-
ter years of successful employment, hundreds of thousands of Ameri-
* Lecturer, Rutgers Law School-Newark; General Counsel, National Coalition for
Cancer Survivorship. I am grateful for the generous assistance of my friend and colleague,
Ellen Lewis Rice, Rutgers Law School-Newark, and my husband, Paul G. Shapiro, for
their insightful editing and comments. I also wish to thank Barbara Ullman Schwerin,
Director, Cancer Legal Resource Center, a joint project of the Western Law Center for
Disability Rights and Loyola Law School, for her feedback on a draft of this Article and
Wanda James, Rutgers Law School-Newark, for secretarial support.
This Article is dedicated to the memory of Eric Neisser, former Acting Dean and Pro-
fessor of Law, Rutgers Law School-Newark, who brilliantly and selflessly instilled in his
friends, colleagues, and students a passion for learning and the pursuit of justice for
others.
1. JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22, at 46 (1961).
2. The oncology community generally considers a cancer survivor to be "anyone with
a diagnosis of cancer, whether newly diagnosed or in remission or with recurrence or ter-
minal cancer." Ellen Stovall & Elizabeth Johns Clark, Survivors as Advocates, in A CANCER
SURVIVOR'S ALMANAC: CHARTING YOUR JOURNEY 274, 276 (Barbara Hoffman ed., 1996)
[hereinafter CANCER SURVIVOR's ALMANAC].
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cans are diagnosed with cancer each year.' Many seek reasonable
accommodations, such as a change in duties or hours, to allow them
to work while receiving medical treatment. Although many employers
readily grant such requests, still other employers discharge, demote,
or refuse to hire cancer survivors. This Article addresses whether
those survivors who face such cancer-based employment discrimina-
tion qualify as disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Since 1992, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990' (ADA)
has purported to have protected a "qualified individual with a disabil-
ity"5 from employment discrimination. Although most cancer survi-
vors should easily meet the statutory definition of an individual with a
disability,6 certain courts have boxed survivors in a Catch-22 by find-
ing that some cancer survivors do not have a "disability" as defined by
the ADA.7 Contrary to the letter and to the intent of the ADA, certain
courts have considered cancer survivors unqualified by finding that
those survivors who are capable of working do not have an "impair-
ment that substantially limits . . . [a] major life activity"8 because they
can work; however, courts have labeled those survivors whose cancer
limits their ability to work as not "qualified."9
3. See Barbara Hoffman, Working it Out: Your Employment Rights, in CANCER SURVIVOR'S
ALMANAC, supra note 2, at 205, 207 (noting that "[a]lthough an individual's risk for cancer
increases with age, cancer often strikes working-age adults"). Approximately 40% of the
more than one million Americans diagnosed with cancer each year are working-age adults.
See id. ("Forty percent of all newly diagnosed survivors are between the ages of 20 and 64");
see also AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, CANCER FACrS & FiCuRts-1999, at 1 (1999) [hereinafter
CANCER FACTS & FiGuREs-1999] (noting that "most cases [of cancer] affect adults middle-
aged or older").
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994); see infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the enactment of the ADA in 1992).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Most cancer survivors can prove that they either have a disa-
bility or have a record of a disability, or are regarded as being disabled by their employers.
See infra notes 69-115 and accompanying text (discussing disability as defined by the ADA);
infra notes 484-485 and accompanying text (discussing the "regarded as" prong of the
ADA's definition of disability); cf Hoffman, Working it Out: Your Employment Rights, in CAN-
CER SURVIVOR's AlMANAC, supra note 2, at 210 (stating that "[a]ll cancer-regardless of
whether your cancer is cured, is in remission or is not responding to treatment-is consid-
ered a 'disability' under the ADA").
6. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (de-
fining disability)).
7. See infra notes 122-269 and accompanying text (examining cases in which courts
granted defendants' motions for summary judgment because the courts found that the
plaintiffs did not meet the ADA's definition of disabled).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A) (defining disability as a "physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities"); see also infra notes 122-223
and accompanying text (reviewing thirteen decisions that found that cancer survivors did
not have a disability as defined by the ADA).
9. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining "qualified individual with a disability...
[as] an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
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Although the ADA applies to an unlimited list of disabilities, most
of the law review articles that have focused on a specific medical con-
dition have analyzed how the ADA applies to persons with HIV/
AIDS.1 ° Only a few commentators have devoted significant analysis to
how the ADA applies to cancer survivors, " despite the fact that cancer
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires").
10. See, e.g., Michael L. Closen, The Decade of Supreme Court Avoidance of AIDS: Denial of
Certiorari in HIV-AIDS Cases and Its Adverse Effects on Human Rights, 61 ALB. L. REV. 897, 955-
58 (1998) (examining the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in HIV-AIDS cases from
1987-1997 and discussing the implications of the ADA as a cap on HIV-AIDS healthcare
benefits); Armen H. Merjian, AIDS, Welfare, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 373, 375 (1998) (arguing that "public entities that fail reasonably
to accommodate persons with AIDS in providing social welfare benefits and services are in
clear violation of Title II of the ADA"); Michael D. Carlis & Scott A. McCabe, Comment,
Are There No Per Se Disabilities Under the Americans with Disabilities Act? The Fate of Asymptomatic
H1VDisease, 57 MD. L. REV. 558, 559-60 (1998) (reviewing the origins and development of
the ADA, federal cases that "examine the issue of whether asymptomatic HIV infection
constitutes a disability under the ADA," and Fourth Circuit decisions that "rejected asymp-
tomatic HIV infection as a federally protected disability under the ADA's principal defini-
tion of disability"); Elizabeth C. Chambers, Comment, Asymptomatic HIVas a Disability Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 73 WASH. L. REV. 403, 405 (1998) (urging that the
Supreme Court "should resolve the debate among the circuits by holding that asymptom-
atic HIV-positive persons are protected by the ADA, but not on the grounds employed by
the district and circuit courts thus far"); Christine Spinella Davis, Comment, Asymptomatic
H1V Under the ADA: The Invisible, Yet Legitimate, Disability, 15J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
357, 359 (1998) (analyzing "the definition of a disability under the ADA, focusing on why
asymptomatic individuals with the HIV virus qualify as disabled"); Robert C. Mathes, Note,
The Status of Persons Infected with Asymptomatic HIV Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 After Bragdon-Did the Supreme Court Miss an Opportunity to Protect Disabled Americans?
Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 1196 (1998), 34 LAND & WATER L. REv. 237, 256-61 (1999)
(examining the impact of Bragdon v. Abbott upon individuals who seek protection under
the ADA); Alison A. Satchwill, Note, Asymptomatic HIV and The Americans with Disabilities Act:
Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Maryland, N.A., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc), 66
U. CIN. L. REv. 1387, 1388, 1408-10 (1998) (discussing the Fourth Circuit's holding in
Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Maryland, N.A., which found that a plaintiff's asymptomatic
"HIV infection did not constitute a disability under the ADA," and analyzing the case's
subsequent impact on classifying a person with a "disability" under the ADA); Anupa Soni-
Gohel, Note, Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Maryland: Asymptomatic HVFinds No Refuge in
the Fourth Circuit's Workplace, 8 TEMPLE POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 243, 245 (1998) (examining
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Runnebaum and "explor[ing] the consequences of the Run-
nebaum holding on individuals who are perceived as having a debilitating disease in society
but not in a legal forum").
11. See Susan M. Gibson, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act Protects Individuals with
a History of Cancer From Employment Discrimination: Myth or Reality?, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EM-
PLOYMENT LJ. 167, 168 (1998) (arguing that "judicial interpretation of the ADA has not
provided the desired protection the Act was intended to afford the cancer survivor"); Bar-
bara Hoffman, Cancer Survivors'Emplyment and Insurance Rights at the Turn of the Century: A
Primer for Oncologists, 13 ONCOLOGY 841, 841 (1999) [hereinafter Hoffman, A Primer for
Oncologists] (reviewing "the problems faced by cancer survivors in obtaining and keeping
adequate employment and health insurance, explain [ing] the legal rights of survivors, and
suggest[ing] ways that survivors and their caregivers can advocate for their rights").
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has a significantly greater impact on our population. Almost ten times
as many Americans have a cancer history than are infected with HIV.12
In addition, far more Americans die from cancer than from AIDS. 13
Most of the 8,200,000 cancer survivors14 are considered by their
oncologists to be cured, while a minority are still receiving cancer
treatment. 15 More than 1,200,000 Americans will be diagnosed16 with
and approximately 563,100 Americans will die17 from cancer in 1999.
Earlier articles have analyzed the employment rights of cancer survivors under the
Federal Rehabilitation Act and under various other federal statutes and state laws. See Bar-
bara Hoffman, Employment Discrimination Based on Cancer Histoy: The Need for Federal Legisla-
tion, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 1, 9-21 (1986) [hereinafter Hoffman, The Need for Federal Legislation]
(examining how the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and state law apply to discrimination based
on a history of cancer); Lisa Bazemore, Note, Employment Discrimination Against Cancer Vic-
tims: A Proposed Solution, 31 ViLL. L. REv. 1549, 1551-56 (1986) (discussing the Federal
Rehabilitation Act as a possible protection for "cancer victims faced with discriminatory
practices"); Laura Canfield, Note, Cancer Patients' Prognosis: How Terminal Are Their Employ-
ment Prospects?, 38 SYRAcusE L. REv. 801, 808-18 (1987) (examining legislative and judicial
responses to employment related discrimination against those who have been treated for
cancer); Kenneth J. Galvin, Note, Cancer as a Protected Handicap in Illinois: Lyons v. Heri-
tage House Restaurants, Inc., 89 III. 2d 163, 432 N.E.2d 270 (1982), 60 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
715, 716 (1984) (discussing "whether cancer of the uterus and, by implication, all forms of
cancer, should be considered a 'handicap' within the meaning of the Illinois Constitution
and statutes"); Carin J. Sigel, Comment, Legal Recourse for the Cancer Patient-Returnee: The
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 309, 309-10 (1984) (discussing how the Fed-
eral Rehabilitation Act of 1973 protects "'cancer patient-returnees' who are well enough to
return to work"); Katherine J. Streicher, Note, Cancer-Based Employment Discrimination:
Whether the Proposed Amendment to Title VII Will Provide An Effective Anti-Discrimination Remedy,
62 IND. L.J. 827, 828-36 (1987) (advocating "for an amendment to Title VII to protect the
employee with a cancer history, and . . attempt[ing] to set out an effective standard for
determining how discrimination should be defined").
12. In 1998, in North America, 890,000 people were infected with HIV. See Lawrence
K. Altman, Dismaying Experts, H.L.V. Infections Soar, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1998, at F3. In
1998, approximately 8,200,000 Americans had a cancer history. See CANCER FAcrs &
FIGOuRs-1999, supra note 3, at 1. Approximately 40,000 new cases of AIDS were diagnosed
in 1997. See Steven A. Holmes, AIDS Deaths in U.S. Drop by Nearly Half as Infections Go On,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1998, at Al. During the same period, the American Cancer Society
projected that more than one million Americans would be diagnosed with cancer. See
AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, CANCER FAcrs & FIGURES-1998, at 4 (1998) [hereinafter CANCER
FAcrS & FIGURES-1998].
13. In 1997, 16,865 Americans died from AIDS. See Holmes, supra note 12, at Al. Dur-
ing this same time span, more than 500,000 people died from cancer. See AMERICAN CAN-
CER SOCIETY, CANCER FAcrs & FIGURES-1997, at 1 (1997) [hereinafter CANCER FACTS &
FIGuRES-1997]. In 1997, the death rate from AIDS was 5.9 deaths per 100,000, Holmes,
supra note 12, at Al, compared with approximately 25,000 deaths per 100,000 from cancer.
See CANCER FACTS & FIGURS-1997, supra, at 1.
14. See CANCER FACTS & FIGuRis-1999, supra note 3, at 1.
15. See id.
16. See id. Note that these estimates do not include basal and squamous cell skin can-
cer and noninvasive cancer of any site except urinary bladder. See id.
17. Id.
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Cancer is second only to heart disease as the leading cause of death in
the United States.' 8
Unlike AIDS, the relative survival rate19 for many cancers has im-
proved significantly during the past thirty years. Currently, the five-
year relative survival rate for all cancers combined is sixty percent.
20
Survival rates have increased every decade. 21
This Article demonstrates that the ADA, the regulations that in-
terpret the ADA, and the ADA's legislative history require federal
courts to consider most cancer survivors as individuals with a disability
under the ADA. The employment problems faced by cancer survivors
are discussed in Part I. The legislative history of, statutory definitions
in, and regulations that interpret the ADA are described in Part II.
Part III reviews federal court decisions brought by cancer survivors
prior to Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,22 the second case in which the
United States Supreme Court reviewed the ADA. Part IV analyzes the
impact of the United States Supreme Court's five rulings that inter-
pret the employment discrimination provisions of the ADA. Finally,
Part V suggests strategies for cancer survivors, who bring ADA claims,
to avoid the Catch-22 and to establish a prima facie case that they have
a disability as defined by the Act.
I. EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS FACED BY CANCER SURVIVORS
A. The Scope of Cancer-Based Employment Discrimination
Working-age survivors find that their cancer experience detri-
mentally affects their employment opportunities.2" Job problems re-
sult not only from the physical results of cancer and of treatment side
effects, but from illegal job discrimination as well. Typical remarks of
18. See id. Approximately one of every four deaths in the United States is from cancer.
See id.
19. See id. at 1-2. The American Cancer Society defines the relative survival rate as:
the survival rate observed for a group of cancer patients compared to the survival
rate for persons in the general population who are similar to the patient group
with respect to age, gender, race, and calendar year of observation. Relative sur-
vival adjusts for normal life expectancy (factors such as dying of heart disease,
accidents, and diseases of old age).
Id.
20. See id. at 2.
21. See ARTHUR I. HOLLEB, THE AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY CANCER BOOK xvii (1986)
(explaining that in the 1930s, only one of five Americans diagnosed with cancer survived
five or more years; in the 1940s, one of four survived as long; in the 1960s, one of three
survived five or more years).
22. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
23. See generally Betty Ferrell et al., Quality of Life Among Long-Term Cancer Survivors, 11
ONCOLOGY 565, 567-68 (1997) (discussing the "long-term impact of cancer on . .. work").
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a bone marrow transplant survivor-"I have not been able to return to
work and must depend on my wife to support our family"24 -illus-
trate the far-reaching impact of cancer. Some employers and co-work-
ers treat cancer survivors differently from other workers. Cancer
survivors frequently report such workplace problems as "dismissal, fail-
ure to hire, demotion, denial of promotion, undesirable transfer, de-
nial of benefits, and hostility in the workplace." 25
Nearly two decades of studies have documented the problems
that cancer survivors face at work because of their cancer histories. 26
One five-year study of cancer-related employment discrimination
against white- and blue-collar workers and against young people 27 re-
ported that more than one-half of the participants in each group had
experienced work problems due to their cancer histories.28 All of the
participants experienced anxiety over potential reactions by employ-
ers and by fellow employees to their medical histories.2 9 Approxi-
mately one-quarter were fired from their old jobs, or rejected from
24. Betty Ferrell et al., The Meaning of Quality of Lifefor Bone Marrow Transplant Survivors,
Part 2: Improving Quality of Life for Bone Marrow Transplant Survivors, 15 CANCER NURSING
247, 250 (1992).
25. Hoffman, Working it Out: Your Employment Rights, in CANCER SURVIVOR'S ALMANAC,
supra note 2, at 208.
26. For a discussion of underlying reasons for cancer-based discrimination and its ef-
fects, see Employment Discrimination Against Cancer Victims and the Handicapped: Hearings on
H.R. 370 and H.R. 1294, Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm.
on Educ. and Labor, 99th Cong. 15 (1985) (statement of Robert J. McKenna, President,
American Cancer Society) [hereinafter Statement of RobertJ. McKenna] (reporting that
individual misconceptions and various social attitudes, as a result of cancer, impact both
the employer and the employee). Dr. McKenna noted that three classifications of work-
related discrimination exist: (1) dismissal, demotion, and reduction or elimination of
work-related benefits; (2) problems arising from coworkers' attitudes; and (3) problems
relating to the cancer patients' attitudes about how they should be perceived by coworkers
resulting in alienation and avoidance by others. Id. at 19 (citation omitted).
27. See Hoffman, The Need for Federal Legislation, supra note 11, at 1, 3 (discussing Fran-
ces Feldman, In Support of the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act of 1985 (H.R.
1294): Some Justification from Research 1 (June 6, 1985)) (quoting participant in Ameri-
can Cancer Society study on workers diagnosed with cancer) (unpublished written testi-
mony submitted to the House Comm. on Education and Labor, Subcomm. on
Employment Opportunities summarizing research findings set forth in Work and Cancer
Health Histories (1982) (five-year study of the work experiences of 344 white-collar work-
ers, blue-collar workers, and youths with cancer histories)). Dr. Feldman's studies were
sponsored by the California Division of the American Cancer Society in response to alleged
incidents of discrimination, and were summarized in the proceedings of the 1982 Western
States Conference on Cancer Rehabilitation in San Francisco. See id. at 3 n. 11.
28. See id. at 3.
29. See id.
2000]
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new jobs, because of their cancer.3" A Stanford University study of
403 Hodgkin's disease survivors found that forty-two percent of the
survivors experienced difficulties at work that they attributed to their
cancer histories.3 ' Childhood cancer survivors, in a similar study, re-
ported that they experienced job refusals, denied benefits, and con-
flicts with supervisors.3 2
Despite significant gains in cancer survival rates and the passage
of federal legislation, such as the ADA, to outlaw disability-based dis-
crimination, cancer survivors still experience barriers to equal job op-
portunities. One 1996 survey questioned 500 cancer survivors who
were employed at the time of their treatment, 100 supervisors, and
100 co-workers.33 The results showed that workers with cancer re-
ported being fired or being laid off at five times the rate of other
workers in the United States (7% vs. 1.3%). 4 A follow-up survey of
662 employed adult Americans who had not been diagnosed with can-
cer found that forty percent worried about losing their jobs if they
were diagnosed with cancer.3 ' Their fear of discrimination was so
great that twenty percent would not disclose their diagnosis to anyone
at work.36 Similarly, "a survey of Hodgkin's disease and leukemia sur-
vivors indicated that more than one-third attributed at least one nega-
tive vocational (employment, income, or education) problem to their
cancer."37
30. See id. Dr. Feldman found that 54% of white-collar respondents described work
problems that they attributed to cancer; 84% of the blue-collar respondents identified such
work problems, and 51% of the youth reported discrimination at work or school. Id. at 7.
31. See Patricia Fobair et al., Psychosocial Problems Among Survivors of Hodgkin's Disease, 4J.
CLINICAL ONCOLoG 805, 810 (1986). Fobair reported a variety ofjob problems including
"denial of insurance, 11%; denial of other benefits, 6%; not being offered a job, 12%;
termination of employment following therapy, 6%; conflicts with supervisors or co-workers,
12%; and rejection by the military, 8%." Id.
32. See GERALD KOOCHER & JOHN E. O'MALLEY, THE DAMOCLES SYNDROME:
PSYCHOSOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF SURVIVING CHILDHOOD CANCER 119-22, 124 (1981).
33. See Working Woman/AMGEN, Cancer in the Workplace Survey, 5 (conducted by
CBD Research & Consulting; random telephone survey of 500 survivors employed at time
of their treatment, 100 supervisors, and 100 co-workers in May 1996; published September
1996) (on file with author).
34. See id. at 1.
35. NCCS/Amgen, National Survey on Cancer & the Workplace (random telephone
survey of 662 employed adult Americans interviewed from June 13 to June 15, 1997) (on
file with author).
36. See id.
37. Hoffman, A Primer for Oncologists, supra note 11, at 841; see also A.B. Kornblith et al.,
Comparison of Psychosocial Adaptation of Advanced Stage Hodgkin's Disease and Acute Leukemia
Survivors, 9 ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY 297, 302 (1998) (providing study results that found that
36% of Hodgkin's disease survivors and 39% of leukemia survivors attributed a negative
socioeconomic impact to their cancer).
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One reason survivors legitimately fear discrimination at work is
because their supervisors and co-workers have misconceptions about
survivors' abilities to work during and after their cancer treatment.38
Of the 200 supervisors questioned in the 1996 survey, thirty-three per-
cent believed that the survivor could not handle the job and cancer,
and thirty-one percent thought that the employee needed to be re-
placed.3 1 Yet after working with a survivor, thirty-four percent of su-
pervisors and forty-three percent of co-workers said that they would be
less concerned about working with a survivor in the future.4" A 1992
survey of 200 supervisors found that sixty-six percent were concerned
that employees with cancer could no longer perform their jobs ade-
38. Three predominant myths about cancer influence survivors' employment opportu-
nities. One myth is that cancer is a death sentence. See Statement of RobertJ. McKenna,
supra note 26, at 16 (noting that because cancer is a life-threatening illness, "some individu-
als expect a fatal outcome even though the prognosis may be excellent"). The impact of
the death sentence myth is that employers are hesitant to invest in an individual whom they
believe will die imminently; insurance companies increase rates or refuse to insure at all,
banks deny loans, and society disallows long-term planning on the assumption of a short-
term life. Yet, the five-year relative survival rate for all cancers combined is 60%. See CAN-
CER FACTS & FiGuREs-1999, supra note 12, at 2.
A second myth is that cancer is contagious. See Abby L. Wasserman et al., The Psychoso-
logical Status of Survivors of Childhood/Adolescent Hodgkin's Disease, 141 A.J.D.C. 626, 628-29
(1987) (noting that one subject in an interview survey of survivors of childhood Hodgkin's
disease was "transferred from his job in a hotel kitchen for fear that he might 'contami-
nate' the food"); Statement of Robert J. McKenna, supra note 26, at 16 (noting that
"[a] Ithough no scientific evidence exists that cancer is contagious, fear that it might be is
sometimes a concern of fellow employees, employers and even friends and neighbors").
The impact of the contagious myth is that fellow workers physically and emotionally isolate
those with cancer, and employers succumb to co-workers' demands to fire or to transfer
survivors. Yet, no type of cancer is contagious. See NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Pub. No. 84-2612, Cancer Prevention Research Summary:
Viruses 4 (1984) (demonstrating that "viral infections that increase the risk of cancer may
be contagious, but ... cancer itself is not").
A third myth is that cancer survivors are unproductive, costly workers. See Statement
of RobertJ. McKenna, supra note 26, at 16 (noting that "[s]ome employers have concerns
about productivity of the patient with cancer who is working"); Working Woman/AMGEN,
supra note 33, at 4 (indicating that "[o]ne in three (33 percent) expressed doubts about
the ability of the worker with cancer to handle his or her job and approximately the same
number (31 percent) felt the employee needed to be replaced"); NCCS/AMGEN, supra
note 35, at 1 (indicating that 27% of "American workers believe they would have to pick up
the slack for a co-worker with cancer"); see also infra notes 3944 and accompanying text
(discussing these concerns). Cancer survivors, however, have relatively the same productiv-
ity rates as other workers. See George M. Wheatley et al., The Employment of Persons with a
History of Treatment for Cancer, 33 CANCER 441, 445 (1974) (concluding that "the selective
hiring of persons who have been treated for cancer, in positions for which they are physi-
cally qualified, is a sound industrial practice"). For a more complete discussion of the
myths associated with cancer, see Hoffman, The Need for Federal Legislation, supra note 11, at
4-6.
39. Working Women/AMGEN, supra note 33, at 4.
40. See id.
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quately.4' Nearly one-half admitted that a current cancer diagnosis
would affect their decision to hire a qualified applicant.4 2 Of 662 em-
ployees surveyed in a 1997 study, fourteen percent believed that co-
workers with cancer probably would not be able to do their jobs.4 3
Twenty-seven percent of co-workers thought they would have to work
harder to pick up the slack.44
B. The Impact of Cancer-Based Employment Discrimination
Fighting a cancer diagnosis can be a full-time job. Few adults,
however, have the financial stability to abandon their employment
during and after their cancer treatment. Most survivors retain their
employment status not only for the obvious financial benefit, but also
for the accompanying health insurance, self-esteem, and social
support.
In cancer survivors' quality of life assessments, survivors stated
that being able to work full-time and having an "enjoyable" job con-
tribute to a better quality of life.45 Survivors reported that work pro-
vided not only an important source of emotional and financial
support, but also a "sense of normalcy."46 Others noted the sense of
control that work provided: "I think that the need to go back to work
or to stay at work depending on your treatment, is extremely impor-
tant.... I had at least control over that. I could go to work."47
The physical and emotional demands of cancer treatment make
it difficult for many survivors to work without at least temporary inter-
ruption to their previous employment schedules. Survivors of thyroid
cancer reported that "[w] ork productivity, concentration, and quality
changed dramatically" within a few weeks of going off their thyroid
hormone medication.48 Some literally had to be carried home from
41. SeeYankelovich Clancy Shulman, Cerenex Survey on Cancer Patients in the Work-
place: Breaking Down Discrimination Barriers 8 (1992) (unpublished survey, on file with
author).
42. See id. at 12.
43. See NCCS/AMGEN, supra note 35.
44. See id.
45. See Ferrell et al., supra note 24, at 249 (reporting that typically, bone marrow trans-
plant survivors found that "being able to work full time," and having an "enjoyable job"
improved their quality of life).
46. See Betty R. Ferrell et al., Quality of Life in Breast Cancer Survivors as Identified by Focus
Groups, 6 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 13, 20-21 (1997) ("The ability to continue working provided a
sense of normalcy and helped the women to overcome the physical effects of treatment in
order to maintain their employment and health care benefits.").
47. Id. at 21.
48. Karen Hassey Dow et al., Balancing Demands of Cancer Surveillance Among Survivors of
Thyroid Cancer, 5 CANCER PRAcc. 289, 294 (1997).
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work.4" Fatigue resulting from cancer treatment affects survivors'
work performance.5 ° One exhausted survivor commented, "I strug-
gled to maintain my part-time job with integrity, poised on the edge of
depression."51
Unlike at the beginning of the century, when cancer was a literal
death sentence,52 today, most survivors who are working-age return to
work.53 Helen Crothers's summary of several studies from the 1970s
and the 1980s concluded that eighty percent of employees returned to
work after being diagnosed with cancer.54 Physicians are now more
aware of cancer survivors' employment problems,55 offer more flexi-
49. See id.
50. See Betty R. Ferrell et al., "Bone Tired" The Experience of Fatigue and Its Impact on
Quality of Life, 23 ONCOLOGY NURSING F. 1539, 1545 (1996) (quoting several patients who
indicated problems with job performance due to cancer treatment fatigue).
51. Id.
52. See CANCER FACTS & FIGURES-1998, supra note 12, at 2 (noting that "[i]n the early
1900s, few cancer patients had any hope of long term survival").
53. A 1960s survey by the Bell Telephone System of more than 900,000 Bell employees
found that each year 1.67 employees per thousand had seven or more days of illness re-
lated to malignancy. See Richard W. Stone, Employing the Recovered CancerPatient, 36 CANCER
285, 285 (1975) (reporting that out of 1417 employees with cancer, 1346 "had an illness
lasting 7 days or more that was related to malignancy of some type"). Of those employed at
the time of their cancer diagnosis, 81.2% returned to work. See Hoffman, The Need for
Federal Legislation, supra note 11, at 4 n.16. Only 4.1% were permanently disabled, while
14.7% died of cancer before returning to work. See id. Another study by the Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company, conducted between 1959 and 1972, concluded that the work
performance of people who were treated for cancer differs little from that of others hired
at the same age for similar assignments. See id. (citing METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO.,
STATISTICAL BULLETIN 5-6 (1973)). When compared with other employees of the same age,
the turnover, the absence rates, and the work performance of the cancer patients were
satisfactory. See id. Additionally, "no employees hired after treatment for cancer died dur-
ing the observation period." See id.
54. See Barbara Hoffman, Cancer Survivors at Work: Job Problems and Illegal Discrimination,
16 ONCOLOGY NURSING F. 39, 40 (1989) (discussing Helen Crothers, Employment Problems of
Cancer Survivors: Local Program and Local Solutions 51-57, in AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY-. PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE WORKSHOP ON EMPLOYMENT, INSURANCE AND THE PATIENT WITH CANCER
(New Orleans, LA: American Cancer Society, Inc., 1986)). Other studies found similar
return-to-work rates after diagnosis. See Stone, supra note 53, at 286 (reporting that, over-
all, 77% of Bell employees returned to work after diagnosis); Hoffman, supra, at 39 (dis-
cussing Vincent Mor, Work Loss, Insurance Coverage, and Financial Burden Among Cancer
Patients 5-10, in AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY. PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKSHOP ON EMPLOY-
MENT, INSURANCE, AND THE PATIENCE WITH CANCER (New Orleans, LA: American Cancer
Society, Inc., 1986) (reporting that 78% of white-collar workers and 63% of blue-collar
workers remained in their jobs twelve months post-diagnosis)). The Crothers, Mor, and
Stone studies are discussed more extensively in Hoffman, supra, at 40.
55. For example, Dr. Anna T. Meadows, "the first" Director of the Office of Cancer
Survivorship, National Cancer Institute in Bethesda, Maryland, has discussed the economic
outcomes of cancer survivorship and has recognized the need for data on the "indirect cost
of cancer survivorship, including lost work and wages." Anna T. Meadows, Cancer Survivors:
Future Clinical and Research Issues, in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY EDUCA-
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ble out-patient treatment to accommodate work schedules,56 and have
an improved medical arsenal with which to combat the side effects of
cancer, such as risk of infection, nausea, and hair loss. 57
Some employers erect unnecessary and sometimes illegal barriers
to survivors' job opportunities. Personnel decisions are usually driven
by economic factors, not by charitable or by personal considerations.
While some employers fear lost productivity, others, especially smaller
employers, face increased costs due to insurance expenses.58 Supervi-
TIONAL BOOK 115, 116 (1998). According to Dr. Meadows, "[t]he Office of Cancer Survi-
vorship (OCS) was established to develop and promote a research and clinical agenda that
considered the gaps in our current knowledge concerning the issues facing [cancer] survi-
vors." Id. at 115.
56. As cancer survivors have become greater advocates for themselves, healthcare prov-
iders have responded to their demands for greater flexibility in scheduling medical care.
See generally Elizabeth J. Clark & Ellen L. Stovall, Advocacy: The Cornerstone of Cancer Survivor-
ship, 4 CANCER PRAc. 239, 243 (1996) (noting the "changes in health care [for cancer pa-
tients]-such as shortened lengths of hospital stays, increased ambulatory and homecare
services").
57. See Patricia Ganz, Understanding Cancer, Its Treatment, and the Side Effects of Treatment,
in CANCER SURVIVOR'S ALMANAC, supra note 2, at 3, 12-23 (providing an extensive review of
the various symptoms and side effects of cancer and offering various methods of treatment
for these symptoms and side effects).
58. See, e.g., infra note 177 and accompanying text (explaining how in Hirsch v. National
Mall & Service, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 977 (W.D. Ill. 1997), the defendant employer feared that
their insurance costs would rise as a result of their employee's cancer). In all respects,
cancer is one of the most expensive diseases. Most survivors experience a significant in-
crease in monthly expenses because of their cancer. See Vincent Mor et al., The Role of
Concrete Services in Cancer Care, 18 ADVANCES PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 102, 104 (1988) (noting
that with cancer care "[f] inancial deprivations accumulate as out-of-pocket expenditures
for insurance deductibles and copayments are required, medication costs increase, and as
income losses due to sickness having a growing impact on family financial resources").
One commentator noted that the costs of cancer treatment can be so overwhelming that
some families may have to choose between treatment and food. See Rose Mary Carroll-
Johnson, Editorial, Long Days and Full Shopping Bags, 23 ONCOLOGY NURSING F. 585, 585
(1996) ("We know that patients sometimes must choose between buying treatments and
buying food.").
Some survivors are forced to continue working, despite severe illness, to maintain
health insurance to pay for cancer treatment. See Betty R. Ferrell, The Quality of Lives:
1,525 Voices of Cancer, 23 ONCOLOGY NURSING F. 909, 912 (1996) (noting that "[e]conomic
factors have forced cancer survivors to maintain employment despite severe illness and
devastating treatment"). One ovarian cancer survivor commented on the plight of other
women she knew with ovarian cancer: "Women's stories of how they work a 40-hour week,
take chemo on Friday night, throw up or feel queasy all weekend between doing house-
hold chores and child care, and then go to work on Monday, as if they had a restful week-
end, are frightening." Id. Insurance companies, which often seem to prioritize cost
controls over appropriate medical care, readily pass on the expenses of cancer treatment
to policyholders. See Kimberly Calder & Irene C. Card, Straight Talk about Insurance and
Health Plans, in CANCER SURVIVOR'S ALMANAC, supra note 2, at 167, 168. As a result, many
employers who offer health insurance to their employees fear that their premiums will
increase. See Hoffman, Working it Out: Your Employment Rights, in CANCER SURVIVOR'S ALMA-
NAC, supra note 2, at 205, 209.
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sors worry about the psychological impact of a survivor's cancer his-
tory on other employees.59 Congress designed the ADA to replace
these raw economic considerations with a carefully calibrated ap-
proach under which disabled employees must be accommodated un-
less the accommodation imposes an undue burden on the employer.
Hopefully, cancer-based employment discrimination6 ° will de-
crease as more employers provide survivors reasonable accommoda-
tions and treat them based on their individual abilities instead of
misconceptions and fears. Employers, however, are unlikely to be so
altruistic of their own accord. Eliminating survivors' barriers to equal
job opportunities will require federal courts' uniform enforcement of
the ADA, public education about cancer survivorship, and construc-
tive public and personal advocacy by cancer survivors.
II. CANCER AS A DISABILITY UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT
A. The Purpose of the ADA
Prior to 1990, the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provided
the only federal remedy to disability-based employment discrimina-
tion.6 The Rehabilitation Act, however, failed to protect most per-
sons with disabilities because it covered only persons who are
employed by a "program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
59. See Susan J. Mellette, The Cancer Patient at Work, 35 CANCER J. FOR CLINICLANs 360,
364 (1985) (noting that "[s]pecific problems, such as coworker attitudes toward the pa-
tient, were recognized by... employer[s] as a source of trouble"); see also Hoffman, The
Need for Federal Legislation, supra note 11, at 6 (noting that "[t] he misconception that cancer
patients or former cancer patients are an unproductive drain on their companies and fel-
low employees is based in part on the erroneous beliefs that cancer is always fatal and that
people with a cancer history are not productive or reliable" (citing Grace Powers Monaco,
Socioeconomic Considerations in Childhood Cancer Survival: Society's Obligations 8
(Apr. 1985) (unpublished manuscript)).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A). As defined by the ADA, "discrimination" includes:
"not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of
an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless
such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity." Id. (emphasis added).
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-7976 (1994).
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ance."62 Congress closed this gap in 1990 with the passage of the
ADA.
63
When President George Bush signed the ADA, he suggested that
it would bring an "end to the unjustified segregation and exclusion of
persons with disabilities from the mainstream of American life."6 4 As
discussed in Part III of this Article,6 5 President Bush's bold optimism
has not been realized. In the introduction to the ADA, Congress
found that, even in 1990, many Americans with disabilities had little
recourse for employment discrimination. 66
In passing the ADA, Congress recognized that the then existing
legislation, such as the Federal Rehabilitation Act and the state civil
rights laws, failed to ensure that most private sector employees had a
legal remedy for disparate treatment. The House of Representatives
reported:
As in Section 504 [of the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973],
the ADA adopts a framework for employment selection pro-
cedures which is designed to assure that persons with disabil-
ities are not excluded from job opportunities unless they are
actually unable to do the job. The requirement that job cri-
teria actually measure the ability required by the job is a criti-
cal protection against discrimination based on disability. As
was made strikingly clear during the hearings on the ADA,
stereotypes and misconceptions about the abilities, or more
62. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994) (stating that "no otherwise qualified individual with a
disability in the United States... shall solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance"); see also Consolidated
Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1984) (holding that the Rehabilitation Act
applies to federally supported programs regardless of whether the primary objective of the
program or federal financial assistance is to promote employment).
63. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994); infra note 68 (providing the articulated pur-
pose of the ADA).
64. Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 1990 PUB. PAPERS
1070, 1071 (July 26, 1990).
65. See infra notes 116406 and accompanying text.
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (articulating the findings of Congress). Congress found:
[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabili-
ties, and despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem;...
discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as
employment; [and] . . .unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination
on the basis of race, color, sex, national original, religion, or age, individuals who
have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal
recourse to redress such discrimination.
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correctly the inabilities, of persons with disabilities are still
pervasive today.67
Consequently, Congress intended that the ADA provide a clear man-
date against, and adequate remedies for, disability-based employment
discrimination.68
B. Definitions in the ADA and Supporting Regulations
1. Statutory Definitions. -Title I of the ADA, which prohibits em-
ployment discrimination, provides that "[n] o covered entity shall dis-
criminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the
disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee com-
pensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment."69 A "qualified individual with a disability" is one "who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires."70
The ADA provides three alternative definitions of a disability:
"(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impair-
ment."71 The statute does not define the term "impairment." To
prove that he or she is a "qualified individual with a disability," a plain-
tiff must prove that he or she not only has a physical or mental impair-
67. H.R. REP. 101-485, pt. 2, at 71 (1990), reprinted in I COMMITEE ON EDUC. AND LA-
BOR, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 101ST CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW
101-336, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, VOL. 1, at 344 (1990) [hereinafter I LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT].
68. The purpose of the ADA is:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrim-
ination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the
standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to en-
force the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address
the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).
69. Id. § 12112(a).
70. Id. § 12111(8).
71. Id. § 12102(2). This three-part definition is the same definition of a "handicapped
individual" set forth in the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (B)
(1994). Congress explicitly intended the ADA to provide standards no less than "the stan-
dards applied under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act . . .or the regulations issued by
Federal agencies pursuant to such tide." 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (a).
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ment, but that the impairment substantially limits a major life
activity.
72
An employer "discriminates" against an employee if the employer
fails to make "reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability
who is an applicant or employee, unless . . . [the employer] can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hard-
ship on the operation of.. . business."7 3 Reasonable accommodations
include, but are not limited to, "making existing facilities... accessi-
ble[,] . . .job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, [and] acquisition or modification
of equipment or devices."74
2. Code of Federal Regulations.-The EEOC regulations that gov-
ern the ADA further define these terms. The definitions of the first
two terms, "physical or mental impairment" and "major life activity,"
which are relevant to this Article, are relatively straightforward. A
"physical or mental impairment" is any physiological disorder that af-
fects a major body system. 75 A "major life activity" is a function "such
as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hear-
ing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."76
The definition of "substantially limits" is far more complex and
problematic.
(1) The term substantially limits means:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular
72. See id. § 12102(2) (A).
73. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
74. Id. § 12111(9)(A), (B).
75. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1999). Physical or mental impairment means:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or ana-
tomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), car-
diovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin,
and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, or-
ganic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities.
Id.
76. Id. § 1630.2(i) (emphasis added). But see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct.
2139, 2151 (1999) (noting that "there may be some conceptual difficulty in defining 'ma-
jor life activities' to include work"). Cf infra notes 457-490 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Sutton decision).
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major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or
duration under which the average person in the general
population can perform that same major life activity.
(2) The following factors should be considered in determin-
ing whether an individual is substantially limited in a major
life activity:
(i) The nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment;
and
(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected
permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the
impairment.77
The regulations provide more guidance to evaluate whether an
individual's ability to work is substantially limited by an impairment
than whether other major life activities are so limited. The inability to
perform one specific job is insufficient to be a "substantial" limita-
tion. 7' Rather, to have a substantial limitation, one must be unable to
perform an entire class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in different
classes.79 Additionally, "in determining whether an individual is sub-
stantially limited in the major life activity of 'working,"' a court may
consider three other factors, which focus on realistically available eco-
nomic opportunities, to determine whether an individual's ability to
work is substantially limited."
77. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)-(2).
78. See id. § 1630.2(j) (3) (i).
79. See id. The EEOC states:
(3) With respect to the major life activity of working-
(i) The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to
perform either a class ofjobs or a broad range ofjobs in various classes as com-
pared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The
inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limi-
tation in the major life activity of working.
Id.
80. See id. § 1630.2(j) (3) (ii) (A)-(C). These three factors are the following:
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access;
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an
impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowl-
edge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is
also disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an
impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar train-
ing, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the
individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (broad range ofjobs in
various classes).
Id.; see also Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2151 (1999) (discussing and
interpreting the EEOC's definition of "substantially limits" to mean that "one must be pre-
cluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice,"
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C. References in the Regulations and in the Legislative History to Cancer-
Based Employment Discrimination
1. EEOC Compliance Manual.-Although the text of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act does not explicitly mention the word "can-
cer," the EEOC's Compliance Manual (Manual), first issued in
January 1992 to supplement the federal regulations, makes specific
references to how the ADA applies to cancer-based discrimination. 8 1
The ADA authorizes the EEOC to issue regulations to implement Title
I of the Act that illustrate how the statute applies to specific circum-
stances.8 2 The Manual provides examples of how cancer is contem-
plated in the definitions "disability" and "reasonable accommodation."
The Manual makes six references to cancer in explaining the fac-
tors that determine whether an individual has a "disability" as defined
by the ADA. First, the Manual notes that the ADA is intended to cover
not only individuals with a visible disability, but those, such as some
cancer survivors, who have a "hidden" disability.8" Second, in defin-
ing what types of medical conditions may substantially limit a major
life activity, the Manual states that "most forms of heart disease and
cancer fall into this category."8 4 Third, in defining a "record of a sub-
stantially limiting condition,"8 5 the Manual recognizes "former cancer
and stating that "if a host of different types ofjobs are available, one is not precluded from
a broad range of jobs").
81. The Equal Employment Opportunities Commission amended 29 C.F.R. § 1630,
Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, to include the "EEOC Compliance Manual: A Technical Assistance Manual on
the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the Americans with Disabilities Act-Appendix B:
EEOC Title I Regulations and Interpretive Appendix" (Jan. 1992). The EEOC regularly
issues updates.
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (stating that "the Commission [EEOC] shall issue regulations
in an accessible format to carry out this subchapter"); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624, 647 (1998) (noting in a parenthetical that 42 U.S.C. § 12116 authorizes the "EEOC to
issue regulations implementing Title I").
83. According to the Manual,
[t]he ADA's provisions concerning medical examinations and disability-related
inquiries reflect the intent of Congress to prevent discrimination against individu-
als with 'hidden' disabilities such as epilepsy, diabetes, mental illnesses, heart dis-
ease, HIV infection/AIDS, and cancer. The guiding principle of these provisions is
that while employers may ask applicants about the ability to perform job func-
tions, employers may not ask about disability at the pre-offer stage.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE
EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE 1) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES AcT 11-6903 (1995)
[hereinafter 1995 EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL] (emphasis added).
84. Id. at II-§ 902.4 (emphasis added).
85. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1999) (stating that "a record of such impairment means
[that the individual] has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or
physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities").
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patients"" as being covered by the ADA.8 7 Fourth, the Manual con-
siders an individual who has a genetic marker for cancer as an exam-
ple of an individual who is covered by the ADA because she is
"regarded as having a substantially limiting impairment. "88 Fifth, be-
cause cancer survivors are protected under the ADA, the Manual
states that employers may not screen out cancer survivors in the hiring
process: 8 9
The ADA prohibits medical inquiries or medical examina-
tions before making a conditional job offer to an applicant.
This prohibition is necessary because the results of such in-
quiries and examination frequently are used to exclude peo-
ple with disabilities from jobs they are able to perform.
Many employers currently use a pre-employment medical
questionnaire, a medical history, or a pre-employment medi-
cal examination as one step in a several-step selection pro-
cess. Where this is so, an individual who has a 'hidden'
disability such as diabetes, epilepsy, heart disease, cancer, or
mental illness, and who is rejected for a job, frequently does
not know whether the reason for rejection was information
revealed by the medical exam or inquiry (which may not
have any relation to this person's ability to do the job), or
whether the rejection was based on some other aspect of the
selection process.
86. Cf id. app. § 1630.2(k) ("The intent of this provision, in part, is to ensure that
people are not discriminated against because of a history of disability. For example, this
provision protects former cancer patients from discrimination based on their prior medical
history." (emphasis added)). See infra text accompanying notes 100-102.
87. The Manual states that the "[r ] ecord of a substantially limiting condition" refers to
.people with a history of cancer, heart disease, or other debilitating illness, whose illnesses
are either cured, controlled or in remission." EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMIS-
SION, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE 1) OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Ar 11-2.2(b) (1992) [hereinafter 1992 EEOC TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL] (emphasis added).
88. The Manual provides an illustrative example:
CP's genetic profile reveals an increased susceptibility to colon cancer. CP is cur-
rently asymptomatic and may never in fact develop colon cancer. After making
CP a conditional offer of employment R learns about CP's increased susceptibility
to colon cancer. R then withdraws the job offer because of concerns about mat-
ters such as CP's productivity, insurance costs, and attendance. R is treating CP as
having an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.
1995 EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 83, at II-§ 902.8.
89. See 1992 EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 87, at II-§ 2.2(b) (claim-
ing that the "record of substantially limiting condition" protects, for example, "people with
a history of cancer").
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A history of such rejections has discouraged many people
with disabilities from applying for jobs, because of fear that
they will automatically be rejected when their disability is re-
vealed by a medical examination. The ADA is designed to
remove this barrier to employment.90
Finally, the Manual recognizes that how a person contracts cancer is
irrelevant to determining whether she is a person with a disability.9'
Additionally, the Manual cites to cancer in two examples that ex-
plain what types of reasonable accommodations are required by the
ADA. In an illustration of flex-time as an accommodation, the Manual
states that cancer survivors are entitled to reasonable modifications in
their work schedules to accommodate the side effects of cancer treat-
ment. 2 In an example of the impact of coworkers' attitudes towards
individuals with disabilities, the Manual instructs that an employer
may not discriminate against an employee on the basis that other em-
ployees react negatively to the employee because of the employee's
90. Id. at II-§ 6.3 (emphasis added). The Manual also recognizes the dilemma some
cancer survivors face in applying for a new job if their cancer affected their performance at
a previous job:
If an applicant has had a poor attendance record on a previous job, s/he may
wish to provide an explanation that includes information related to a disability,
but the employer should not ask whether a poor attendance record was due to
illness, accident or disability. For example, an applicant might wish to disclose
voluntarily that the previous absence record was due to surgery for a medical
condition that is now corrected, treatment for cancer that is now in remission or to
adjust medication for epilepsy, but that s/he is now fully able to meet all job
requirements.
Id. at § 5.5(f), at V-15 (emphasis added).
91. The Manual states:
Voluntariness is irrelevant when determining whether a condition constitutes an
impairment. For example, an individual who develops lung cancer as a result of
smoking has an impairment, not withstanding the fact that some apparently voli-
tional act of the individual may have caused the impairment. The cause of a con-
dition has no effect on whether that condition is an impairment.
1995 EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 83, at II-§ 902.2 (emphasis added).
92. The Manual provides the following example:
38. Must an employer provide a reasonable accommodation that is needed be-
cause of the side effects of medication or treatment related to the disability, or
because of symptoms or other medical conditions resulting from the underlying
disability?
Yes. The side effects caused by the medication that an employee must take
because of the disability are limitations resulting from the disability. Reasonable
accommodation extends to all limitations resulting from a disability.
Example A: An employee with cancer undergoes chemotherapy twice a week,
which causes her to be quite ill afterwards. The employee requests a modified
schedule-leave for the two days a week of chemotherapy. The treatment will last
six weeks. Unless it can show undue hardship, the employer must grant this
request.
See 1999 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 915.002.
370
2000] BETWEEN A DISABILITY AND A HARD PLACE
cancer history.9" The EEOC's eight specific references to cancer in
the Manual support the conclusion that Congress, by delegating regu-
latory authority to the EEOC, intended the ADA to prohibit cancer-
based employment discrimination.
2. References in the Legislative History to Cancer-Based Employment
Discrimination.-The legislative history to the ADA further confirms
that Congress intended the ADA to prohibit cancer-based employ-
ment discrimination.94 The House and the Senate subcommittees
held numerous hearings on the ADA throughout 1988 and 1989,"5
which included testimony on the need for federal legislation to pro-
hibit cancer-based discrimination.
Mary DeSapio, a breast cancer survivor, testified before the Sen-
ate Committee on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcommit-
tee on the Handicapped on May 9, 1989.96 DeSapio told the
Subcommittee of the discrimination that challenged her "road to re-
93. Id. The Manual states:
An employer cannot claim undue hardship based on employees' (or customers')
fears or prejudices toward the individual's disability. Nor can undue hardship be
based on the fact that provision of a reasonable accommodation might have a
negative impact on the morale of other employees. Employers, however, may be
able to show undue hardship where provision of a reasonable accommodation
would be unduly disruptive to other employee's ability to work.
Example A: An employee with breast cancer is undergoing chemotherapy. As
a consequence of the treatment, the employee is subject to fatigue and finds it
difficult to keep up with her regular workload. So that she may focus her reduced
energy on performing her essential functions, the employer transfers three of her
marginal functions to another employee for the duration of the chemotherapy
treatments. The second employee is unhappy at being given extra assignments,
but the employer determines that the employee can absorb the new assignments
with little effect on his ability to perform his own assignments in a timely manner.
Since the employer cannot show significant disruption to its operation, there is
no undue hardship.
Id.
94. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990) reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, supra note 67, at 324 (noting that "[i]t is not possi-
ble to include in the legislation a list of all the specific conditions, diseases, or infections
that would constitute physical or mental impairments because of the difficulty of ensuring
the comprehensiveness of such a list" and clarifying, however, that under the ADA, the
term "disability" does "include[ ] .. .such conditions, diseases and infections as: ... can-
cer" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also infta notes 106-114 and accompanying
text (discussing the final ADA Reports of the House and of the Senate).
95. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 24-28 (1990), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, supra note 67, at 297-301 (recognizing the vari-
ous hearings that the House Subcommittee on Select Education and the Subcommittee on
Employment Opportunities held regarding the ADA).
96. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933, Before the Subcomm. on the
Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong. (1989) (state-
ment of Mary DeSapio), reprinted in BERNARD D. REAMS ET AL., 2 DISABILITY LAW IN THE
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covery," an experience that she acknowledged was not unique.97
DeSapio stated:
I became employed on a full-time basis as vice president
in charge of transportation by Josephthal and Company,
Inc., on March 11, 1987. On January 29, 1988, I was diag-
nosed as having breast cancer. I immediately informed my
superior at Josephthal. On February 1st, I was hospitalized
for treatment, a lumpectomy and auxiliary nodes were ex-
cised. My superiors knew that my recovery would take about
a month. During my recuperation I would report daily by
phone, even while I was in the hospital, to advise my clients
as to market strategy. After I returned home, I often
dropped by the office to pick up mail and work on any ur-
gent matters.
One month later, on March 1st, I returned to
Josephthal, ready to resume my life and my employment on
a full-time basis. I scheduled my radiation treatments at the
earliest possible time in the morning so that they would not
interfere with my daily work schedule. My superiors were
aware of this treatment schedule. Immediately upon my re-
turn I was asked to attend a meeting with the director of Re-
search and the Senior Vice President. At that meeting I was
told that I was terminated, effective immediately. They told
me that I was no longer needed. 98
Describing the stigmatizing effect of cancer, DeSapio stated: "I
feel like I have been unfairly branded for life. Cancer does not
discriminate."99
In addition to DeSapio's testimony, the subcommittee accepted
written testimony from the National Coalition for Cancer Survivor-
ship, a national advocacy organization, which detailed the need for
federal legislation.1 °° This testimony cited studies that documented
UNITED STATES: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr OF 1990,
PUBLIC LAW 101-336, at 24 (1992) [hereinafter Statement of Mary DeSapiol.
97. See id. at 24, app. at 259 (stating "[mly story is not unique"); id. ("During my life-
time I have never experienced a more difficult and challenging road to recovery.").
98. Id. at 24-25, app. at 260.
99. Id. at 25, app. at 262.
100. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933, Before the Subcomm. on the
Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong. (1989) (state-
ment of Barbara Hoffman, vice president of the National Coalition for Cancer Survivor-
ship), reprinted in REAMS ET AL., supra note 96, at app. 383 [hereinafter Statement of the
National Coalition for Cancer Survivorship].
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employment discrimination against cancer survivors.' 1 The National
Coalition for Cancer Survivorship argued that, without the passage of
the ADA, cancer survivors would find an "inadequate patchwork" of
state laws that failed to address most instances of cancer-based employ-
ment discrimination. 02 In 1989, the employment discrimination laws
of twelve states10 protected only individuals who had an actual handi-
cap, and not those who were regarded as having a handicap or who
had a history of a handicap.1"4 The National Coalition for Cancer
Survivorship testified that the ADA was needed to fill this critical gap
in the civil rights laws to protect individuals who encountered employ-
ment discrimination solely because of their cancer histories, yet who
had no legal remedy because they are too healthy to be "handi-
capped" as defined by some statutes. 105
The final reports of both the House and the Senate illustrate how
the ADA would provide a remedy for cancer-based employment dis-
crimination.106 Both reports note that the law could not include an
exhaustive list of specific conditions that could be a physical impair-
ment "because of the difficulty of ensuring the comprehensiveness of
such a list, particularly in light of the fact that new disorders may de-
101. See id., app. at 383. For example, the testimony discussed "[s]tudies of the work
experience of cancer survivors [that] found that between 20% and 84% report employ-
ment discrimination attributed to their cancer histories." Id. (citation omitted).
102. Id. at 388. For example, the testimony discussed a lawsuit brought by Walter Ray
Ritchie, a lymphatic cancer survivor whom the Houston Fire Department failed to hire
solely because of his cancer history. Id. at 387; see also Ritchie v. City of Houston, Civ. A.
No. H-87-504, 1988 WL 24676 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 1988). Ritchie brought a claim under the
Federal Rehabilitation Act and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. See id. at *1.
The court ruled that the City violated Mr. Ritchie's federal rights and, as the City Fire
Department was a recipient of federal funds regardless of whether Mr. Ritchie was substan-
tially limited in a major life activity, "it is uncontroverted that he was treated by [the Fire
Department] as having such a limitation." Id. at *3. The court, however, rejected Ritchie's
state law claim on the ground that he was not a "handicapped person" as defined by Texas
law because he was not severely limited by his cancer history. Id. at *2. In the absence of
federal legislation, like the plaintiffs in cases discussed in Part III of this Article, Ritchie
would have found himself in the Catch-22 of being healthy enough to be a firefighter, but
too healthy to be protected from disparate treatment. See infra Part III.
103. See Statement of National Coalition for Cancer Survivorship, supra note 100, app. at
387-88 (noting that the ADA expands "the rights of individuals living in Alabama, Connect-
icut, Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, and Virginia").
104. See id. at 388.
105. See id. at 387-88.
106. See generally H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 1, reprinted in I LEGISLATvE HISTORY OF
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, supra note 67, at 441; S. RP. No. 101-116, at 1,
reprinted in I LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES AcT, supra note 67,
at 67.
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velop in the future.""0 7 The reports recognize, however, that diseases
such as cancer are an impairment.10 8 Furthermore, in defining the
second prong of the definition of a disability-record of such an im-
pairment-the reports note that "persons with histories of... cancer"
were included in this definition.10 9
To achieve that end, the ADA prohibits employers from making
pre-employment medical inquiries that are designed to screen out in-
dividuals with disabilities.110 The House Report explains that this pro-
vision was intended to prohibit employers from using medical
examinations and inquiries "to exclude applicants with disabilities,
particularly those with 'hidden' disabilities such as ... cancer, before
their ability to perform the job was even evaluated."'11 The Senate
recognizes that a pre-employment medical question that is
not job-related serves no legitimate employer purpose, but
simply serves to stigmatize the person with a disability. For
example, if an employee starts to lose a significant amount of
hair, the employer should not be able to require the person
to be tested for cancer unless such testing is job-related.'12
Finally, the ADA requires employers to make reasonable accom-
modations. 1 ' Although it did not specifically mention cancer treat-
ment, the Senate noted that "persons who need medical treatment
107. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERI-
CANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, supra note 67, at 273, 324; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22, reprinted
in I LEGISLATrVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, supra note 67, at 97,
120.
108. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, supra note 67, at 273, 324 (noting that the term "disabil-
ity" includes "such conditions, diseases and infections as: ... cancer"); S. REP. No. 101-116,
at 22, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, supra
note 67, at 97, 120 (same).
109. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52-53, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, supra note 67, at 273, 325-26; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23,
reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, supra note 67,
at 121.
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (1994) (stating that, within the ADA, "the term 'dis-
criminate' includes... using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of
individuals with disabilities"); id. § 12112(d) (applying the ADA's prohibitions against dis-
crimination to "medical examinations and inquiries").
111. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 42, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERI-
CANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, supra note 67, at 482.
112. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 39, repinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT, supra note 67, at 137.
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A) (defining "discriminate" to include "not making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability").
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may benefit from flexible or adjusted work schedules." '14 A flexible
work schedule, to accommodate appointments for an examination, ra-
diation, chemotherapy, surgery, or other medical treatment, is one of
the most common types of accommodations requested by cancer
survivors." 5
III. LOWER FEDERAL COURT CANCER-BASED EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES BEFORE SUTTON V. UNITED
AIR LINES
The following discussion analyzes the twenty-four leading cases in
which lower federal courts have discussed whether cancer was a disa-
bility under the ADA.1 16 These cases illustrate how some courts have
placed plaintiffs in a Catch-22,"1 while other courts have adhered to
the letter and the purpose of the ADA. 1 8 These cases represent less
than one percent of the ADA cases filed that alleged cancer-based dis-
crimination. Given that approximately 2615 complaints of cancer-
based discrimination were filed with the EEOC from 1992 to 1998,119 I
do not suggest that the results of these reported decisions represent
how most cancer survivors have fared under the ADA.121 Indeed,
114. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 31, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES AcT, supra note 67, at 129.
115. See supra notes 23-44 and accompanying text; cf Hoffman, A Primer for Oncologists,
supra note 11, at 843 (noting that "[c]ommon accommodations for [cancer] survivors in-
clude change in work hours.., to accommodate medical appointments and treatment side
effects").
116. This Article does not discuss other ADA cases brought by cancer survivors in which
the court declined to evaluate, either explicitly or implicitly, whether cancer was a disabil-
ity. For example, one court granted summaryjudgment to an employer who terminated a
breast cancer survivor who claimed that she was "unable to perform her job because of the
severity of her disability" with or without accommodations, and therefore, was not qualified
to perform the essential functions of herjob. Graham v. Rosemount, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d
1093, 1100-01 (D. Minn. 1999). Additionally, this Article does not discuss post-Sutton can-
cer discrimination cases under the ADA. See, e.g., Cinelli v. U.S. Energy Partners, No. 97-
5630 (BJS), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14958, at *2, 21 (D.N.J. Sept. 21, 1999) (holding "that
plaintiff has raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendants fired him be-
cause of perceived disability" because he "cites as evidence a series of occurrences which,
taken in combination, raise genuine issues as to whether his supervisors felt that he was
unable to do his job because of his cancer").
117. See, e.g., infra note 144 and accompanying text (citing language in Ellison v. Software
Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1996)).
118. See, e.g., infra notes 284-299 and accompanying text (discussing Berk v. Bates Adver.
USA, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 9140, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19224 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1997)).
119. Of the 108,939 cases filed under the ADA from 1992 to 1998, 2.4% involved cancer-
based discrimination. SeeJoan Biskupic, Five Cases at Supreme Court Could Affect Disabilities
Law; Job Opportunities, Employers' Responsibilities at Stake, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1999, at A3.
120. Most lower court decisions are not reported. For example, in an unreported deci-
sion, an employee with a brain tumor who was demoted and then fired, won a jury award
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nothing in these cases suggests that cancer survivors, like all other
ADA plaintiffs, ultimately prevail in more than a small minority of
ADA claims.'
21
A. Cases Holding That Cancer is Not a Disability
1. Circuit Courts of Appeals Decisions That Misapply the ADA.-In
thirteen cases, federal courts concluded that cancer survivors did not
have a disability as defined by the ADA.122 Of these, despite the glar-
ing flaws in its analysis of the ADA,1 23 the Fifth Circuit's seven page
against his former employer. See Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 298, 300
(1998) (discussing the district court's unreported decision in which the "district court en-
tered judgment against Wal-Mart in the amount of $668,895.18"). The court subsequently
reduced the jury award to $300,000 to comply with statutory caps.
121. Defendants prevail in the vast majority of ADA claims. According to Colker, "de-
fendants prevail in more than ninety-three percent of reported ADA employment discrimi-
nation cases decided on the merits at the trial court level. Of those cases that are
appealed, defendants prevail in eighty-four percent of reported cases." Ruth Colker, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfallfor Defendants, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99, 108
(1999). Colker noted:
The editors of the National Disability Law Reporter and Disability Compliance
Bulletin collected 261 decisions in which federal courts of appeals have issued
rulings on claims made under the ADA. In 209 of 261 decisions decided between
1994 and 1997, they found that the appellate panel sided with the defendant on
the ADA claim or claims, in employment and non-employment cases, resulting in
an 80% success rate for ADA defendants overall. The American Bar Association's
Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law... concluded that of the 760
decisions in which one party or the other prevailed, employers prevailed in
92.11% of those cases. Similarly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion has reported that it achieved 'merit resolutions' in only 13.6% of all cases
filed with the commission for fiscal years 1992 through 1997. 'Merit resolutions'
are defined as 'charges with outcomes favorable to charging parties and/or
charges with meritorious allegations. These include negotiated settlements, with-
drawals with benefits, successful conciliations, and unsuccessful conciliations.'...
The success rate for plaintiffs at the pre-trial level is extraordinarily low, as it is at
the appellate level.
Id. at 100 n.9 (internal citations omitted).
122. See Innes v. Mechatronics, Inc., No. 96-35515, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18000 (9th
Cir. July 17, 1997); Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assoc., 100 F.3d 907 (11th Cir. 1996); Ellison
v. Software Spectrum Inc., 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996); Barger v. Owens-Brockway Glass
Container, Inc., No. C97-4418 FMS, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 945 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1999);
Giruzzi v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, No. 97-CV-0078, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15589 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30, 1998); Olmeda v. New York State Dep't of Civil Serv., No. 96 Civ. 7557 (HB), 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 345 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1998); Hirsch v. National Mall & Serv., Inc., 989 F.
Supp. 977 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Madjlessi v. Macy's West, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Cal.
1997); Cook v. Robert G. Waters, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 1463 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Malewski v.
Nationsbank of Florida, 978 F. Supp. 1095 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Nave v. Wooldridge Constr.,
No. 96-2891, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9203 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1997); EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher
Co., 959 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Tex. 1997), rev'd, 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999); Farmer v.
National City Corp., No. c-2-94-966, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20941 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 1996).
123. The Fifth Circuit has earned a reputation so hostile to ADA employment cases that
one commentator suggested that the Circuit is attempting to "repeal the law through judi-
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opinion in Ellison v. Software Spectrum Inc.,' 2 4 has been relied upon
more than any other case by federal courts considering cancer-based
discrimination claims.
1 25
Phyllis Ellison began working full-time for Software Spectrum in
January 1992 after working there for two years as a temporary em-
ployee. 126 Ellison was diagnosed with breast cancer in August 1993.127
Like many cancer survivors, Ellison had surgery and daily radiation
treatments from mid-September through October 1993.128 Eager to
continue to work, Ellison worked on a modified schedule until she felt
"back to normal" by February 1994.129 Soon after Ellison returned to
her regular schedule, Software Spectrum decided to downsize from
thirty-five to thirty-one employees.13 ° On March 2, Software Spectrum
fired Ellison and three other employees.
1 31
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas granted summary judgment to Software Spectrum on the
ground that Ellison's breast cancer was not a disability. 1 2 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed, 13 3 relying on circular reasoning that ignored the lan-
guage and the intent of the ADA.
cial interpretation." Gary Taylor, Texas ADA Caseload Puts 5th Circuit in Major Role, NAT'L
L.J., Dec. 4, 1995, at BI.
124. 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996).
125. Of the twenty-four cases discussed in this section, seven cited Ellison. See Gordon,
100 F.3d at 911-13; Barger, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *11; Berk v. Bates Advert. USA, Inc.,
No. 94 Civ. 9140 (CSH), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19224, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1997);
Hirsch, 989 F. Supp. at 981; Madjlessi, 993 F. Supp. at 741-42; Cook, 980 F. Supp. at 1468;
Malewski, 978 F. Supp. at 1100-01. Of these, the plaintiff prevailed only in Berk. Berk, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19224, at *25 (concluding that a "genuine issue of material fact exist[ed]
with respect to [the] plaintiff's discrimination claim"). Since the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Ellison on May 30, 1996, cancer survivors have prevailed in only four of reported ADA
decisions discussed in this Article that considered whether cancer is a disability: Berk, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19224; Freiman v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 96C 4101, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19562 (N.D. Ill.. Dec. 2, 1997); Bizelli v. Parker Amchem, 981 F. Supp. 1254 (E.D.
Mo. 1997); and Mark v. Burke Rehab. Hosp., 94 Civ. 3596 (RLC), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5159 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1997).
126. See Ellison, 85 F.3d at 189.
127. See id.
128. See id. Prior to her radiation treatment, Ellison underwent a lumpectomy. See id.
129. Id. Ellison "arrived at work at 10:30 a.m. following her radiation therapy, skipped
her lunch hour and morning break, and took work home." Id.
130. See id.
131. See id. Ellison was subsequently rehired to a different position several weeks later.
See id. The fact that Ellison continued to work for Software Spectrum, and thus suffered
little harm, may have contributed to the court's denial of her claim. See id. at 193 (conclud-
ing that "[t]he fact that SSI offered Ellison another position in the company... precludes
there being a material fact issue").
132. See Ellison, 83 F.3d at 193.
133. See id.
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The court limited its analysis to whether Ellison's breast cancer
substantially limited her ability to work."' Although the Fifth Circuit
began its analysis with a selective review of the ADA's three-part defini-
tion of disability and the EEOC regulations that provide guidance as
to how an impairment can affect work,135 the court inexplicably ig-
nored other relevant parts of the regulations and imposed a Catch-22
on Ellison.
The court first concluded that Ellison was able to perform herjob
during and after her cancer treatment. 136 Acknowledging that Ellison
experienced nausea, fatigue, swelling, inflammation, and pain result-
ing from her treatment, the court found that she could nonetheless
perform her essential job duties with accommodations.' 37 Although
"[o]bviously, her ability to work was affected, 1 38 the court concluded
that these limitations were not sufficient to render Ellison a person
with a disability as defined by the ADA.139
Next, the court rejected Ellison's claim that her cancer estab-
lished a record of an impairment. The court selectively ignored the
regulations' express reference to "former cancer patients"14 ° as indi-
viduals with a "record" of an impairment, as well as the Supreme
Court's declaration that a hospitalization is sufficient to establish a
record of an impairment. 41 Instead, the court relied on the conclu-
134. The Fifth Circuit agreed with Ellison that her "cancer was an 'impairment.'" Id. at
190 (citation omitted). The court confined its analysis to the major life activity of working
because "'working' is the only major life activity for which Ellison claimed a substantial
limitation." Id.; see also supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text (discussing the EEOC
regulations that define "major life activity" and "substantially limits").
135. See Ellison, 83 F.3d at 189-90; see also supra notes 69-72 (explaining the ADA's three-
part definition of disability).
136. See Ellison, 83 F.3d at 190-91. The court explained:
[A] t all times, she had demonstrated the physical and mental ability to work. SSI
also submitted excerpts from Ellison's deposition; she testified that the radiation
treatment made her nauseous and tired and she suffered an allergic reaction to
the radiation which caused painful swelling and inflammation, but that the treat-
ment did not affect her ability to do her job and she never missed a day of work.
She testified further that her normal workday was seven and one-half hours; that
she was able to work almost that amount while receiving treatment, by working
from 10:30 a.m. until 6:00 p.m., with no lunch and only an afternoon break; and
that she improved steadily after the radiation treatment was completed, and was
back to normal in three or four months (by February 1994).
Id.
137. See id. at 191.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k) (1999); see supra note 86 and accompanying text (pro-
viding relevant text).
141. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987) (interpreting section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and concluding that "hospitalization ... suffices to establish that
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sion of Software Spectrum's Human Resources Department that
"nothing in Ellison's personnel file has ever indicated that she was
substantially limited by a physical or mental impairment either in her
ability to perform her job or in any other respect."'14 2 Furthermore,
the court relied on the fact that "Ellison did not present any evidence
to counter that affidavit."' 43  The court also stated that "SSI's
[Software Spectrum's] acquiescence in her modified schedule to ac-
commodate her treatment does not create a material fact issue on
whether she had the requisite record, in that she did not miss a day of
work and her ability to work was not substantially limited."' 44
Finally, Ellison asserted that four comments by her supervisor,
Logan, evidenced that he regarded her breast cancer as substantially
limiting her ability to work. First, when Ellison told Logan that she
would need to change her working hours to accommodate her radia-
tion treatments, "Logan expressed his irritation by suggesting that she
get a mastectomy instead because her breasts were not worth sav-
ing."'4 5 Second, when Ellison told Logan that she had been in the
restroom suffering from nausea resulting from thinking about eating
or drinking, "Logan responded that it had not affected her weight." '46
Third, Ellison encountered a power outage at work when she re-
turned from radiation treatment. 14 ' As employees were trying to evac-
uate a dark building, "Logan laughed and said, 'don't worry about it.
Follow Phyllis . . . see, look over there. She's glowing."'"48 Fourth,
during a meeting at which human resources personnel asked if any of
the downsized employees had special circumstances, Logan stated that
"Phyllis has cancer. " 149
The court held that none of these comments were sufficient to
allege that Software Spectrum regarded Ellison's cancer as substan-
tially limiting her ability to work.150 Again the court narrowly read the
regulations:
As noted [in the regulations], an employer does not neces-
sarily regard an employee as having a substantially limiting
[an individual] has a 'record of ... impairment' . . . and is therefore a handicapped
individual").
142. Ellison, 83 F.3d at 192.
143. Id.
144. Id. This language clearly illustrates the court's use of a Catch-22.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 192-93.
148. Id. at 193.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 192-93.
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impairment simply because it believes she is incapable of
performing a particular job; "[t]he statutory reference to a
substantial limitation indicates instead that an employer re-
gards an employee as [substantially limited] in his or her
ability to work by finding the employee's impairment to fore-
close generally the type of employment involved."15'
The court then concluded that none of Logan's first three comments,
although "beneath contempt," created "a material fact issue on
whether [Software Spectrum] regarded Ellison as having a substan-
tially limiting impairment.' 15 2  Although acknowledging that it
"presents a closer question," the court held that Logan's notifying the
human resources department that Ellison had cancer was also insuffi-
cient evidence that Software Spectrum regarded Ellison as substan-
tially limited because it subsequently hired her back at her previous
pay scale. 1
53
In essence, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Ellison was not enti-
tled to the protection of the ADA because she had so successfully
fought to mitigate the effects of her cancer. Under the Fifth Circuit's
logic, had Ellison chosen to take several months of medical leave dur-
ing the first stage of her treatment, and then returned to work half-
time for the next several weeks, she would have demonstrated a "sub-
stantial limiting impairment"' 54 of her ability to work. Thus, under
the Fifth Circuit's analysis, those employees who work the hardest to
maintain theirjobs are precisely the ones denied protection under the
ADA. Bringing this irony full circle, the Fifth Circuit would doubt-
lessly have concluded that had Phyllis Ellison taken an extended medi-
cal leave from work, she would not have been "otherwise qualified"
155
for her job, and therefore, it would have caught her with the other
prong of the Catch-22.
Several months after Ellison, the Eleventh Circuit followed the
Fifth Circuit's Catch-22 logic to reverse a jury verdict for a cancer sur-
vivor in Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Associates.'56 E.L. Hamm and Associ-
ates hired Mervin Gordon in January 1993 to perform on-site
maintenance for military housing at an air base. 157 Four months later,
151. Id. at 192 (alteration in original) (quoting Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 935 (4th
Cir. 1986) and citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (3) (i)).
152. Id. at 193.
153. Id.
154. See generally supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing the ADA's defini-
tion, and the EEOC's interpretation, of "substantially limited").
155. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A) (1994); see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
156. 100 F.3d 907 (11th Cir. 1996).
157. See id. at 909.
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Gordon discovered a growth in his shoulder, which turned out to be
malignant lymphoma.15 8 Gordon took a medical leave from June 18
until June 28, 1993.59 From June 25 through November 1, Gordon
received chemotherapy while continuing his normal activities." 6
Although Gordon attempted to go back to work on June 28, Hamm
would not let him return to his job until July 8.161 Gordon alleged
that upon his return to work, Hamm changed the conditions of his
employment to be less desirable. 16 2 Subsequently, Gordon had a dis-
pute with his supervisor, who fired him on July 16.163
At trial, the jury found that Gordon had a disability under the
ADA.16 4 Hamm filed motions for judgment as a matter of law and a
new trial, which the district court denied. 16 5 In an opinion that relied
considerably on Ellison, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded
to the district court to enter judgment for Hamm.166
As did the Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the regula-
tions to define disability,1 67 yet failed to note that a cancer history is
evidence of a record of a disability. 6 8 The Eleventh Circuit held that
Gordon did not have a disability because "except for a couple of days
of medical testing and a leave of absence from June 18 until June 28,
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id. Gordon's doctor noted that Gordon's
life activities were limited by the chemotherapy to the extent that Gordon had to
go to the doctor's office, receive the treatments, and endure the side effects that
often occur in many patients. The side effects that Gordon experienced included
weakness, dizziness, swelling of the ankles and hands, numbness of the hands, the
loss of body hair, and vomiting.
Id.
161. See id. As an accommodation, Gordon required "leaving work a few hours early
every Friday for blood testing and chemotherapy." Id.
162. See id. (describing Gordon's assertions that his job had changed when he returned
including being "assigned... to more physically taxing work").
163. See id. at 909 (explaining that Gordon and his supervisor "had a dispute after
Gordon inadvertently cut a window shade for one of the units at the air station improp-
erly"). Gordon alleged that he was fired, although his supervisor contended that he "sim-
ply told Gordon to go home." Id. No doubt, this evidence, which suggested that Gordon
was not the most cooperative employee, affected the Eleventh Circuit's analysis.
164. See id. at 908 (noting that the "district court concluded that the evidence ... sup-
ported the jury's finding that the plaintiff was a 'qualified individual with a disability'
under the ADA").
165. See id.
166. See id. at 915.
167. See id. at 912-13 (discussing the definition of "disability" articulated in the EEOC's
regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2); see also supra notes 140, 150-153 and accompanying text
(discussing the Fifth Circuit's review of the regulations in Ellison v. Software Spectrum Inc., 85
F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996)).
168. See supra notes 81-115 and accompanying text (analyzing references in the regula-
tions and in the legislative history to cancer-based discrimination).
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in which Gordon underwent the bone marrow biopsy, Gordon was
fully capable of working."' 69 The court stressed that "Gordon himself
conceded that he was fully capable of working,"170 a position sup-
ported by his physician."' 1 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that, be-
cause Gordon could work despite the side effects of chemotherapy,
his cancer did not substantially limit him as required by the ADA. 17 2
Like the Fifth Circuit in Ellison, the court regarded, as determinative,
the fact that Gordon demonstrated laudable success in working de-
spite the debilitating effects of his disease. 7 Instead, the court first
should have recognized that Gordon had a disability because he had
an impairment that, as his physician showed, substantially limited ma-
jor life activities, and then the court should have considered whether
Hamm fired Gordon because of his disability or because of a legiti-
mate business reason.
2. Lower Court Decisions that Followed Ellison.-Five federal dis-
trict court decisions relied on Ellison to grant defendants' summary
judgment motions against employees who had cancer.1 74 In the most
illogical of these decisions, the District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois granted a defendant's summary judgment motion against
169. Id. at 912.
170. Id.
171. See id. (noting that Gordon's oncologist "stated that Gordon was not disabled by
the cancer and that he could continue to work" (citation omitted)).
172. See id. (finding that "the extent, duration, and impact of Gordon's chemotherapy
treatment side effects on his ability to care for himself and to work reveal that these side
effects did not substantially limit his ability to care for himself or to work"). Additionally,
the court rejected Gordon's claim that Hamm regarded him as having an impairment. See
id. at 912-13. The court did not consider whether Gordon had a history of an impairment.
Substituting itself for the jury, the court found that Hamm gave Gordon different assign-
ments when he returned from medical leave because of legitimate business reasons, and
not because of Gordon's cancer. See id. at 914 (finding that upon his return to work,
"Gordon was assigned that work which was then available," and those assignments "merely
reflected the types of work... pending.., completion," and "in no way support a finding
that [Gordon's supervisor] regarded Gordon as having a physical impairment under the
ADA which substantially limited his ability to ... work").
173. See id. at 913-14 ("Following his diagnosis with cancer, Gordon continued to per-
form the same or similar work that he had previously performed for Hamm at the Jackson-
ville project site."); see also supra text accompanying notes 154-155 (discussing the Fifth
Circuit's acknowledgment of how well Ellison was able to work despite her bout with
cancer).
174. See Barger v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., No. C97-4418FMS, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 945 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1999); Hirsch v. National Mall & Serv., Inc., 989 F.
Supp. 977 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Madjlessi v. Macy's West, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Cal.
1997); Cook v. Robert G. Waters, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 1463 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Malewski v.
Nationsbank of Florida, 978 F. Supp. 1095 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
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an employee who ultimately died from his cancer.1 75 Paul Hirsch
worked for the defendant for nearly thirty years when he was diag-
nosed with non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, a hematic cancer. 176 Although
Hirsch continued to work for several years after his diagnosis, his em-
ployer feared that Hirsch's future health insurance claims would
cause his insurance costs to rise ten to twelve percent.177 After con-
cluding that he would save money without Hirsch on the payroll, the
defendant fired Hirsch.
178
Judge James Moran concluded "that the ADA was not truly meant
to apply to this situation" because Hirsch claimed he was discrimi-
nated against because of the costs of his cancer treatment, and not
because of the cancer itself.179 Then, after conceding that "[t] here is
no question that someone with a history of cancer may be considered
disabled for ADA purposes," ' 0 Judge Moran held that, even though
Hirsch had a "life-threatening" disease, his cancer did not substan-
tially limit a major life activity.' The court based its conclusion on
Hirsch's failure to produce "medical records or other affirmative evi-
dence to show exactly how Hirsch was impaired in his daily activi-
ties." '182 This conclusion ignored the record that Hirsch "asked to
work at home part-time and was forced to be occasionally absent from
work,"18 3 and ultimately died from his lymphoma a year and a half after
he was fired. 84 Finally, the court inexplicably concluded that Hirsch
was not fired "because he had cancer," but because his employer
"wanted to cut back on expenses" and so "terminated Hirsch to avoid
175. See Hirsch, 989 F. Supp. at 984.
176. See id. at 979.
177. See id. at 984 (explaining that "defendants were aware of and concerned about
their rising health insurance premiums... [and] Hirsch's health care costs may have been
a factor in driving up insurance costs . . . ten to twelve percent").
178. See id. at 979. In June 1994, Elmer and Carl Schmitt realized that they would have
to make some budgetary adjustments to deal with Photo-Vend's lack of business. They
discussed how terminating Paul Hirsch would affect Photo-Vend's finances. Carl Schmitt
calculated how much money the company would save by firing Hirsch, including the
amounts that would be saved by not having to pay for his health care. Id.
179. Id. at 980.
180. Id. at 981.
181. See id. (concluding that the "[p]laintiff ... failed to produce evidence sufficient to
show... that Hirsch's performance of major life activities was substantially limited by his
cancer").
182. Id. The court noted that Hirsch did "continue to work and although plaintiff indi-
cate[d] [that] work was difficult for him, [plaintiff] ... [did] not indicate how or why.
Many people with cancer are able to walk, see, hear, speak, breathe and work without
impairment until late stages of the disease." Id. at 981-82.
183. Id. at 981.
184. See id. at 978. Hirsch died while this action was pending. See id. at 979. His wife was
substituted as the plaintiff and she continued the action on behalf of Hirsch's estate. See id.
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the financial repercussions of his illness."1" 5 This logic flies in the face
of the underlying purpose of the ADA, to prohibit discrimination
whatever the motivation, as recognized in the regulations, which ex-
pressly prohibit discrimination "because of concerns about ... insur-
ance costs." '1 86
In two separate decisions, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California adopted Ellison's Catch-22 analysis in
rejecting the claims of cancer survivors. In Madjlessi v. Macy's West,
Inc.,187 a breast cancer survivor sued Macy's for failing to retain her
when it purchased her employer, Broadway Stores, Inc. in its Empo-
rium retail unit.18 8 Virginia Madjlessi worked as sales manager of the
lingerie department of Emporium, a California department store,
when she was diagnosed with breast cancer in February 1994.189 She
received radiation and chemotherapy throughout the year. 190 Empo-
rium accommodated her by arranging her work schedule around her
treatments.'91 After Macy's purchased Broadway Stores, Inc., Macy's
refused to offer Madjlessi employment in December 1995.192
Judge Vaughn Walker concluded that Madjlessi failed to prove
that she had a disability, a record of a disability, or was regarded as
having a disability. 193 The court correctly concluded that "loss of a
breast or any portion thereof fits squarely into [the definition of an
impairment].""' It rejected, however, Madjlessi's claim that she had
a disability because, according to the court, her "breast cancer did not
substantially limit her ability to work."'1 95 Although the court noted
that Madjlessi required flex-time accommodations for six months, it
nonetheless concluded that her cancer treatment did not substantially
limit her ability to work:
Madjlessi admits that except for the four days she took off
every month, she worked as usual. Indeed, in her papers,
185. Id. at 982.
186. 1995 EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 83, at II-§ 902.8.
187. 993 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
188. See id. at 738.
189. See id. at 737-38.
190. See id. at 738.
191. See id. (noting that "[d]uring her chemotherapy, Madjlessi experienced side effects
such as nausea, vomiting and weakness which rendered her unable to work for four days
following each monthly treatment" and explaining that Emporium allowed Madjlessi to
structure her work schedule "so that she would not have to work during those difficult
four-day periods").
192. See id.
193. See id. at 740-41.
194. Id. at 740 n.1 (construing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)).
195. Id. at 741.
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she avers that she worked even harder to move herself up the
career path. Her coworkers praise her ability to work
through adversity. Even though she may have worked while
suffering the side effects of vomiting, weakness and nausea,
this alone does not satisfy the "substantial limits" standard.
19 6
Next, the court concluded, despite its description of Madjlessi's
cancer treatment, that she did not have a record of an impairment:
"The documents Madjlessi presents to the court establish only that she
saw an oncologist, underwent surgery, and unfortunately, had a diffi-
cult time during the two days following each [of six] chemotherapy
treatment [s]. "19 The court reasoned, however, that "the mere fact
that Madjlessi had cancer and was utterly incapacitated for brief peri-
ods of time after chemotherapy does not mean she was 'substantially
limited' for purposes of the ADA." '19 8 Although the court noted Mad-
jiessi's surgery, it declined to conclude that her hospitalization created
a record of an impairment. Finally, the court rejected Madjlessi's
claim that Macy's regarded her as being disabled because her supervi-
sor continued her employment for nearly a year after she completed
treatment.199
In a second case before the Northern District of California,2 ° °
Judge Fern Smith correctly granted Owens-Brockway Glass
Container's summaryjudgment motion against a long-time employee,
but for the wrong reason. Larry Barger had worked at the Owens-
Brockway plant in Oakland, California since 1961.201 In May 1995, he
was diagnosed with cancer of the mandible (lower jaw), for which he
later endured extensive surgery to remove part of his jaw.2 °2 Barger
took several medical leaves during the next year for surgeries related
to his cancer, as well as to an accidental injury. 21' Although Barger
196. Id. (citing Ellison v. Software Spectrum Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1996)).
Although the court recognized that Madjlessi required accommodations for six months, it
reasoned that the flex-time was "of such short duration" that her work was not substantially
limited. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 74243 (concluding that "there is no doubt that Madjlessi continued to
work at Emporium until it became Macy's," and rejecting the argument that the store
manager "would suddenly perceive Madjlessi as substantially limited months after she fin-
ished treatment").
200. See Barger v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., No. C97-4418, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 945 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1999).
201. See id. at *1.
202. See id. at *2.
203. See id. at *2-3.
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was able to return to work without accommodations, 2°4 he filed an
ADA claim that alleged a fellow employee had created a hostile work
environment by making a single offensive comment about his physical
appearance.2 °5
For Owens-Brockway to prevail, the court need only have con-
cluded that Owens-Brockway had not in fact created a hostile work
environment. 20 6 The court need not have reached the issue of
whether Barger had a disability. Instead, the court improperly re-
jected Barger's claim that his facial cancer substantially limited his
ability to eat. 20 7 Despite its recognition that Barger had difficulty eat-
ing for more than one year,20 8 the court concluded that Barger did
not have a record of an impairment because he did "not produce any
evidence tending to show that he has, or ever had, an impairment that
substantially limits or limited a major life activity. °209 Finally, the
court correctly concluded that Owens-Brockway did not perceive
Barger as disabled because it allowed Barger to return to work after
each medical leave, and it disciplined the employee who made the
derogatory statements.2
°
In a case particularly ill-suited for summary judgment, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted defend-
ant's summary judgment motion against a cashier whom it fired two
months after her diagnosis.2 1 1 Patricia Cook joined Robert G. Waters,
204. See id. (noting that "[a]fter each of these leaves, Barger was able to perform his job
without any medical restrictions").
205. Id. at *3. Barger claimed that the employee wrote "Larry's jaw" under the heading
'things to fix" on a company black board. Id. Owens-Brockway suspended the employee
for three days without pay. Id. at *4.
206. See id. at *9-11 (noting that if Barger's psychiatric impairment was caused by the
hostile work environment created by the defendant, then the impairment was not the rea-
son for the alleged discrimination as required by the ADA).
207. Rather than considering the activity of eating, the opinion focused on the major
life activity of working. The court stressed the fact that Barger's condition "did not interfere
with his ability to do his job and ... he never told anyone at work that there was any
particular job .. .he was unable to do." Id. at *7 (citations omitted).
208. See id. (noting that "[d]uring the thirteen month period between Barger's initial
surgery to remove part of his mandible in July of 1995 and the reconstructive surgery in
August 1996, he had difficulty eating salad or any hard foods" (citation omitted)).
209. Id. at *11. Additionally, the court noted that Barger "admitted that his injuries did
not prevent him from performing his current job." Id. at *9.
210. See id. at 12; cf id. (concluding that in proving an employer regarded an individual
as having a substantially limiting impairment, "[e]vidence of derogatory statements by a co-
worker, of the type made by Vitug, does not suffice" (citing Ellison v. Software Spectrum,
Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 192-93 (5th Cir. 1996))).
211. Cook v. Robert G. Waters, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 1463, 1469 (M.D. Fla. 1997). The
court made factual determinations inconsistent with the standard of summaryjudgment by
concluding that the plaintiff did not have a substantially limiting physical or mental impair-
ment or was subject to unlawful discrimination. See id. at 1469.
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Inc. (Waters) as a full-time cashier in January 1993.212 Waters fired
her only two months after she was diagnosed with a brain tumor.21 3
The defendant alleged that Cook failed to work with her new supervi-
sor; Cook claimed that the defendant refused to accommodate
changes in her ability to concentrate and in her personality resulting
from her medication. 214 Judge Elizabeth Kovachevich held that Cook
was not substantially limited in her ability to work because "except for
during doctor appointments and during Plaintiff's headaches, Plain-
tiff states that she could fulfill the essential requirements of the job by
continuing to perform her job until she was terminated. ' 215  The
court concluded that "[w] hile the side effects of Plaintiff's medication
and headaches [might] qualify as 'physical impairments' under the
ADA," they did "not substantially limit Plaintiff's ability to care for her-
self, or to work. 21
6
Lastly, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida re-
lied on ElUison, but nonetheless correctly rejected a cancer survivor's
ADA claim because her employer had had legitimate business reasons
for firing her. In Malewski v. NationsBank of Florida2 17 the district
court dismissed the claims of a breast cancer survivor who was fired
from her position as an administrative assistant.218  Malewski took
time off for a lumpectomy and radiation treatments. 219 The following
year, she was terminated, along with other employees, as part of a "re-
duction in force."220 In rejecting Malewski's claim that her employer
perceived her cancer as a disability, 221 the court properly recognized
that the factual circumstances of each case dictate whether the plain-
tiff has a disability. 222 The court concluded that NationsBank did not
212. Id. at 1464.
213. See id. at 1464-65 (explaining that Cook was diagnosed with a brain tumor in May
1994, and terminated onJuly 11, 1994).
214. See id. at 1465 ("Plaintiff alleges she was substantially impaired in her ability to work
because the headaches required numerous medications which affected her ability to con-
centrate, her ability to complete her work, and her personality.").
215. Id. at 1469 (citation omitted).
216. Id.
217. 978 F. Supp. 1095 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
218. See id. at 1105 (granting NationsBank's summaryjudgment motion because it "prof-
fered evidence supporting a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Malewski's termina-
tion" and because Malewski did "not come forward with any evidence to show that [the
proffered reason was] . . .pretextual").
219. See id. at 1097.
220. See id. at 1097-98.
221. The court noted that Malewski did "not argue that she had a disability, but rather
that the defendant perceived her as disabled." Id. at 1100.
222. See id. (stating that "whether or not [cancer] substantially limits major life activities
depends upon each case's factual circumstances" (citation omitted)).
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regard Malewski as disabled just because it gave her consistently poor
performance reviews before and after her diagnosis. 2 23 Accordingly,
the court held that Malewski was fired because of inferior perform-
ance, and not because of her cancer history.224
3. Decisions That Improperly Grant Summary Judgment for the Em-
ployer Based on Misreading of the ADA.--In one case of blatant summary
judgment abuse, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas
grossly misapplied the ADA in confining a cancer survivor to a Catch-
22.225 For twenty years, Michael Boyle worked his way up from sales-
man to president of the Gallagher Company (Gallagher) .226 At the
age of fifty-nine, after serving as president for one year, Boyle was di-
agnosed with leukemia.227 When he was first diagnosed, Boyle was
hospitalized for chemotherapy for thirty days.228  His cancer was in
remission when he was released from the hospital, so his doctor gave
him permission to return to work without limitations. 229 When Boyle
223. See id. at 1101 (pointing out that Malewski's "1994 review was consistent with her
ratings for 1992, before she was diagnosed with breast cancer" and concluding that "[t]he
fact that she again received an unsatisfactory review in 1994 does not raise an inference
that NationsBank perceived Malewski as foreclosed from being able to perform her job
because of her cancer").
224. See id. at 1103 (concluding that "there is no evidence that a perception of disability
because of Malewski's cancer was a motivating factor in NationsBank's decision to termi-
nate her employment").
225. See EEOC v. RJ. Gallagher Co., 959 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Tex. 1997), affd in part,
vacated in part, 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999). Although this opinion has been affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings, an analysis of the district
court opinion is still necessary for a number of reasons. First, the case remains a useful
reflection on how lower federal courts often misapply the ADA. See R.J. Gallagher Co., 181
F.3d at 656 (describing the district court's analysis of what satisfies the "regarded as" prong
of the ADA's definition of disability, as "off the mark"). Second, as to the district court's
analysis of the second prong of disability under the ADA, a record of impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity, the Fifth Circuit simply found that the "district
court's analysis [did] not resolve the matter" and instructed the court, on remand, to apply
the principles articulated by the Supreme Court in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998),
"to determine whether the record of Boyle's impairment includes a substantial effect on a
major life activity." R.J Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d at 656. This determination does not change
the fact that the district court ignored the Supreme Court's mandate that the hospitaliza-
tion alone establishes a record of an impairment, see infra note 236, nor does such a deter-
mination change the fact that the district court grossly misapplied the "regarded as" prong
of the ADA's definition of disability.
226. See P.J. Gallagher Co., 959 F. Supp. at 406.
227. See id. at 407.
228. See id.
229. See id. "The only complication was that Boyle would require six monthly chemo-
therapy treatments, with each treatment lasting three to five days." Id.
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returned to work the next week, Gallagher demoted him to executive
vice-president with a lower salary. 3 °
Judge Lynn Hughes granted summary judgment on Boyle's ADA
claims.23 ' With only fleeting reference to the ADA's definition of disa-
bility, no consideration of the regulations or any case law, she con-
cluded that Boyle was not disabled:
Boyle had no disability-actual, historic, or perceived. He
was not disabled; he was critically ill. This law covers condi-
tions, temporary or permanent, affecting specific functional
capacity that are essentially incurable with current medical
science .... Although the cause of cancer is not known, it
may result from genetic misprogramming or from an exter-
nal influence on sound programming; it is not a disability.
The effects of cancer can leave a person disabled. It may
cause a leg to be amputated or lung capacity to be restricted.
An ordinary illness does not disable the patient, but the
course of the illness may cause a disability.232
The court noted that the only accommodation Boyle sought was
time off each month for chemotherapy. 33 Judge Hughes concluded
that the need for flex-time is "not a disability under this act; it is a
right under another act."234 She then ignored the Supreme Court's
clear mandate in Arline 35 that hospitalization alone establishes a rec-
ord of an impairment. 236 Judge Hughes first failed to consider
230. See id. "Boyle left and never returned to work." Id. He died one year later. See id.
231. See id. at 410. On appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit held that summary judgment
was inappropriate. See EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999). Though
the Fifth Circuit agreed that Boyle was not substantially limited in any major life activity at
the time he was demoted, the court found that the district court erred in assuming that
Boyle must have had "some obvious specific handicap" to be "regarded as" being disabled.
Id. at 655-56. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Boyle raised a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Gallagher regarded him as disabled. Id. at 657. Furthermore, the Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of
whether Boyle had a record of an impairment because Boyle's thirty-day hospital stay may
have had a substantial limitation on a major life activity. Id. at 656. Accordingly, the Fifth
Cirtcuit remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 657.
232. R.J. Gallagher Co., 959 F. Supp. at 409.
233. See id.
234. Id. Judge Hughes did not name the act under which it is a right, and she failed to
recognize that "the need for flex-time" is the need for a reasonable accommodation, a
specific type of accommodation illustrated in the EEOC Compliance Manual. See 1999
EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 915.002, supra note 92.
235. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
236. See id. at 281 (holding that a hospitalization is sufficient to establish a record of an
impairment under the Rehabilitation Act); see also supra note 141 (discussing the Arline
decision); cf KJ Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d at 655 (interpreting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 and Sutton
v. United Air Lines, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999), and concluding that "it is not enough for an
ADA plaintiff to simply show that he has a record of a cancer diagnosis, in order to estab-
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whether Boyle's hospitalization created a record of an impairment.
She then concluded that Gallagher did not regard Boyle as having a
disability because "Gallagher perceived Boyle as ill," and not as being
unable to work based on social stereotypes.
23 7
In a similar case, Judge Marjorie Rendell granted summary judg-
ment to an employer that fired a Hodgkin's Disease survivor when he
tried to return to work after treatment.2 3 John Nave was hired by
Wooldridge Construction (Wooldridge) on February 23, 1994, to
work in landscaping and in lawn care.23' Nave was diagnosed with
Hodgkin's Disease the following month and had surgery on April 26,
1994.240 After months of treatment, Nave returned to work part-time
in September.241 Wooldridge fired him on January 12, 1995.242
lish the existence of a 'disability' ... there must be a record of an impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more of the ADA plaintiffs major life activities"). Additionally, the
Arline Court specifically referred to cancer as a condition that generates the types of erro-
neous stereotypes that result in discrimination:
By amending the definition of 'handicapped individual' to include not only those
who are actually physically impaired, but also those who are regarded as impaired
and who, as a result, are substantially limited in a major life activity, Congress
acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and dis-
ease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual im-
pairment. Few aspects of a handicap give rise to the same level of public fear and
misapprehension as contagiousness. Even those who suffer or have recovered
from such noninfectious diseases as epilepsy or cancer have faced discrimination
based on the irrational fear that they might be contagious.
Arline, 480 U.S. at 284 (citations omitted).
237. R.. Gallagher Co., 959 F. Supp. at 409. Judge Hughes's reasoning, fueled by a not-
so-veiled hostility toward ADA plaintiffs, stands logic on its head:
As usual in these cases, when the record shows no actual disability the worker
claims that the employer perceived him as disabled. Assuming that Gallagher
perceived Boyle as ill, that is not a perception of disability. The "or perceived"
language is in the law to protect people who have some obvious specific handicap
that employers might generalize into a disability. Boyle did not have a condi-
tion-a defect-that Gallagher, based on erroneous social stereotypes, could gen-
eralize into an inability to function on the job.
Id. Concluding that this analysis was "off the mark," the Fifth Circuit pointed out that "the
text of the ADA could not be clearer on" the application of the "regarded as" prong. R.J.
Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d at 656. Under that definition, an individual is "disabled" if he or she
is "regarded as having" an impairment that "substantially limits one of the major life activi-
ties." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). As the Fifth Circuit noted, one does not have to actu-
ally have"'some obvious specific handicap'" to fall into this category. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181
F.3d at 656.
238. See Nave v. Wooldridge Constr., No. 96-2891, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9203, at *2, 5-6
(E.D. Pa. June 30, 1997).
239. See id. at *4.
240. See id.
241. See id. at *5. Nave did not work during the period from about April 26, 1994, to
September 15, 1994. See id. at *4-5.
242. See id. at *6.
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The court rejected Nave's claim that his Hodgkin's Disease was a
disability.2 43 Although the court conceded that lymphatic cancer was
an impairment 244 and detailed Nave's erratic work schedule during
his treatment, the court concluded that Nave's cancer did not substan-
tially limit his ability to work because he "could function by either
working fewer hours or performing lighter duties."24 5 The court then
reasoned that if Nave had had a disability prior to his remission in
December 1994, then his "impairment . . . [would have been] of a
temporary nature since the disease was only active for a temporary
period, and as such does not qualify as a disability. ' 24 6 Finally, the
court held that Wooldridge did not regard Nave as disabled because
Wooldridge's perception "was not based upon speculation, stereotype
or myth, but instead was responsive to plaintiffs own representations
as to what he could and could not do at his job" and encouraged him
to work.2 47
4. Decision that Failed to Consider Whether Cancer Established a Rec-
ord of an Impairment.-A court that evaluates only whether the plaintiff
has a disability, and not whether the plaintiff is regarded as or has a
record of a disability, is less likely to find that the plaintiff belongs to a
class protected by the ADA than is a court that considers all three
prongs of the definition.24" For example, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed an ADA com-
plaint brought by Rene Olmeda against the New York State Depart-
243. See id. at *31 (concluding that the "plaintiff has failed to establish that he was 'dis-
abled' under the ADA because he has not raised a material issue as to whether he was
substantially limited in a major life activity or that the defendant regarded him as dis-
abled"). Nave did not claim that he had a record of impairment. See id. at *9 n.5.
244. See id. at *10 ("Hodgkin's disease is a cancer of the lymphatic system and as such is
a physical impairment as that term is defined under the ADA." (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.20(h) (1), (2) (1996))).
245. Id. at *19.
Dr. Glick [Nave's oncologist] note[d] that it "would be impossible for individuals
such as Mr. Nave to work full time or to perform manual tasks requiring heavy
physical activity." Dr. Glick d[id] not, however, indicate that plaintiff could not
work at all or that he was substantially limited in his ability to work. Plaintiff also
d[id] not testify that he could not work at all, but instead testifie[d] that he could
only work for so many hours before he started to feel fatigued, which was usually
about three to four hours.
Id. at *21 (citation omitted).
246. Id. at *26 (citing Rakestraw v. Carpenter Co., 898 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Miss. 1995)).
247. Id. at *29 (citing Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir. 1995)).
248. See infra note 387 and accompanying text (discussing why plaintiffs should plead
every potentially applicable prong of the three part definition of disability).
2000]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ment of Civil Service for failing to hire him as a Parole Officer.24 9
Olmeda was placed on the "certified eligible list" to be hired as a pa-
role officer after receiving a passing score on the civil service exam.250
The Division of Parole offered Olmeda employment, subject to his
completion of a physical examination. 251' During the physical,
Olmeda revealed that he had been successfully treated for leukemia
seven years earlier, which had been in remission since 1987.252 The
Division of Parole told Olmeda that it would not hire him until it re-
ceived a letter from his doctor that stated that his leukemia was in
remission and that he was able to perform the duties of a parole of-
ficer.253 While Olmeda obtained the letter, the Division of Parole in-
stituted a hiring freeze.254 Instead of hiring Olmeda when it received
his physician's letter, the Division told him that he would have to re-
take the exam the following year to apply for a post-freeze position. 55
Judge Harold Baer ruled that Olmeda did not have a disability
because "his leukemia has been in remission since 1987," and he "as-
serted that he is not limited in any way."' 2 5 6 The court did not con-
sider the obvious-that the Division of Parole regarded Olmeda's
leukemia history as a disability and as an obstacle to employment be-
cause it required him to submit medical evidence not required of
other employees.
25 7
249. See Olmeda v. New York State Dep't of Civil Serv., No. 96 Civ. 7557(HB), 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 345, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1998).
250. See id. at *2.
251. See id. ("By letter . . .plaintiff received from the Division of Parole a conditional
offer of employment subject to him meeting the requirements for the position, including a
physical and a background investigation.").
252. See id.
253. See id. at *3.
254. See id.
255. See id. Olmeda filed an ADA complaint instead of waiting to sit for the next exam.
See id. at *34.
256. Id. at *6 (citation omitted).
257. See id. (defining disability under the ADA as "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual or being
regarded as having such an impairment" and concluding that because the plaintiff "as-
serted that he is not limited in any way" he failed to prove "a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities"). Such reasoning
virtually erases the "regarded as" prong of the ADA's definition of disability. The fact that
the plaintiff testified at trial that he was not limited in any way is irrelevant to the inquiry of
whether he was "regarded as" disabled and thus burdened with additional tasks, such as
presenting a letter of certification from his doctor. The court noted that the ADA does
provide that "it is appropriate for an employer to require a medical examination after an
offer of employment has been made to a job applicant, and may condition an offer of
employment on the results of such examination, provided that all entering employees are
subject to such an examination." Id. at *7 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)). The ADA
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5. Decisions that Correctly Dismissed Plaintiffs' Claims.-Three of
the thirteen cases discussed here correctly ruled that the plaintiff
failed to establish a prima facie case under the ADA.25 8 The Act pro-
vides an appropriate balance between an employee's right to be pro-
tected from disability-based discrimination and an employer's right to
make legitimate, nondiscriminatory business decisions. Accordingly,
one federal court correctly granted the defendant's summary judg-
ment motion against a prostate cancer survivor whose cancer diagno-
sis unfortunately coincided with his employer's economic
difficulties.2" 9 At the age of fifty-six, James Farmer lost his job as Vice-
President and Assistant General Auditor in a downsizing one month
after he returned to work from undergoing prostate cancer surgery.260
Although the court recognized that Farmer's cancer was an impair-
ment,2" it found that Farmer failed to show that his cancer, resulting
impotence, or incontinence substantially limited a major life activity,
including working and a "loving and supportive relationship with his
wife of thirty-two years."262
In other situations, plaintiffs unjustifiably allege an ADA claim in
the absence of any evidence to prove disability status. In a rejection of
a cancer survivor's apparent last minute attempt to add an ADA claim
to his lawsuit against his employer, the Ninth Circuit rejected his crea-
tive allegation that "staying awake and alert" is a substantial life activity
under the ADA.26 3 The court affirmed the lower court's refusal to
allow James Innes to amend his complaint to include a claim for can-
cer-based discrimination under the ADA.2" The court held that In-
nes failed to make a prima facie case that his cancer treatment caused
does not, however, specifically provide for additional documentation, and the decision
does not mention whether other applicants are subjected to similar burdens.
258. See infra notes 259-270 and accompanying text (discussing cases where the plaintiff
failed to establish a prima facie case under the ADA).
259. See Farmer v. National City Corp., No. C-2-94-966, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20941
(S.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 1996).
260. See id. at *1-3. Farmer was diagnosed 2-3 months prior to surgery, which took place
in September 1992, and he returned to work in October 1992. Id. at *3, 16. He was "se-
lected for displacement" on November 18, 1992. Id. at *2-3.
261. See id. at *15 ("There is no dispute that plaintiff was treated for prostate cancer and
that he suffered side effects of incontinence and impotence. Hence, under the definition
set forth in the regulations, plaintiff suffered a physical impairment.").
262. Id. at *16.
263. See Innes v. Mechatronics Inc., No. 96-35515, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18000, at *7-8
(9th Cir. July 17, 1997) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)).
264. See id. at *4-5; see also id. at *7-8 (finding that "the district court correctly deter-
mined Innes was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA" because "Innes admitted he
was able to perform all of his job duties while undergoing treatment, despite the treat-
ment's side effects").
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a substantial limitation on a major life activity because he claimed that
his cancer treatment limited only his ability to stay awake and alert.265
Similarly, the District Court for the Northern District of New York
appropriately dismissed an ADA claim where the plaintiff offered
scant evidence that her dismissal was related to her cancer diagno-
sis. 26 6 Angela Giruzzi claimed that Blue Cross "repeatedly denied her
promotions because it regarded her as disabled" due to her breast
cancer. 267 Less than four months after Blue Cross hired her as a sup-
port clerk, Giruzzi took eight months disability leave for surgery and
follow-up treatment for breast cancer.268 She worked for four more
years, before taking another medical leave for recurrence. 269  The
court justifiably held that an interviewer's "one fairly innocuous com-
ment" was not sufficient to prove that he regarded her as disabled. 270
B. Cases Holding that Cancer is a Disability
While a number of federal courts have boxed cancer survivors in
a Catch-22, almost as many federal courts have found cancer survivor-
ship to be a disability.
1. Wessel: The First Jury Verdict.-The first case to result in a jury
verdict under the ADA was brought by an executive who was fired
when his lung cancer metasticized to his brain.271 Charles Wessel, an
experienced security guard executive, was hired in 1986 as the Execu-
tive Director of the security guard division of AIC International.272 Af-
ter being diagnosed with lung cancer in 1987, Wessel returned to
work.2 73 Although he continued to work for the next five years, Wes-
265. See id. at *6-8.
266. See Giruzzi v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Inc., No. 97-CV-078, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15589, at *15-16 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1998).
267. Id. at *1. Giruzzi also claimed that Blue Cross denied her promotions "because she
was older than the successful applicants for the positions she sought." Id.
268. See id. at *2.
269. See id.
270. Id. at *14. The interviewer asked Giruzzi, during an interview for an executive
secretary position, if she "'could handle the job in light of the disability involved."' Id. at
*2 (citation omitted). Giruzzi did not claim that she had a disability, only that Blue Cross
perceived her breast cancer as a disability. Id. at *13.
271. See EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 820 F. Supp. 1060 (N.D. Ill. 1993), modi-
fied, 823 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ill. 1993). The ADA took effect onJuly 26, 1992. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112 (1994). Thejury verdict was entered on March 18, 1993. SeeAICSec. Investigations,
Ltd., 823 F. Supp. at 581.
272. See AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 820 F. Supp. at 1061 (noting that Wessel was a
"widely recognized leader in the security guard industry").
273. See id. (explaining that after being diagnosed with lung cancer, Wessel was away
from work due to surgery and recuperation).
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sel's lung cancer ultimately spread, and his doctors declared that he
had six to twelve months to live.274 Shortly after this diagnosis, AIC
fired Wessel although he had never been subject to any negative work
evaluations. 97 5
AIC moved for summary judgment on the ground that Wessel was
not a qualified individual with a disability.276 Magistrate Judge Guz-
man denied summary judgment, finding that disputed facts remained
as to the medical evidence regarding Wessel's ability to perform his
job.277 The court's analysis focused primarily on whether Wessel was
able to perform the "essential functions" of his job.27' The court ap-
parently assumed, without express discussion, that Wessel's brain tu-
mors were a disability under the ADA2 7 9 because it denied AIC's
motion and set a trial date.2 ° Following an eight-day trial, the jury
found that AIC and its owner had fired Wessel because of his terminal
cancer at a time when he was still able to perform the "essential func-
tions" of his job.21 The jury awarded Wessel $22,000 in back pay,
$50,000 in compensatory damages, and $250,000 in punitive damages
against the defendants.
28 2
2. Decisions that Relied Upon the Regulations to Conclude the Plaintiff
Had a Disability under the ADA.-Most courts that deferred to the
EEOC regulations, as well as contemplated the legislative history of
the ADA, found that cancer survivors stated a claim under the ADA.28 3
274. See id.
275. See id. at 1062 ("Prior to his termination from AIC, Wessel was never subject to any
warning relating to his performance, his attendance, or any disciplinary action.").
276. See id. at 1063.
277. See id. at 1066-67.
278. See id. at 1064 (recognizing that "only those persons who are qualified-that is,
able, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of a
particular job-may state a claim under the ADA" (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8))).
279. See id. at 1063-64. AIC first argued that Wessel could "not meet his initial burden of
proof that he was a qualified individual with a disability." Id. at 1063. Second, AIC argued
that Wessel "could not perform his job without risk to himself and others, regardless of any
reasonable accommodation." Id. at 1066. Without examining the preliminary matter of
whether Wessel's impairment qualified as a disability under the ADA, the court considered
whether Wessel was a "qualified" individual and whether he could perform his job without
risk to himself or others. Of course, such considerations are only necessary if Wessel's
impairment is in fact a disability under the ADA.
280. See id. at 1067.
281. See EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571, 572 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
282. See id. The court later denied AIC's motion for a new trial. The court did, how-
ever, reduce the punitive damages award to $150,000 to comply with the limitation on
punitive and compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (3) (C). See id. at 576.
283. See infra notes 284-344 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of a court's
consideration of the regulations and legislative history).
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The first published, yet unreported, decision in which a federal court
engaged in a detailed analysis of how the ADA applied to cancer-based
discrimination was issued five and a half years after the ADA took ef-
fect when the Southern District of New York denied summary judg-
ment in Berk v. Bates Advertising, USA, Inc. 284 Claudia Berk was hired
by Bates Advertising in 1980 as an advertising executive. 2 5 Berk took
time off for breast cancer treatment in 1993.26 After two and a half
months of medical leave, Berk attempted to return to her position.28 7
At that time, she informed Bates that she could schedule her six to
eight weeks of daily radiation treatments around her work sched-
ule.288 After several months of negotiating with Berk about her work
assignments, Bates fired her.2 9 Berk sued Bates for violating her
rights under the ADA and under state law.29 °
The court denied Bates's summary judgment motion.29' The
court rejected Bates's argument that Berk did not have a disability
when she attempted to return to work because her breast cancer im-
posed "no limitation on her major life activities. 292
First, Judge Charles Haight carefully reviewed the ADA, support-
ing regulations, and the legislative history and concluded that cancer
is an impairment under the ADA. He stated:
The legislative history of the ADA makes clear that cancer
patients were intended to receive protection under the stat-
ute. For example, an early report on the bill lists cancer
among the list of conditions constituting an "impairment."
H.R. Rep. 101-485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 51 (1990).
Persons with a history of cancer are listed among "frequently
occurring examples" of persons with a "record" of impair-
ment. Id. at 52-53. The report explained that testimony
heard by Congress "indicated there still exists widespread ir-
rational prejudice against persons with cancer." Id. at 75.
Likewise, EEOC Regulations implementing the ADA state
284. No. 94 Civ. 9140 (CSH), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19224 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1997).
285. See id. at *2. In 1985, Bates was promoted to Management Representative and be-
came the "Senior Vice President and Management Representative for Bates's TWA and
Philip Morris advertising accounts." Id.
286. See id.
287. Id. at *2-3 (explaining that Berk "stopped reporting to work ... on July 12" and on
"September 24 .... informed Anne Melanson, Director of Human Resources at Bates, that
she was ready to return to work").
288. See id. at *3.
289. Id. at *34.
290. See id. at *1 (citations omitted).
291. See id. at *25.
292. See id. at *10.
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that the provision regarding a "record" of impairment serves,
for example, to protect "former cancer patients from dis-
crimination based on their prior medical history." 29 C.F.R.
Pt. 1630, App. 1630.2(k).
It is clear that cancer patients were contemplated in the
drafting of the ADA. It is also clear that cancer constitutes
an "impairment" under the ADA.298
Second, the court concluded that Berk's breast cancer substan-
tially limited a major life activity. 294 While the court declined to hold
"that cancer, like HIV, is inherently substantially limiting, ' 295 it held
that Berk's cancer was a disability that had in fact substantially limited
her in the past and that had also resulted in "a record of an impair-
ment" because she had had breast cancer surgery. 296 The court
stated:
Plaintiff missed work and was in and out of the hospital on
three occasions over the course of two months for surgical
procedures; this is sufficient evidence of a disability under
the ADA, as her breast cancer substantially limited her major
life activities. Moreover, upon plaintiffs return to work, her
hospitalization established a record of impairment as articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in Arline. Plaintiff, with a history
of battling breast cancer, is precisely one type of person that
Congress intended to receive the protection of the ADA. Ac-
cordingly, at all pertinent times plaintiff has demonstrated
that she had a disability under the statute: first, a physical
impairment under § 12102 (2) (A), and then a record of such
an impairment under § 12102(2) (B).297
Additionally, the court held that Berk was presently substantially lim-
ited in her ability to have children. 298
The court, therefore, found that Berk was a "qualified individual
with a disability" when she returned to work.299 In rejecting the
293. Id. at *10-11.
294. See id. at *14.
295. Id.
296. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (B)).
297. Id. at *14.
298. See id. at n.3 (explaining that because of her "treatment for cancer, [Berk] was
unable to have children" and concluding that "[t] he inability to reproduce and bear chil-
dren constitutes a limitation on a major life activity" (citing Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co.,
916 F. Supp. 797, 802 (N.D. I11. 1996))).
299. See id. at *15 (noting that under the ADA, Berk was required to prove that she was a
"'qualified individual with a disability'" and explaining that "plaintiff was 'qualified' upon
her return to work" (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8))).
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Catch-22 analysis employed in Ellison °° and Gordon,3 °1 the court prop-
erly recognized that an employee does not lose her "qualified" status
simply because she misses ten weeks of work for medical treatment.3 0 2
The court stated:
A person may be qualified even though, as part of a reason-
able accommodation, she requires some time away from
work for treatment. An employer cannot claim that a re-
cently disabled employee missed work and became, there-
fore, "unqualified." Congress, in passing the ADA, certainly
did not intend to provide an incentive to employers to termi-
nate their employees the first time they missed work for a
disability.303
The court thus denied Bates' alternative argument for summary judg-
ment on the ground that Berk was able to return to work after ten
weeks of cancer treatment. 30 4
In a well-reasoned, but extremely cautious opinion, the Eastern
District of Texas considered whether testicular cancer is a disability
under the ADA in Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store.3"5 David Ander-
son began working for Gus Mayer, a women's clothing store, in
1982.306 Six years later, Anderson was diagnosed with testicular can-
cer and received surgery and radiation. 0 7 After Anderson's cancer
and subsequent HIV diagnosis, Gus Mayer selected a new group
health insurance provider, which rejected Anderson's health insur-
300. See Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing
that although plaintiffs breast cancer was an impairment, it was not a disability under the
ADA); see also supra notes 124-155 and accompanying text (examining the Ellison court's
analysis of the ADA).
301. See Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., 100 F.3d 907, 912 (11th Cir. 1996) (failing to
find plaintiffs malignant lymphoma a disability under the ADA because it "did not substan-
tially limit his ability to care for himself or to work"); see also supra notes 156-173 and ac-
companying text (examining the Gordon court's analysis of the ADA).
302. Berk, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19224, at *16-17. The court distinguished Ellison and
Gordon on the facts without deciding "whether these cases .... were properly decided." Id.
at *12.
303. Id. at *16 (footnote omitted). The court recognized that an employee who re-
quires "indefinite leave" as an accommodation may not be qualified. See id. at *16 n.4
(citing Rogers v. International Marine Terminals, 87 F.3d 755, 759-60 (5th Cir. 1996); Hud-
son v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1996)).
304. See id. at *9, *22 (rejecting the defendant's argument that when Berk returned to
work, despite her continuing treatment for cancer, she no longer had a "'disability' under
the [ADA]").
305. 924 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
306. See id. at 769.
307. See id. Anderson was diagnosed with HIV and AIDS in 1991 and ultimately died
prior to the court's decision. See id.
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ance application because of his medical history.3"' Anderson sued
Gus Mayer under the ADA for failing to provide him with the same
health insurance benefits provided to other employees.3 0 9
In determining whether Anderson was a person with a disability,
Judge Howell Cobb reviewed the EEOC regulations and guidelines,310
declaring them to be "immensely probative to the issues of this
case .... Economies of scale, collective expertise, and other factors
weigh in favor of deferring to the agencies who are most familiar with
specialized issues of regulation."3 a The court noted that judicial def-
erence to agency interpretations is most important when judges have
little guidance from other court decisions.312
The court recognized that conditions that are not per se disabili-
ties must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine whether
they meet the definition of a disability under the ADA.3 13 Relying on
three cancer-discrimination cases under other laws, the court con-
cluded that Anderson's testicular cancer, which was treated by surgery
308. See id. at 769-70 (explaining that Randolph Ney, sole proprietor of the Gus Mayer
Boston Store, "told his agent Ross Green to seek other coverage with new carriers" when
some of the employees participating in the group plan informed Ney "that if reduced
premiums were not secured they would withdraw from the group" because of recent pre-
mium increases, due, in part, to Anderson's cancer and AIDS status, and that the new
carrier, John Alden Life Insurance Company, "had the flexibility to deny some members of
the group").
309. See id. at 770-71. The ADA prohibits discrimination in terms of employment, which
includes fringe benefits such as health insurance. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a) (1994) (stating
that a covered entity shall not discriminate in regard to "terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment").
310. See Anderson, 924 F. Supp. at 772. The court cited to the United States Supreme
Court's deference to administrative agency expertise: "The Americans With Disabilities
Act clearly allows the EEOC to promulgate regulations to fill many gaps in the statutory
scheme. In this situation, the EEOC's interpretations (i.e. regulations) are given 'control-
ling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.'" Id.
(quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984)).
311. Id. (construing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837).
312. See id. The court explained:
Not only do courts need to give deference to agency regulations and heightened
deference to agency interpretations of those regulations, but there is an addi-
tional reason why the EEOC interpretation of the ADA is to be respected. When,
as is the case with the ADA, an agency is entrusted with implementing an entirely
new statutory scheme, judicial deference is especially appropriate.
Id.
313. See id. at 775 (concluding that "some conditions have been established through
regulations and case law to be per se disabilities" and explaining that "[i]f a condition has
not been established to be a per se disability" an individual may attempt to classify a condi-
tion using "precedent established under the Rehabilitation Act as a guide").
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and by radiation, "is probably a disability or is regarded as such."3 14
Although it recognized that former cancer patients are frequently
cited as an example of persons who are "regarded as disabled," the
court, "in an abundance of caution" and without further elaboration,
refused to hold "that Anderson's testicular cancer was a condition cov-
ered by section 12101 (2)." 15 In denying defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment,31 6 the court had the luxury of evading the cancer
issue-finding that Anderson's cancer was "probably" but not defi-
nitely a disability-because it ruled that Anderson's HIV was a per se
disability.317
In Mark v. Burke Rehabilitation Hospital,318 the court considered
whether lymphoma is a disability under the ADA.319 Herbert Mark
was a part-time attending physician in the cardiac Rehabilitative Ser-
vice Department at The Burke Rehabilitation Hospital.3 2 After work-
ing for a little more than one year, Mark was diagnosed with
lymphoma, a hematic cancer, in February 1992.321 Although Mark
continued to work during his cancer treatment, he had to avoid con-
tact with patients for three to four days after each of six monthly
chemotherapy treatments. 322 One of Mark's responsibilities was to
cover for another physician when she was on vacation.323 Burke fired
Mark in August 1992 when Mark was unable to postpone a chemo-
314. Id. at 777. The court cited three cases that found cancer to be a disability. Id. at
n.40 (citing Moore v. SunBank of North Florida, 923 F.2d 1423, 1424-25 (11 th Cir. 1991);
Katradis v. Dav-El of Washington, DC, 846 F.2d 1482, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1988); C932 ALI-ABA
343 (July 21, 1994)).
315. Id. (footnote omitted).
316. See id. at 781. When the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, it held that only two issues of fact remained to be determined: "Whether Gus Mayer
... appropriately availed itself of the ADA's undue hardship defense and what recoverable
damage were sustained by Anderson." Id.
317. See id. at 774-75 (recognizing that HIV is a per se disability because it has been
established by the court that conditions such as HIV "impact a major life activity and that
this impact is substantially impairing of a given activity" (citations omitted)).
318. 94 Civ. 3596 (RLC), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5159 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1997).
319. See id. at *9 (considering whether, under the specific facts of the case, plaintiffs
condition qualified as a "disability" under any of the ADA's three tests); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2) (1994) (articulating the three alternative definitions of disability); supra note
71 and accompanying text.
320. See Mark, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5159, at *2.
321. See id. at *2-3.
322. See id. at *3 (explaining that "Mark's white blood cell count usually dropped to low
levels for three to four days following each chemotherapy treatment," and as a precaution
to prevent Mark from contracting an infection, the hospital's Associate Director concluded
that Mark "should not make contact with patients during this time" (citation omitted)).
323. See id. at *2.
400
BETWEEN A DISABILIrY AND A HARD PLACE
therapy treatment to cover for his supervisor while she was on summer
'124vacation.
Judge Robert Carter correctly examined the EEOC regulations
and legislative history to support the characterization of Mark's lym-
phoma as an impairment.3 21 First, Mark's lymphoma affected his di-
gestive system. The court reiterated that the EEOC regulations for
the ADA define "physical ... impairment" as "any physiological disor-
der or condition ... affecting one or more of the... body systems...
[including] digestive."3 26 Therefore, the court concluded that Mark's
cancer was a physical impairment.327
Second, the court held that Mark's lymphoma history was a "rec-
ord of his physical impairment." 28 In giving "great deference ''s 29 to
the EEOC guidelines, the court recognized that the "record of' defi-
nition "protects former cancer patients from discrimination based on
their prior medical history. 33 " Relying on School Board of Nassau
County v. Arline,33 the court held that Mark had a record of a substan-
tially limiting impairment because he was hospitalized for cancer sur-
gery.332 Accordingly, the court denied Burke's summary judgment
motion because its failure to provide Mark with a reasonable accom-
modation of his chemotherapy treatment was prima facie evidence
that it fired him because of his disability. 333
324. See id. at *3 (citation omitted).
325. See id. at *9-12. The court noted that "the legislative history of the ADA indicates
that Congress considered cancer to be an impairment." Id. at *9-10 (citing S. REP. No. 101-
116, 22 (1989), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT,
supra note 67, at 120).
326. See id. at *9 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1)
(1992)); see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERI-
CANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, supra note 67, at 120.
327. See Mark, 199 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5159, at *10.
328. See id. at *10-11 (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k) (1992)).
329. Id. at *10 n.5 ("In reviewing cases under the federal disability statutes, courts must
give 'great deference' to guidelines of the EEOC, though those guidelines are not bind-
ing." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Castellano v. City of New York, 946 F.
Supp. 249, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Blum v. Bacon, 470 U.S. 132, 141 (1982); Teal v.
State of Conn., 645 F.2d 133, 137 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981), affd, 457 U.S. 440 (1982))).
330. Id. at *10-11 (quoting, in a parenthetical, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k) (1992)).
331. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
332. See Mark, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *12 (analyzing that under Arline an impairment
that is "'serious enough to require hospitalization' [is] an impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities" and that, under Arline, "a hospitalization suffi-
ciently represents a record of that impairment" (quoting and citing Arline, 480 U.S. at
281)).
333. See id. at *22 (concluding that, because Burke "knew about the physical limitations
that Mark experienced after chemotherapy treatments[,] . . . Burke had an affirmative
obligation to reasonably accommodate those physical limitations" (citation omitted)).
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In a rare jury verdict, a testicular cancer survivor won damages
against the employer who fired him. 34 John Bizelli was hired as a
chemical operator by Parker Amchem in 1987.Y15 Seven years later,
he was diagnosed with testicular cancer.33 6 After six months of non-
work related medical leave, Bizelli's physician suggested that he could
return to work with lifting restrictions.337 Parker Amchem refused to
allow Bizelli to return to limited duty and ultimately refused to allow
him to return to full duty unless he successfully completed a physical
examination to which no other employee was subject.33 8
Judge Limbaugh relied on the ADA's legislative history and Mark
v. Burke Rehabilitation Hospital3 9 to first acknowledge that "[t] here is
no dispute that cancer can constitute a physical impairment under the
ADA."'34 0 The court then concluded that Bizelli's particular medical
history placed him under the protection of the ADA:
Plaintiff has established a record of an impairment. The
Plaintiff had been on a leave of absence and receiving short
term disability benefits since he was diagnosed with testicular
cancer. Moreover, the Defendants were aware of both his
chemotherapy and his surgery. Plainly, this provision of the
ADA was intended to ensure that former cancer patients are
not discriminated against on the basis of their prior medical
history. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has
met his burden of establishing that he is a qualified individ-
ual with a disability under the ADA. 4 1
The court denied Parker Amchem's summary judgment motion be-
cause Bizelli established a genuine issue as to whether he could per-
334. See Bizelli v. Parker Amchem, 17 F. Supp. 2d 949, 951 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (noting that
ajury returned a verdict in favor of Bizelli on November 24, 1997); see also Bizelli v. Parker
Amchem, 981 F. Supp. 1254, 1258 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (denying the defendants' motion for
summary judgment on the basis that the defendants had "not advanced . .. a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for their actions"). Of the twenty-four lower court cases dis-
cussed in this Article, only Bizelli, Wessel, and Gordon resulted in reported jury verdicts for
the plaintiffs. See supra notes 156-173, 271-282 and accompanying text (discussing the
Gordon and Wessel decisions); infra notes 335-338 and accompanying text (discussing the
Bizelli decision).
335. See Bizelli, 981 F. Supp. at 1255.
336. See id.
337. See id. at 1256.
338. See id. (explaining that "[a]lthough [Bizelli] successfully completed the first part of
his medical examination, he was given certain temporary restrictions after his functional
capacity exam").
339. 94 Civ. 3596 (RLC), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5159 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1997).
340. Bizelli, 981 F. Supp. at 1257 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990), re-
printed in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITY AcT, supra note 67, at
468; Mark, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5159).
341. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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form the essential functions of his job with reasonable
accommodations. 4 2
A jury considered Bizelli's two claims: whether Parker Amchem
had a duty to accommodate his return to work with a temporary lifting
restriction and whether he was fired because of his record of testicular
cancer.3 4 The jury awarded Bizelli $5,000 in lost wages and benefits
and $400,000 in compensatory damages on the first count; it awarded
$50,000 in lost wages and benefits and $100,000 in compensatory
damages on the second count.
3 44
3. Decisions that Recognized that Summary Judgment is Inappropriate
to Resolve Whether the Plaintiff has a Disability Because this Determination
Usually Involves Disputes over Material Facts.-Two years after the ADA
took effect, 45 the United States District Court for the District of
Maine held that the issue of whether a plaintiff who suffered from
cancer had a disability under the ADA is a question of material fact.
346
Melvin Braverman worked for the Penobscot Shoe Company from
1983 to 1992, when he was diagnosed with prostate cancer.3 "7 Penob-
scot fired Braverman the first day that he returned to work from a
leave for radiation treatment.: 4 Judge Brody denied the defendant's
summary judgment motion on Braverman's claim that Penobscot
fired him because of his cancer.3 49 The court held that summary
judgment was inappropriate because the parties disagreed upon
whether the facts of the case were sufficient to support the conclusion
that Braverman was substantially limited in a major life activity and
upon whether the facts of the case supported that Braverman had a
record of impairment under the ADA.3 5 °
342. See id. at 1258.
343. See Bizelli v. Parker Amchem, 17 F. Supp. 2d 949, 951 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
344. See id. The court denied defendant's motion for a new trial or to amend the judg-
ment. See id. at 955.
345. See id.; see also supra note 271 (explaining that the ADA took effect on July 26,
1992).
346. See Braverman v. Penobscot Shoe Co., 859 F. Supp. 596, 603 (D. Me. 1994) (finding
that Bravernan "has raised a question of material fact about having a disability, and is,
therefore, within the protected class for summary judgment purposes"). The court also
found that "Braverman ha[d] narrowly raised a question of material fact regarding
whether Defendants had discriminatory intent based on the timing of Braverman's termi-
nation." Id.
347. See id. at 599.
348. See id. Penobscot fired Braverman on August 3, 1992, just one week after the ADA
took effect. See id.
349. See id. at 603.
350. Id. Unlike the courts in Gallagher and Nave, supra, at notes 225-247, the court in
Braverman correctly recognized the material-fact dispute inherent in such ADA claims.
Judge Brody stated:
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In Overturf v. Penn Ventilator Co.,35 1 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered whether
Penn Ventilator regarded Steven Overturf as disabled when it fired
him after he was diagnosed with a tumor behind his eye.352 Judge
Curtis Joyner ruled that Overturf did not allege sufficient evidence
that created an issue of fact as to whether his tumor substantially lim-
ited his ability to see, despite the fact that Overturf experienced
double and triple vision and had lost all peripheral vision.3 "3  The
court denied Penn Ventilator's summary judgment motion, however,
because it found a question of fact as to whether Penn Ventilator per-
ceived Overturf as disabled.154 Overturf alleged that a supervisor had
noted at a managers' meeting that he had a "brain tumor" and later
remarked that the company needed "youth, vigor and health and that
Plaintiff was better off being terminated because he could concentrate
on getting treatment and not let other things, like his job, take prece-
dence over his health.
3 55
In a similar case, Sandra Vendetta claimed that the Bell Atlantic
Corporation transferred her to an undesirable location and treated
her differently from other employees after she was diagnosed with
Hodgkin's Disease. 6 Judge Buckwalter held that Vendetta raised an
Braverman argues that his major life activities were substantially limited at
the time of his termination. He had just missed a significant amount of work due
to radiation treatment, and the treatment had caused various intestinal, rectal,
anal and urinary difficulties. Although Braverman had an excellent response to
the treatment, Braverman's cancer was not in remission when he returned to
work at the Company. A question of material fact obviously remains about
whether this constitutes a substantial limit on Braverman's major life activities.
A question of material fact also remains over whether Braverman had a rec-
ord of, or was regarded as being substantially limited at the time of his termina-
tion. Braverrnan argues that Hansen [his supervisor] regarded him as disabled.
Braverman also maintains that his leave for radiation treatment established a rec-
ord of disability. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281, 107 S.
Ct. 1123, 1127-28, 94 L. Ed. 2d 307 (1987) (Under the Rehabilitation Act, hospi-
talization sufficient to establish substantial limitation of major life activity). Sum-
mary judgment is therefore inappropriate on the issue of Braverman's alleged
disability because of the factual issues that remain for resolution.
Id.
351. 929 F. Supp. 895 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
352. See id. at 898-99.
353. See id. at 898.
354. See id. at 898-99.
355. Id. at 899.
356. Vendetta v. Bell Atlantic Corp., No. Civ. A. 97-4838, 1998 WL 57511, at *4-5 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 8, 1998). In her suit against Bell Atlantic, Vendetta brought two claims under the
ADA. First, she claimed that Bell Atlantic discriminated against her because of her disabil-
ity. See id. at *1. Second, she claimed that Bell Atlantic created a hostile work environment
in violation of the ADA. See id.
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issue of fact as to whether she had a disability because she continued
to suffer fatigue resulting from chemotherapy. 357 Additionally, her su-
pervisor's negative comments about her health "strongly evince[d] a
fact issue as to whether Vendetta was 'regarded as' disabled by" her
employer.358
Three other cancer survivors who were fired several years after
their diagnoses also withstood their employers' summary judgment
motions by alleging sufficient evidence to prove that they had a disa-
bility under the ADA. The Village Green Care Center hired Patricia
Shea in October 1991. 35' From July 1994 until December 1994, she
worked part-time while receiving cancer treatment.360 Although she
returned to work full-time in early 1995,361 her employer subsequently
fired her in January 1996.62 Senior Judge Britt denied the defend-
ant's summary judgment motion on the ground that Shea presented
evidence that she had a record of a disability3 63 and that her supervi-
sors regarded her as disabled. 64
Another cancer survivor defeated her employer's summary judg-
ment motion twenty-three years after her initial cancer diagnosis.3 65
Dodge Management Company, which managed rental properties,
hired Marilyn Cornman in 1973.366 Three years later, Cornman had a
mastectomy for breast cancer and reconstructive surgery with silicone
357. See id. at *23-24. The court noted that Vendetta's cancer was in remission "during
the period at issue in her [c]omplaint"; however, the record stated that "Vendetta contin-
ued to suffer from the effects of her cancer treatment, particularly chemotherapy, and that
the greatest effect was fatigue." Id. at *23. The court also noted that "Vendetta exper-
ienced a severe bout of arthritis around the time she returned to Bell." Id.
358. Id. at *24 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c)).
359. See Shea v. Village Green Care Ctr., Ltd., No. 5:97-CV-343-BR3, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16470, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 1998).
360. See id.
361. See id.
362. See id. at *2 (citation omitted).
363. See id. at *6. The court stated that:
[p] laintiff has put forth evidence that she had a record of disability from her 1994
diagnosis and treatment of and recovery from cancer. . . . Further, plaintiffs
treating oncologist, Dr. Joseph Moore, stated that her treatment required
monthly hospitalization of five days and kept her from working and limited other
major life activities from June until December 1994.
Id. at *6 (internal citations omitted).
364. See id. at *6-7. Shea's employer "expressed concerns about her future health and its
impact upon responsibilities she may have in the future." Id. (citation omitted). He also
"told her that her job was in jeopardy because [her supervisors] feared her cancer would
return, rendering her unable to do her job." Id. (citation omitted)
365. See Cornman v. N.P. Dodge Management Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1068 (D. Minn.
1999).
366. See id.
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implants.367 After her implants ruptured in 1992, Cornman sought
four to six weeks leave to recover from surgery to remove the im-
plants.3 68 Although her employer told her not to discuss her surgery
with the owners of a residential complex that had high vacancy rates,
Cornman informed the owners that her temporary replacement
would work on their property while she was recuperating from surgery
to remove breast implants.369 Cornman was fired when she returned
from medical leave.37°
In denying the defendant's summary judgment motion,371 Judge
Frank considered the three-part definition of disability in determining
whether Cornman's medical condition was a disability. First, the court
held that Cornman did not have a disability when she was fired be-
cause she did not then have cancer and "the silicone leakage did not
itself amount to a disability under the ADA. '3 72 The court held, how-
ever, that Cornman sufficiently alleged that she had a record of a disa-
bility because she had spent two weeks in the hospital in 1976 for
breast cancer surgery373 and because her mastectomy had had a signif-
icant impact on her sexual self-image. 374 Additionally, the court held
that Cornman raised facts that suggested her employer regarded her
cancer as a disability because he asked her not to disclose her medical
history to the residential complex owners. 5
367. See id.
368. See id. at 1069.
369. See id.
370. See id. Cornman never actually returned to work. See id. After her medical leave,
Cornman arranged a meeting with Paul Curry, then president of N.P. Dodge, "to discuss
when [Cornman] would be cleared to return to work." Id. At this meeting, Curry fired
Cornman. See id.
371. See id. at 1074.
372. Id. at 1071.
373. See id. at 1071-72. In support of its conclusion that Cornman's hospital stay created
a record of a disability, the court cited School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273
(1987). See supra notes 331-332 and accompanying text (discussing the Arline decision).
374. See Cornman, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1072. The court extended the Supreme Court's
rationale in Bradgon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), which held that reproduction is a major
life activity, to conclude that:
an impairment which impedes, limits, or otherwise negatively affects a person's
sexual relations in a substantial way may be considered a disability under the
ADA. This society clearly considers a woman's breasts to be a integral part of her
sexuality, the loss of which would necessarily involve some significant impact on
her sexual self-image.
Id.
375. See id. (discussing "Curry's admonition to [Cornman] not to inform clients of her
illness"). The court further stated:
Thus, whether or not Plaintiffs cancer genuinely had a substantial impact on a
major life activity, it is possible to conclude that, while Defendant may not have
had a skewed perception of the effect of a cancer recurrence, Defendant acted
[Voi. 59:352
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Finally, Stanley Freiman was fired four years after being diag-
nosed with throat cancer.37 6 Freiman worked for the Chicago Hous-
ing Authority (CHA) from 1982 to 1995."' v After throat cancer
surgery in February 1991, he used a tracheostomy to breathe and to
speak.378 Because he had trouble breathing, Freiman could not walk
and talk at the same time.379  CHA fired Freiman during a downsiz-
ing.380 Freiman claimed that after his surgery, "he was taunted by sev-
eral fellow employees, including his supervisor, who called him
'button neck' and 'dark cloud.' '3 81 Although the court did not explic-
itly discuss whether Freiman's throat cancer was a disability, it held
that Freiman's major life activities were substantially limited when he
was fired because his "ability to speak and breathe... was substantially
limited."38 2
C. Analysis: Why Some Federal Courts Place ADA Plaintiffs in a
Catch-22
Most of the decisions discussed in this Article are resolutions of
summary judgment motions.3 8 3 Unfortunately, ADA cases are particu-
out of fear of the reaction of clients. In other words, even if Plaintiffs situation
and the record thereof does not place her squarely within the definition of a
'record of disability, she may be classified as a person with a disability through an
analysis which bridges the 'record of and 'regarded as' prongs of the definition
of a disabled person in that she has a record of a condition which, in light of the
attitudes of Defendant's clients, Defendant regarded as a disability....
The court concludes that there is adequate evidence in the record from
which a reasonable jury could conclude that the Defendant became aware of
Plaintiffs past impairment-an impairment which led to a grave anatomical loss,
and which either did substantially limit a major life activity or might be perceived
as so limiting by Defendant's clients-and sought to terminate Plaintiffs employ-
ment as a result, out of fear of a recurrence of cancer.
Id. at 1072-73.
376. See Freiman v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 96-C-4101, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19562, at
*1-3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 1997).
377. See id. at *1.
378. See id. at *1-2.
379. See id. at *2.
380. See id. at *2-3.
381. Id. at *6.
382. Id. at *9.
383. Plaintiffs' complaints were dismissed prior to trial in eleven of the twenty-four
cases. The defendants prevailed at summary judgment in Innes v. Mechatronics, Inc., No. 96-
35515, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18000 (9th Cir. July 17, 1997); Ellison v. Software Spectrum Inc.,
85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996); Barger v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., No. C97-4418
FMS, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 945 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1999); Giruzzi v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield,
Inc., No. 97-CV-0078, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15589 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1998); Olmeda v. New
York State Department of Civil Service, No. 96 Civ. 7557 (HB), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 345
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1998); Hirsch v. National Mall & Service, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 977 (N.D. Ill.
1997); Madjlessi v. Macy's West, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Cook v. Robert G.
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larly poorly suited for resolution at summary judgment because in
many cases, the parties disagree on material facts as to whether the
plaintiff's impairment substantially limits a major life activity. 8 4 With
the exception of BizellrI15 and Wessel,386 no published decisions reveal
the post-summary judgment disposition of these cases.
Three factors appear to distinguish the eleven decisions that
found that the plaintiffs' cancer was covered by at least one of the
three-parts of the ADA's definition of a disability from the thirteen
decisions that did not. First, plaintiffs who pleaded that they were cov-
Waters, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 1463 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Malewski v. Nationsbank of Rorida, 978 F.
Supp. 1095 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Nave v. Wooldridge Construction, No. 96-2891, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9203 (E.D. PaJune 30, 1997); and Farmer v. National City Corp., No. C-2-94-966, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20941 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 1996).
The plaintiffs withstood defendants' motions for summary judgment in Cornman v.
NP. Dodge Management Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (D. Minn. 1999); Shea v. Village Green Care
Center, Ltd., No. 5:97-CV-343-BR3, 1998 WL 960307 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 1998); Bizelli v.
Parker Amchem, 17 F. Supp. 2d 949 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Vendetta v. Bell Atlantic Corp., No. CIV.
A. 97-4838, 1998 WL 575111 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 1998); Berk v. Bates Advertising USA, Inc., No.
94 Civ. 9140 (CSH), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19224 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1997); Mark v. Burke
Rehabilitation Hospital, 94 Civ. 3596 (RLC), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5159 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16,
1997); Overturf v. Penn Ventilator Co., 929 F. Supp. 895 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Anderson v. Gus
Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Tex. 1996); Braverman v. Penobscot Shoe Co., 859 F.
Supp. 596 (D. Me. 1994); and EEOC v. AIC Security Investigation, [sic], Ltd., 820 F. Supp.
1060 (N.D. Ill. 1993). Though the district court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment in EEOC v. RtJ. Gallagher Co., 959 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Tex. 1997), on appeal the
Fifth Circuit reversed EEOC v. RlJ. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999). In Frieman v.
Chicago Housing Authority, No. 96C 4101, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19562 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2,
1997), the court denied plaintiffs summary judgment motion. With the exception of
Bizelli, 981 F. Supp. 1254, and EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 820 F. Supp. 1060, no
post summary judgment decisions were published. Juries returned verdicts for the plain-
tiffs in Bizelli, 981 F. Supp. 1254 and EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 820 F. Supp.
1060, which the court affirmed, and Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Associates, 100 F.3d 907 (11th
Cir. 1996), which the court reversed.
384. See Colker, supra note 121, for an excellent discussion of how many federal courts
are abusing summary judgment, in two ways, to dismiss ADA complaints. Colker stated:
First, district courts are refusing to send 'normative' factual questions to the jury,
such as issues of whether an individual has a 'disability.' . . . Instead, trial courts
are substituting their own normative judgments for that of the jury. The question
of whether cases go to the jury is significant because it can affect overall out-
comes. Eisenberg has found, for example, that plaintiffs fare better injury trials
than in court trials in civil rights, employment discrimination, and prisoner civil
rights cases. Thus, a reluctance to send cases to the jury may make a difference in
substantive outcome under the ADA.
Courts are also abusing the summary judgment device by creating an impos-
sibly high threshold of proof for defeating a summary judgment motion.
Colker, supra note 121, at 101-02 (internal footnotes omitted).
385. See Bizelli v. Parker Amchem, 981 F. Supp. 1254 (E.D. Mo. 1997); see also Bizelli v.
Parker Amchem, 17 F. Supp. 2d 949 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
386. See E.E.O.C. v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ill. 1993); see
also E.E.O.C. v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. (Ill.) May 22, 1995).
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ered by all three parts of the definition of a person with a disability
provided courts with more opportunities to reject summary judg-
ment.3 87 Second, courts that did not give deference to the regulations
and/or the legislative history were less likely to recognize that Con-
gress intended the ADA to avoid confining plaintiffs in a Catch-22.
Third, courts seemed more receptive to characterizing certain cancers
as more disabling than others.
Turning first to the importance of comprehensive pleading,
those plaintiffs who pleaded that they had a disability under more
than one part of the three-part definition were more likely to con-
vince the court that at least one part of the definition covered them.
For example, Herbert Mark asserted that his lymphoma was a disabil-
ity, that his hospitalization for cancer surgery established a record of a
disability, and that The Burke Rehabilitation Hospital fired him be-
cause it regarded his lymphoma as a disability. 88 The court ruled that
Mark's hospitalization for cancer surgery "sufficiently represents a rec-
ord of that impairment."3 89 Because the court found sufficient evi-
dence to hold that Mark had a record of an impairment, it did not
consider whether his cancer was a disability at the time he was fired.39 °
Had Mark pled only that he had a disability, the court may not so
easily have rejected the defendant's summary judgment motion.
On the contrary, John Nave did not claim that his surgery to stage
and to treat his Hodgkin's Disease established a record of an impair-
ment.3 91 The court rejected Nave's claim that his Hodgkin's Disease
was a disability because Nave failed to present evidence that it substan-
tially limited a major life activity.39 2 Thus, the court boxed Nave into a
Catch-22 by dismissing his claim because he was not presently limited
in his ability to work, among other activities. Had Nave pleaded that
387. Compare Cook, 980 F. Supp. at 1463 (granting the defendant's motion for summary
judgment when the plaintiff only claimed that her impairment actually substantially lim-
ited a major life activity), and Farmer, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20941 (granting the defendant's
motion for summaryjudgment when the plaintiff claimed that his impairment was substan-
tially limiting and he was regarded as having a substantially limiting impairment), with
Common, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment
after considering all three prongs of the ADA's definition of disability), and Braverman, 859
F. Supp. 596 (same).
388. SeeMarkv. Burke Rehab. Hosp., 94 Civ. 3596 (RLC), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5159, at
*9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1997).
389. Id. at *12 (citing School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987)).
390. See id. at *11-12.
391. See Nave v. Wooldridge Constr., No. 96-2891, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9203, at *9 n.5
(E.D. Pa. June 30, 1997) (declining to consider whether the plaintiff established a record
of a substantially limiting impairment because the "plaintiff assert[ed] no claim in his
pleading, motion or responses that he has a record of such an impairment").
392. See id. at *31.
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his hospitalization established a record of an impairment, his claim
may have survived summary judgment.
Next, courts that did not defer to the EEOC regulations393 and/
or to the legislative history394 of the ADA were more likely to rule for
the defendant than courts that did defer to the regulations and/or
legislative history. Although most of the courts at least mentioned the
EEOC regulations that interpret the definitions of the ADA,395 only
393. Professor Colker argued that one reason federal courts reject the majority of ADA
claims is that many courts have refused to defer to the EEOC regulations, despite a con-
gressional mandate that they do so. Colker, supra note 121, at 133-59. Colker contended:
First, the plain language of the ADA requires courts to defer to the EEOC's
historic views under section 504 as well as its contemporaneous view under the
ADA. Congress has expressly delegated enforcement of the employment discrim-
ination provisions of the ADA to the EEOC.
Not only was the EEOC required by Congress to draft regulations, but it did so in
a manner that is usually accorded the highest judicial deference.
Second, regulations are particularly entitled to deference when it is clear that
Congress has put its stamp of approval on them. By directly incorporating pre-
existing section 504 EEOC regulations into the ADA, Congress clearly indicated
that it approved of the agency's historical interpretations of disability discrimina-
tion law.
Yet given Congress' clear statement of intentions, the courts should defer to
the views of the EEOC under the ADA.
Nonetheless... many lower courts have refused to defer to the EEOC's views
under the ADA. The EEOC's ADA regulations have been a victim of the agency's
historic second-class status; the courts continue to disregard its regulations and
guidance, even when a very strong case can be made that Congress intended
courts to give deference to those rules under the ADA.
Id. at 134-36 (internal footnotes omitted).
394. See id. at 137. Professor Colker noted that although courts should consider the
legislative history of the ADA, the mandate for deferring to legislative history is not nearly
as strong as is the mandate for deferring to agency regulations. Id. at 136-37.
The use of legislative history has its critics. Justice Scalia has suggested that
young staffers may seek to transform obscure district court cases into the law of
the land by planting language in congressional committee reports. Even Judge
Mikva, who is less skeptical of legislative history than Justice Scalia, acknowledges
that colloquies on the floor of Congress are often not worthy of serious considera-
tion. Nonetheless, because the ADA was passed by an overwhelming margin, its
legislative history is arguably entitled to significant weight. The House of Repre-
sentatives approved the conference report on the ADA by a vote of 377-28 on July
12, 1990, and the Senate approved the conference report on July 13, 1990, by a
vote of 91-6. Thus, the ADA is a consensus statute whose legislative history should
arguably be given much deference.
Id. at 137 n.192 (internal citations omitted).
395. Of the twenty-four cases discussed, only five failed to cite to federal regulations. See
Vendetta v. Bell Atlantic Corp., No. Civ. A. 97-4838, 1998 WL 575111, at *22 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
8, 1998) (ignoring EEOC regulations and requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate her enti-
tlement to a reasonable accommodation); Shea v. Village Green Care Ctr., Ltd., 5:97-CV-
343-BR3, 1998 WL 960397 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 1998) (relying upon traditional summary
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five decisions discussed the EEOC regulations and the legislative his-
tory of the ADA in considering whether the plaintiffs had a disabil-
ity.396 The plaintiff prevailed in each of those cases, except in Nave,
where the court found that Nave "presented no evidence that he is
substantially limited in his ability to care for himself, perform manual
tasks, or stand." '397 Courts that did not consider the legislative history
ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the defendants.39 8
Finally, the type of cancer the plaintiff had appears to have some
effect on the courts' analysis of whether the cancer substantially lim-
judgment standard of review alone); Olmeda v. New York State Dep't of Civil Serv., No. 96
Civ. 7557 (HB), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 345 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1998) (relying on the plain-
tiffs testimony that his leukemia was in remission and that he was not limited in any way to
conclude that the plaintiff was not disabled); Freiman v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No 96C
4101, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19562 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 1997) (denying the plaintiffs summary
judgment motion without consideration of the EEOC's regulations); EEOC v. R.J. Gal-
lagher Co., 959 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Tex. 1997), rev'd, 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying
the facts alleged by the plaintiff to a formula-like series of questions about the abilities of
the plaintiff, and the motivations of the employer in the adverse employment action).
396. See Berk v. Bates Advert. USA, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 9140 (CSH), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19224, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1997) (discussing the legislative history of the ADA and
concluding that the ADA was intended to protect cancer patients); Bizelli v. Parker
Amchem, 981 F. Supp. 1254, 1257 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (interpreting the legislative history of
the ADA and finding that cancer may be considered a physical impairment under the
statute); Nave v. Wooldridge Constr., No. 96-2891, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9203, at *10-11
(E.D. Pa. June 30, 1997) (relying on the EEOC's regulations to establish whether the plain-
tiffs disability substantially limited any major life activities); Mark v. Burke Rehab. Hosp.,
94 Civ. 3596 (RLC), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5159, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1997) (utilizing
EEOC regulations to evaluate whether the plaintiffs cancer constituted a physical or
mental impairment under the ADA); Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp.
763, 774-75, 777 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (relying heavily upon agency's guidance in determining
if the plaintiff had a disability that substantially limited major life activities).
397. Nave, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9203, at *13.
398. Seventeen of the twenty-four decisions did not discuss legislative history. Of these,
the defendants prevailed in Innes v. Mechatronics, Inc., No. 96-35515, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
18000 (9th Cir. July 17, 1997), Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Associates, 100 F.3d 907 (11th Cir.
1996), Ellison v. Software Spectrum Inc., 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996), Barger v. Owens-Brockway
Glass Container, Inc., No. C97-4418 FMS, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 945 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29,
1999), Giruzzi v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, No. 97-CV-0078, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15589
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1998), Olmeda, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 345, Hirsch v. National Mall &
Service, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 977 (N.D. Ill. 1997), Madjlessi v. Macy's West, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 736
(N.D. Cal. 1997), Cook v. Robert G. Waters, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 1463 (M.D. Fla. 1997), Malewski
v. NationsBank of Florida, 978 F. Supp. 1095 (S.D. Fla. 1997), Farmer v. National City Corp.,
No. C-2-94-966, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20941 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 1996), R.J. Gallagher Co.,
959 F. Supp. 405. The plaintiffs prevailed in Cornman v. N.P. Dodge Management Co., 43 F.
Supp. 2d 1066 (D. Minn. 1999), Vendetta, No. Civ. A. 97-4838, 1998 WL 575111, Shea, 1998
WL 960307, Braverman v. Penobscot Shoe Co., 859 F. Supp. 596 (D. Me. 1994), and Freiman,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19562.
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ited a major life activity.3 99 Survivors of solid tumors and testicular
cancer fared well. Of the eight survivors with solid tumors or testicu-
lar cancer, two prevailed at trial,4 ° ° and three others survived summary
judgment motions.40 1 Survivors of breast and hematic cancers seldom
convinced courts that their cancer substantially limited their major
life activities. Of the six breast cancer cases analyzed, only Berk and
Cornman prevailed.40 2 Of the seven plaintiffs with hematic cancers,
only Mark and Vendetta prevailed.403
Several factors seemed to have no impact on the plaintiffs'
chance of success. Gender had no effect; women prevailed at the
same rates as did men.40 4 Additionally, whether the plaintiff was in
399. Given that these twenty-four cases represent less than one-tenth of one percent of
the cancer-based claims filed under the ADA, this analysis is more anecdotal than statisti-
cally conclusive. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
400. Bizelli, who had testicular cancer, and Wessel, who had a brain tumor, won jury
verdicts that were upheld on appeal. See Bizelli, 17 F. Supp. 2d at 953; EEOC v. AIC Sec.
Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.2d 1276, 1288-89 (7th Cir. 1995).
401. In Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (testicular
cancer); Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Civ. No. 95-0056-H (W.D. Ca. Oct. 17, 1996) (brain
tumor); and Overturf v. Penn Ventilator Co., 929 F. Supp. 895 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (eye tumor),
the plaintiffs withstood summary judgment motions. The defendants in Barger v. Owens-
Brockway Glass Container, Inc., No. C97-4418 FMS, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 945 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
29, 1999) (mandibular) and Cook v. Robert G. Waters, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 1463 (M.D. Fla.
1997) (brain) were granted summary judgment.
402. The court denied the defendants' summary judgment motions in Cornman, 43 F.
Supp. 2d at 1068, 1073-74, and Berk v. Bates Advert. USA, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 9140 (CSH), 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19224, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1997). The court granted summary judg-
ment to the defendants in Ellison, 85 F.3d at 189, 193, Giruzzi, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15589,
at *24, Madjlessi, 993 F. Supp. at 743, and Malewski, 978 F. Supp. at 1105.
403. Mark had lymphoma and Vendetta had Hodgkin's Disease. See supra notes 313-326,
349-351 and accompanying text. Five plaintiffs who had hematic cancers did not survive
summaryjudgment. The plaintiffs in Olmeda, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 345, and R.J. Gallagher
Co., 959 F. Supp. 405, had leukemia. The plaintiffs in Gordon, 100 F.3d 907, and Hirsch, 989
F. Supp. 977, had lymphoma, while the plaintiff in Nave v. Woolridge Construction, No. 96-
2891, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9203 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1997), had Hodgkin's Disease.
404. Female plaintiffs withstood defendants' motions for summary judgment in four
cases. See Cornman, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1066; Shea v. Village Green Care Ctr., Ltd., No. 5:97-CV-
343-BR3, 1998 WL 960307 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 1998); Vendetta v. Bell Atlantic Corp., No.
Civ. A. 97-4838, 1998 WL 575111 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 1998); Berk, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19224. In five cases, female plaintiffs saw the court grant the defendants' motions for
summaryjudgment. See Ellison, 85 F.3d 187; Giruzzi, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15589; Madjlessi,
993 F. Supp. 736; Malewski, 978 F. Supp. 1095; Cook v. Robert G. Waters, Inc., 980 F. Supp.
1463 (M.D. Fla. 1997). Male plaintiffs withstood defendants' motions for summary judg-
ment in eight cases. See EEOC v. RJ. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999); Freiman
v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 96C 4101, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19562 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2,
1997); Bizelli v. Parker Amchem, 981 F. Supp. 1254 (E.D. Mo. 1997); Mark v. Burke Rehab.
Hosp., 94 Civ. 3596 (RLC), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5159 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1997); Overturf
v. Penn Ventilator Co., 929 F. Supp. 895 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston
Store, 924 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Tex. 1996); Braverman v. Penobscot Shoe Co., 859 F. Supp.
596 (D. Me. 1994); EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
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treatment or was post-treatment at the time of the discrimination had
no effect on the outcome.4"5 Finally, with the possible exception of
cases brought in Florida and in the Northern District of California,
jurisdiction had little effect on the outcome.4 °6
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S ADA
RULINGS (1998-1999)
Most of the lower court decisions discussed above were issued
prior to any consideration of the ADA by the United States Supreme
Court. Until its 1997-1998 term, the Court refused to consider the
application of the ADA. Since then, however, the Court has inter-
In seven cases, male plaintiffs saw the court grant the defendants' motions for summary
judgment. See Innes v. Mechatronics Inc., No. 96-35515, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18000 (9th
Cir. July 17, 1997); Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assoc., 100 F.3d 907 (11th Cir. 1996); Barger
v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., No. C97-4418 FMS, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 945
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1999); Olmeda v. New York State Dep't of Civil Serv., No. 96 Civ. 7557
(HB), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 345 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1998); Hirsch v. National Mall & Serv.,
Inc. 989 F. Supp. 977 (N.D. Il. 1997); Nave, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9203; Farmer v. National
City Corp., No. C-2-94-966, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20941 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 1996).
405. Three plaintiffs who were discriminated against during treatment survived sum-
mary judgment, R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, Berk, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19224, Mark,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5159, while six plaintiffs who were treated differently after treatment
survived summary judgment, Cornman, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1066, Vendetta, 1998 WL 57511, Shea,
1998 WL 960307, Bizelli, 981 F. Supp. 1254, Freiman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19562, Anderson,
924 F. Supp. 763. Three plaintiffs who were discriminated against during treatment lost on
the defendant's motion for summary judgment, Cook, 980 F. Supp. 1463, Hirsch, 989 F.
Supp. 977, Gordon, 100 F.3d 907, while eight plaintiffs who were treated differently after
treatment lost on the defendant's motion for summary judgment, Barger, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 945, Giruzzi, 1998 LEXIS 15589, Olmeda, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 345, Madjilessi, 993 F.
Supp. 736, Malewski, 978 F. Supp. 1095, Nave, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9203, Ellison, 85 F.2d
187, Farmer, 1996 LEXIS 20941.
406. Defendants prevailed in the three Florida cases, Cook, 980 F. Supp. 1463, Gordon,
100 F.3d 907, and Malewski, 978 F. Supp. 1095, all of which relied on Ellison, 85 F.2d 187.
Defendants also prevailed in the two cases from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, Madjlessi, 993 F. Supp. 736, and Barger, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 945. In other jurisdictions, with more than one case, the decisions were divided.
For example, in Texas, the plaintiffs survived defendant's motion for summary judgment
in Anderson, 924 F. Supp. 763 (Eastern District), and in KJ. Gallagher, 959 F. Supp. 405
(Southern District), but lost in Ellison, 85 F.2d 187 (Fifth Circuit). In New York, the plain-
tiffs survived summary judgment in Berk, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19224, and in Mark, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5159 (Southern District), but lost in Giruzzi, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15589
(Northern District) and in Olmeda, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 345 (Southern District). In Illi-
nois, the plaintiffs survived summary judgment in AIC Sec. Investigations, 823 F. Supp. 571
(Northern District), but lost in Hirsch, 989 F. Supp. 977 (Northern District). Finally, in
Pennsylvania, the plaintiffs survived summaryjudgment in Overturf, 929 F. Supp. 895 and in
Vendetta, 1998 WL 575111 (Eastern District), but lost in Nave, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9203
(Eastern District).
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preted the ADA in five decisions.4" 7 One decision considered
whether an individual who was disabled enough to receive Social Se-
curity Disability Insurance was too disabled to be a qualified employee
under the ADA.4" 8 The other four decisions analyzed the factors that
a lower court must consider to determine whether an individual has a
disability under the ADA.4 09
A. The Five Decisions
1. Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.-One issue
that resulted in sharply conflicting opinions in the courts of appeals
was whether an individual who sought to receive or who received So-
cial Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits was automatically es-
topped from pursuing an ADA claim.410 The Supreme Court finally
resolved the controversy with a unanimous "no."
Carolyn Cleveland took medical leave from her job when she de-
veloped side effects41 ' from a stroke that she had at work.4 1 2 She ap-
plied for and received SSDI benefits by claiming that she was totally
407. See Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999) (deciding whether mo-
nocular vision is a disability under the ADA); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct.
2139 (1999) (considering whether corrective and mitigating measures should be consid-
ered when evaluating a plaintiff's claim that plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the
ADA); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999) (same); Cleveland v.
Policy Management Sys. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999) (considering whether the attempt to
receive or success in receiving Social Security Disability Insurance estoppes a plaintiff from
asserting a valid ADA claim); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (determining
whether the plaintiffs HIV infection was a physical impairment substantially limiting a
major life activity).
408. See Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1599-1600.
409. See Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2167-69; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146; Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at
2143; Bradgon, 524 U.S. at 628.
410. See Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1601. The court noted the following cases:
Ranscon v. U.S. West Communications, Inc. 143 F.3d 1324, 1332 (C.A.10 1998)
(application for, and receipt of, SSDI benefits is relevant to, but does not estop
plaintiff from bringing, an ADA claim); Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 135 F.2d
376, 382 (C.A.6 1998) (same), cert. pending, No. 97-1991; Swanks v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 586 (C.A.D.C. 1998) (same); McNemar
v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618-610 (C.A.3 (1996) (applying judicial estop-
pel to bar plaintiff who applied for disability benefits from bringing suit under
the ADA), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115, 117 S. Ct. 958, 136 L. Ed. 2d 845 (1997), and
Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481-1482 (C.A.9 1996) (declining to
applyjudicial estoppel but holding that claimant who declared total disability in a
benefits application failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
she was a qualified individual with a disability)).
Id.
411. Cleveland's stroke affected her concentration, memory, and language skills. See id.
at 1600.
412. See id.
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disabled.413 After she returned to work, she informed the Social Se-
curity Administration (SSA) that she was employed, yet she did not
withdraw her application for disability benefits.414 Cleveland's return
to work was not successful. She sought, but did not receive accommo-
dations. 41  Her employer subsequently fired her for poor job
performance.416
The Court ruled that, "despite the appearance of conflict that
arises from the language of' the ADA and the SSDI, claims under the
two acts do not sufficiently conflict to allow courts to presume that a
plaintiff can never prevail under both acts.4 17 For example, the Court
explained that the ADA considers reasonable accommodations in de-
termining whether an individual has a disability;418 the SSDI does
not.41 ' Additionally, the SSA grants benefits in several circumstances
"to individuals who not only can work, but are working."420
Finally, the Court acknowledged that individuals should not be
estopped from ADA claims simply because they apply for SSDI because
plaintiffs do not know which claims will succeed and such inconsistent
pleadings are "the sort normally tolerated by our legal system." 42 A
plaintiff, however, has the burden of explaining contradictory factual
allegations:422 "[t] o defeat summary judgment, that explanation must
be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that, assuming
the truth of, or the plaintiff's good faith belief in, the earlier state-
413. See id. Cleveland filed an SSDI application on January 28, 1994 "in which she stated
that she was 'disabled' and unable to work.'" Id. (citation omitted).
414. See id. Cleveland returned to work on April 11, 1994, and reported this to SSA two
weeks later. See id. On July 11, 1994, SSA denied her SSDI application. See id.
415. See id. (citation omitted).
416. See id. Cleveland was fired on July 15, 1994.
417. Id. at 1602. The Court found that "the two claims do not inherently conflict to the
point where courts should apply a special negative presumption." Id.
418. See id. (observing that the "ADA defines a 'qualified individual' to include a dis-
abled person 'who . . . can perform the essential functions' of her job 'with reasonable
accommodation'" (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112)).
419. See id. (contrasting the ADA's definition of disability with the SSDI's and pointing
out that the SSDI, unlike the ADA, "does not take the possibility of 'reasonable accommo-
dation' into account"). The Court reasoned that the "result is that an ADA suit claiming
that the plaintiff can perform her job with reasonable accommodation may well prove con-
sistent with an SSDI claim that the plaintiff could not perform her own job (or other jobs)
without it." Id.
420. Id. at 1603. The Court provided the example that "to facilitate a disabled person's
reentry into the workforce, the SSA authorizes a 9-month trial-work period during which
SSDI recipients may receive full benefits." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 422(c); 423(e)(1); 20
C.F.R. § 404.1592 (1998)).
421. Id.
422. See id. (holding that "an ADA plaintiff cannot simply ignore the apparent contradic-
tion that arises out of the earlier SSDI total disability claim," and as such, "must proffer a
sufficient explanation").
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ment, the plaintiff could nonetheless 'perform the essential functions'
of her job, with or without 'reasonable accommodation.' '' 23
2. Bragdon v. Abbott.-Almost eight years after President Bush
signed the ADA into law,421 the United States Supreme Court issued
Bragdon v. Abbott,425 its first opinion that interpreted the definitions of
the ADA.126  Sidney Abbott was infected with the human immu-
nodeficiency virus (HIV) that causes AIDS.4 27 When she went to
Randon Bragdon's office for a dental appointment, even though her
HIV was asymptomatic, she disclosed her HIV infection on the patient
registration form. 428 After examining Abbott and discovering a cavity,
Bragdon notified her that he would fill her cavity only in the hospital
and not in his office. 4 29 Although Bragdon would not charge her an
additional fee, Abbott would have to pay for the extra hospital
charges."3 0 Abbott sued Bragdon, alleging discrimination on the basis
of her disability-HIV infection."31
The majority held that HIV was a disability as defined by the
ADA." 32 In vacating and remanding the lower court's order, the
Court did not consider whether Bragdon regarded Abbott's HJV in-
fection as a disability or treated her differently because of her history
of an impairment.433 While the Court declined to decide whether
HIV is a per se disability, 434 in concluding that Abbott's HIV was a
disability, the Court walked through the three-part definition set forth
in section 12102(2) of the ADA."35 In so doing, it recognized that
423. Id. at 1604 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)).
424. President Bush signed the ADA on July 26, 1990. See supra notes 61-68 and accom-
panying text.
425. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
426. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, with Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joining in full, and Justice O'Connor joining in part.
427. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628.
428. See id. at 628-29.
429. See id. at 629.
430. See id.
431. See id.
432. See id. at 631 (holding that the "respondent's HIV infection was a disability under
subsection (A) of the definitional section of the statute").
433. See id. (declining to consider whether Bragdon was regarded as having a disability
or had a record of a disability in light of concluding that Bragdon actually was disabled
under the ADA).
434. See id. at 641-42 (stating "[i]n view of our holding, we need not address the second
question presented, i.e., whether HIV infection is a per se disability under the ADA").
435. See id. at 631.
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Congress intended that federal courts rely upon cases and regulations
that interpreted the Rehabilitation Act to resolve ADA claims.436
The first step that the Court considered was whether Abbott had
a physical impairment.437 The majority looked to the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) regulations that interpreted
the Rehabilitation Act for examples of substantial impairments.43
Recognizing that the regulations, which now apply to the ADA, did
not include an exhaustive list, the Court noted that they did contain
"a representative list of disorders and conditions constituting physical
impairments, including. . . 'cancer."' 439 Based on this, the Court con-
cluded that Abbott had a physical impairment because she had an
infection that affected her hemic and lymphatic systems. The Court
explained:
In light of the immediacy with which the virus begins to dam-
age the infected person's white blood cells and the severity
of the disease, we hold it is an impairment from the moment
of infection. As noted earlier, infection with HIV causes im-
mediate abnormalities in a person's blood, and the infected
person's white cell count continues to drop throughout the
course of the disease, even when the attack is concentrated
in the lymph nodes. In light of these facts, HIV infection
must be regarded as a physiological disorder with a constant
and detrimental effect on the infected person's hemic and
lymphatic systems from the moment of infection.44 °
Next, the Court analyzed what major life activity the impairment
affected. The majority held that reproduction is a major life activ-
ity.44 1 Unlike Justice Rehnquist in his dissent,442 the majority did not
436. See id. at 631-32 (noting Congress's directive that "nothing ... [in the ADA] shall
be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under Title V of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . .or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to
such title" (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a)).
437. See id. at 632.
438. See id. The HEW regulations simply promulgated a definition of a "physical or
mental impairment" under the Rehabilitation Act. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1997).
According to the Court, rather than including an uncomprehensive list of qualifying disor-
ders in the text, the HEW included a list of qualifying disorders in commentary accompa-
nying the regulations. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 633 (citing 42 Fed. Reg. 22685 (1977), reprinted
in 45 C.F.R. § 84, app. A).
439. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 633 (quoting 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A).
440. Id. at 637; see id. at 633-63. According to the Court, the regulations to the Rehabili-
tation Act and the ADA state that a "physical or mental impairment" means "any physiolog-
ical disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or
more of the following body systems: ... hemic and lymphatic." Id. at 632 (citing 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(j) (2) (i) (1997)).
441. See id. at 638 ("Reproduction falls well within the phrase 'major life activity.'").
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limit this analysis to whether Abbott considered reproduction a per-
sonal major life activity.4 43 The Court correctly reasoned that Con-
gress intended reproduction to be a major life activity per se.
We ask, then, whether reproduction is a major life activity.
We have little difficulty concluding that it is. As the
Court of Appeals held, "[t]he plain meaning of the word
'major' denotes comparative importance" and "suggest[s]
that the touchstone for determining an activity's inclusion
under the statutory rubric is its significance." Reproduction
falls well within the phrase "major life activity." Reproduc-
tion and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to
the life process itself.44
4
Finally, the Court considered whether Abbott's HIV infection
substantially limited her major life activity of reproduction.445 The
Court concluded that Abbott's medical condition "substantially lim-
ited her ability to reproduce" because she risked exposing a sexual
partner, as well as a fetus, to HIV.4 46 Justice Kennedy surmised that
substantial limitations on major life activities need not arise to the
level of "utter inabilities" to satisfy this definition.44 7 In contrast to
Justice Rehnquist's dissent, Justice Kennedy found that although
"[c]onception and childbirth are not impossible for an HIV victim,"
they are sufficiently dangerous to the public health to be a substantial
limitation on reproductive activity.44 8
442. See id. at 658 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (stating that
"there is not a shred of record evidence indicating that, prior to becoming infected with
HIV, respondent's major life activities included reproduction").
443. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637-39 (concluding that reproduction is a major life activity
without discussing the respondent's personal ambitions). The Court also remarked that
"[f]rom the outset, however, the case has been treated as one in which reproduction was
the major life activity limited by the impairment." Id. at 638.
444. Id. (internal citation omitted).
445. See id. at 639.
446. Id. The Court reviewed the factual record to answer this question because it found
"the Rehabilitation Act regulations provide no additional guidance." Id.
Our evaluation of the medical evidence leads us to conclude that respon-
dent's infection substantially limited her ability to reproduce in two independent
ways. First, a woman infected with HIV who tries to conceive a child imposes on
the man a significant risk of becoming infected.
Second, an infected woman risks infecting her child during gestation and
childbirth, i.e., perinatal transmission.
Id. at 638-39.
447. See id. at 641 (noting that "the definition is met even if the difficulties are not
insurmountable").
448. Id.
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The majority concluded its opinion with a clear message to lower
courts to consider relevant agency guidelines and regulations in apply-
ing definitions in the ADA. Justice Kennedy cautioned that trial and
appellate courts should not substitute their own interpretations of the
ADA for that of the Justice Department and of the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission. The Court stated:
Our holding is confirmed by a consistent course of agency
interpretation before and after enactment of the ADA.... It
is enough to observe that the well-reasoned views of the
agencies implementing a statute "constitute a body of experi-
ence and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance."449
The majority held that "the administrative guidance issued by the
Justice Department to implement the public accommodation provi-
sions of Title III" and presumably by agencies such as the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunities Commission, which are "authorized to
administer . . . the ADA," "are entitled to deference."4 50
In his dissent,4 51 Justice Rehnquist maintained that Abbott's im-
pairment did not substantially limit one or more of her major life ac-
tivities because Abbott failed to offer evidence that, absent the HIV,
she would have considered having children. 452 Justice Rehnquist re-
jected Abbott's argument "that reproduction must be a major life ac-
tivity because regulations issued under the ADA define the term
'physical impairment' to include physiological disorders affecting the
reproductive system. '4 53 The ability to bear a child, he reasoned, is
not the type of "day-to-day" activity "of a normally functioning individ-
ual" envisioned in the definition of "substantially limits a major life
activity. "' 4 4 Moreover, Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that "the disability definition does not turn on personal
choice."455
Despite his restrictive interpretation of the ADA, even Justice
Rehnquist acknowledged that cancer is an impairment that can sub-
stantially limit a major life activity. Although rejecting the majority's
449. Id. at 642 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)).
450. Id. at 646 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
451. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 657 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
Justice Scalia andJustice Thomasjoined the opinion. Justice O'Connor joined Part II, but
not Part I, of the opinion. See id.
452. See id. at 658-59 (stating "there is absolutely no evidence that, absent the HIV, re-
spondent would have had or was even considering having children").
453. Id. at 660 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1997)).
454. Id. at 660-61.
455. Id. at 661-62.
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finding that reproduction itself is a major life activity, Justice Rehn-
quist acknowledged that "numerous disorders of the reproductive sys-
tem . . . are so painful that they limit a woman's ability to engage in
major life activities such as walking and working. And, obviously, cancer
of the various reproductive organs limits one's ability to engage in
numerous activities other than reproduction. 4 56  This statement
marks the first time a member of the Supreme Court has suggested
that it is obvious that an individual, whose cancer is so painful that it
limits his or her ability to engage in major life activities such as walk-
ing and working, has an impairment that substantially limits a major
life activity as defined by the ADA.
3. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.-In Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc.,457 the Court held that myopic twin sisters are not "disabled" be-
cause "the determination of whether an individual is disabled should
be made with reference to measures that mitigate the individual's im-
pairment, including, in this instance, eyeglasses and contact
lenses." '458 The Court neglected to defer to the EEOC regulations that
explicitly state that the "determination of whether an individual is sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case
basis, without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or
assistive or prosthetic devices."45
The Court explained that Congress explicitly gave the EEOC au-
thority to implement Title I of the ADA,4 60 but not to implement sec-
tion 12102, which defines the term disability.46' Although the Court
conceded that the "EEOC has, nonetheless, issued regulations to pro-
vide additional guidance" to define "disability," it declined "to con-
sider what deference" the regulations "are due, if any." '4 62 Justice
Breyer's dissent, which Justice O'Connor ironically characterized as
an "imaginative interpretation, 461 3 correctly points out the illogic of
the majority's support for its failure to defer to the regulations' une-
quivocal position:
456. Id. at 660 (emphasis added).
457. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
458. Id. at 2143.
459. Id. at 2145 (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1998)).
460. See id. at 2144 (providing in a parenthetical that § 2116 states that "[n]ot later than
1 year after [the date of enactment of the ADA] the Commission shall issue regulations...
to carry out this subchapter").
461. See id. at 2145 (asserting that "no agency has been delegated authority to interpret
the term 'disability"' (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2))).
462. Id.
463. Id.
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There is no reason to believe that Congress would have
wanted to deny the EEOC the power to issue such a regula-
tion, at least if the regulation is consistent with the earlier
statutory definition and with the relevant interpretations by
other enforcement agencies. The physical location of the
definitional section seems to reflect only drafting or stylistic,
not substantive, objectives.464
The Court then relied on three provisions of the ADA to further
support its narrow reading of the Act. First, the Court reasoned that
because the phrase "substantially limits" in the first prong of the defi-
nition of disability is "in the present indicative verb form," this re-
quires "that a person be presently-not potentially or hypothetically-
substantially limited... to demonstrate a disability." '465 In his dissent,
Justice Stevens correctly suggested that the Court's emphasis on pres-
ent disability applies only to a consideration of whether one has a disa-
bility under the first prong, and not whether one has a record of an
impairment or is regarded as having an impairment.4 66
Second, the Court reemphasized its holding in Bragdon that
"whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized
inquiry."' It then concluded that this individualized inquiry "runs
directly counter" to assessing an individual in his or her uncorrected
or unmitigated state because it would require "courts and employers
to speculate about a person's condition and would, in many cases,
force them to make a disability determination based on general infor-
mation about how an uncorrected impairment usually affects individ-
uals, rather than on the individual's actual condition." '468 Yet, as
Justice Stevens explained, the Court's reasoning is circular:
464. Id. at 2162 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
465. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
466. See id. at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that if the majority is
"correct that '[a] "disability" exists only where' a person's 'present' or 'actual' condition is
substantially impaired, there would be no reason to include in the protected class those
who were once disabled but who are not fully recovered." Id. (quoting Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at
2146-47).
467. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); 29 C.F.R.
app. § 1630.20)).
468. Id. The Court rejected the "mitigating measures" language because it conflicts with
the individualized inquiry mandated by the ADA and creates a system in which persons
often must be treated as members of a group of people with similar impairments, rather
than as individuals. This is contrary to both the letter and spirit of the ADA. Id. Without
directly relying on Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), the Court's reasoning appears to invoke the spirit of the Chevron rule. This rule
provides that where a statute is silent as to the precise issue before a court, the court should
defer to agency interpretation of the statute. See id. at 843. If the regulations are arbitrary,
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The Court's mantra regarding the Act's "individualized ap-
proach," however, fails to support its holding. I agree that
the letter and spirit of the ADA is designed to deter decision
making based on group stereotypes, but the agencies' inter-
pretation of the Act does not lead to this result. Nor does it
require courts to "speculate" about people's "hypothetical"
conditions. Viewing a person in her "unmitigated" state sim-
ply requires examining that individual's abilities in a differ-
ent state, not the abilities of every person who shares a
similar condition. It is just as easy individually to test peti-
tioners' eyesight with their glasses on as with their glasses
off.
4 6 9
Justice Stevens illustrated the irony in the Court's position.47 °
The majority "seem[s] to allow an employer to refuse to hire every
person who has epilepsy or diabetes that is controlled by medication,
or every person who functions efficiently with a prosthetic limb."4 7'
Moreover, considering that "the purpose of the ADA is to dismantle
employment barriers based on society's accumulated myths and fears,
it is especially ironic to deny protection for persons with substantially
limiting impairments that, when corrected, render them fully able
and employable."472
Additionally, although the Court correctly recognized that a
lower court must consider how the negative side effects of a condition
or its treatment limit an individual's abilities, 473 the Court incorrectly
claimed that the EEOC guidelines precludes consideration of the side
effects, both negative and positive, of mitigating measures.4 7 4 Justice
Stevens suggested that this position is "misplaced" because "most indi-
viduals who take medication that itself substantially limits a major life
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute, however, a court is free to reject them. Id.
at 844.
469. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2159 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
470. See id. at 2154. Justice Stevens exposed the Court's "counterintuitive conclusion
that the ADA's safeguards vanish when individuals make themselves more employable by
ascertaining ways to overcome their physical or mental limitations." Id.
471. Id. at 2159.
472. Id. (internal citations omitted).
473. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146 (noting that "the effects of [corrective] measures-
both positive and negative-must be taken into account when judging whether that person
is 'substantially limited' in a major life activity and thus 'disabled' under the Act").
474. See id. at 2147 (concluding that "[tihe guidelines approach could ... lead to the
anomalous result that in determining whether an individual is disabled, courts and em-
ployers could not consider any negative side effects suffered by an individual resulting
from the use of mitigating measures, even when those side effects are very severe").
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activity would be substantially limited in some other way if they did not
take the medication."475
Third, the Court gave great weight to the "findings and purposes"
introduction to the ADA, which states that Congress found that 43
million Americans had a disability.476 The Court reasoned that this
number could not possibly include "those whose impairments are
largely corrected by medication or other devices" because "[h] ad Con-
gress intended to include all persons with corrected physical limita-
tions among those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have
cited a much higher number of disabled persons in the findings. 477
As Justice Stevens noted, however, the Court has previously criticized
reliance on a "'statement of congressional findings [as] a rather thin
reed upon which to base' a statutory construction."47 Additionally,
Justice Stevens demonstrated that the 43 million Americans refer to
persons with actual disabilities, not those individuals also protected by
the Act because they are regarded as having a disability or have a rec-
ord of a disability.47
Once the Court concluded that the plaintiffs did not have a disa-
bility under section 12102(2) (A),480 the Court should have ended its
analysis and affirmed the lower court's order dismissing plaintiffs'
complaint.4"' Instead, the Court, which so often rails against judicial
activism,48 2 unnecessarily addressed the two other provisions of the
ADA.
475. Id. at 2159 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
476. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)); see 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(1) (stating that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or
mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is getting
older").
477. Id. at 2148-49.
478. Id. at 2160 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting National Org. for Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994)).
479. See id. (noting that "by including the 'record of and 'regarded as' categories, Con-
gress fully expected the Act to protect individuals who lack, in the court's words, 'actual
disabilities' and therefore are not counted in that number [43 million]").
480. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149.
481. Even had the Court correctly interpreted the ADA and held that the plaintiffs had
a disability under the ADA, it could have affirmed the Tenth Circuit's decision by finding
that the plaintiffs were not "otherwise qualified" to be commercial airline pilots because
they did not meet legitimate, safety-necessitated vision criteria. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)
(1994) (stating "'qualified individual with a disability' means an individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of
the employment position").
482. Ironically, this unnecessary section of Justice O'Connor's opinion is peppered with
lip service to her professed judicial minimalism by claiming that the Court need not con-
sider what deference EEOC regulations and legislative history are due. See id. at 2145 ("Be-
cause both parties accept these regulations as valid, and determining their validity is not
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First, the Court considered whether the defendant regarded the
plaintiffs' myopia as a disability.4" 3 The Court irrationally restricted
the scope of this provision, which Congress included to address "soci-
ety's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease, "484 to
two circumstances:
(1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a
physical impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly be-
lieves that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially
limits one or more major life activities. In both cases, it is
necessary that a covered entity entertain misperceptions
about the individual-it must believe either that one has a
substantially limiting impairment that one does not have or
that one has a substantially limiting impairment when, in
fact, the impairment is not so limiting.
485
Without explanation, the Court excluded another class of individ-
uals that the regulations expressly consider as protected by this third
prong: individuals who have an impairment that "is only substantially
limiting because of the attitudes of others toward the impairment. "486
By ignoring this category, the Court gave employers freedom "to de-
cide that physical characteristics or medical conditions that do not rise
to the level of an impairment. .. are preferable to others,just as [they
are] free to decide that some limiting, but not substantially limiting,
impairments make individuals less than ideally suited for a job."487
This restricted view of the "regarded as" prong allows employers to
evade the ADA by artfully crafting job criteria that, in fact, screen out
necessary to decide this case, we have no occasion to consider what deference they are due,
if any."). See also id. at 2146 ("Because we decide that, by its terms, the ADA cannot be read
in this manner, we have no reason to consider the ADA's legislative history.")
483. See id. at 2149-50.
484. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (citation omitted).
485. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149-50.
486. See id. at 2150 (failing to recognize this aspect of the definition of disability); 29
C.F.R. app. § 1630.2() (1) (2) (1999) ("The individual may have an impairment which is
only substantially limiting because of the attitudes of others toward the impairment.").
The EEOC Interpretive Guidelines suggest that discriminatory action by an employer,
which is solely the result of the attitudes of third parties toward an individual's impairment,
may satisfy the "regarded as" definition of a disability.
For example, an individual may have a prominent facial scar or disfigurement, or
may have a condition that periodically causes an involuntary jerk of the head but
does not limit the individual's major life activities. If an employer discriminates
against such an individual because of the negative reactions of customers, the
employer would be regarding the individual as disabled and acting on the basis of
that perceived disability.
Id.
487. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150.
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individuals with disabilities. Such a loophole undermines the ADA's
express prohibition against employers' use of "qualification standards,
employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with
disabilities unless" the employer proves that the criteria are 'job-re-
lated for the position in question and [are] consistent with business
necessity. ' '
Second, the Court took a tangential swipe at the inclusion of
"work" as a major life activity. Although the Court assumed that
"working is a major life activity,"48 9 it noted "that there may be some
conceptual difficulty in defining 'major life activities' to include
work.
4 9 0
4. Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.-The same seven Jus-
tices who denied the Suttons' claim ruled that United Parcel Service
could fire Vaughn Murphy when it learned that he did not meet the
Department of Transportation regulations that required truck drivers
to have controlled blood pressure.4 9 1 The Court affirmed the Tenth
Circuit's conclusion that Murphy was not a person with a disability
under the ADA because when he took medication, his "high blood
pressure [did] not substantially limit him in any major life activity." '492
The Court also affirmed the Tenth Circuit's finding that the United
Parcel Service did not regard Murphy as disabled because it regarded
him as unable to meet DOT safety regulations.4 93 Justice Stevens, with
whom Justice Breyer joined dissenting, asserted that Murphy had a
disability because his severe hypertension, without medication, sub-
stantially limited his ability to perform major life activities.49 4
488. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6).
489. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151. Because both parties accepted the proposition that
working" is a "major life activity," the Court did not address whether "working" could be a
valid "major life activity." Id. Indeed, in his dissent in Bragdon, Justice Rehnquist lists
"working" as a major life activity. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 659 (1998) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
490. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151.
491. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
492. Id. at 2136. Although the Court discounted the EEOC regulations in Sutton, the
Court relied on the regulations in Murphy to determine the meaning of "substantially lim-
its" and to justify its conclusion that Murphy was not substantially limited in a major life
activity. See id. at 2138 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1998)) (discussing the EEOC's
definition of "substantially limits").
493. See id. at 2139 (finding that the evidence that United Parcel Service regarded Mur-
phy as unable to perform his particular job "is insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that
petitioner is regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working" (citing
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151-52)).
494. See id. at 2139 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "[w]ithout medication, peti-
tioner would likely be hospitalized" (citation omitted)).
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5. Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkinburg.-In Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirk-
ingburg,49 5 the Court unanimously ruled that a truck driver who had
monocular vision did not have a disability as defined by the ADA.4 96
Albertsons refused to rehire Kirkingburg as a truck driver when it
learned that he could not meet the vision standard set by the Depart-
ment of Transportation regulations.49 7 The Court affirmed the Ninth
Circuit's conclusion "that the ADA allowed Albertsons to establish a
reasonable job-related vision standard as a prerequisite for hiring and
that Albertsons could rely on Government regulations as a basis for
setting its standard."4 9 On the one hand, the Court took a broader
view of the ADA's scope than in did in Sutton by acknowledging that
some impairments may be per se disabilities.4 9 9 On the other hand,
the Court extended Sutton's restrictions by finding that mitigating
measures that "must be taken into account in judging whether an in-
dividual possesses a disability" include not only "artificial aids, like
medications and devices," but also include "measures undertaken,
whether consciously or not, with the body's own systems."500
B. The Supreme Court's Mandate to Federal Courts
The Supreme Court's five ADA decisions provide detailed, albeit
somewhat conflicting and illogical, instruction to lower federal courts
on how to interpret the ADA. These opinions are likely to make it
more difficult for many individuals who have physical and mental im-
pairments to prove that they have a disability under the ADA. Most
cancer survivors, however, will probably not face an adverse impact on
their efforts to prove that their claim of cancer-based employment dis-
crimination is covered by the ADA.
1. Whether an Individual has a Disability Must be Determined by Indi-
vidualized Inquiry.-The Court correctly stressed that whether an indi-
vidual has a disability must be determined on a case-by-case basis.50 1
495. 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
496. See id. at 2165; see also id. at 2169 (explaining that "[wlhile some impairments may
invariably cause a substantial limitation of a major life activity, we cannot say that monocu-
larity does" (internal citation omitted)).
497. See id. at 2166.
498. Id. at 2167 (construing Kirkingburg v. Albertsons Inc., 143 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir.
1998)).
499. See id. at 2169 (noting that although the determination of a disability requires a
case-by-case analysis, "some impairments may invariably cause a substantial limitation of a
major life activity").
500. Id.
501. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2147 (1999) (stating that "whether a person has a disabil-
ity under the ADA is an individualized inquiry" (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624
(1998))); Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638, 641 (noting that there is "no general principle major
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Although it rejected the notion of per se disabilities,50 2 the Court ac-
knowledged that "some impairments may invariably cause a substan-
tial limitation of a major life activity. "503 Most cancer survivors should
be able to prove that they have a disability because, at some point
during the disease and its treatment, most cancers result in a substan-
tial limitation of a major life activity. The Supreme Court's recogni-
tion that some medical conditions are inherently far more limiting
than others is consistent with the EEOC's statements that "most forms
of ... cancer" are medical conditions that may substantially limit a
major life activity.50 4
The Court's decision in Cleveland, that an individual who sought
or received Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits is not
automatically estopped from pursuing an ADA claim,50 5 is perhaps the
Court's most dramatic admission that an individualized inquiry is es-
sential to determine whether a plaintiff is a qualified individual under
the ADA. Although the SSDI and the ADA appear to conflict,50 6 the
Court acknowledged that an individual who was disabled under the
SSA could allege sufficient evidence to prove that he or she "could
nonetheless 'perform the essential functions' of her job, with or with-
out 'reasonable accommodation' 5 0 7 and therefore prevail in an ADA
claim. Some cancer survivors who successfully apply for SSDI benefits
are also able to prove that they can perform the essential functions of
their job.
life activity" but there is a "representative list"). For example, one post-Sutton decision
recognized that cancer is not a per se disability. See Cinelli v. U.S. Energy Partners, No. 97-
5630 (BJS), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14958, at *21 (D.N.J. Sept. 21, 1999) (denying defend-
ants' summary judgment motion, in part, because plaintiff raised "genuine issues as to
whether his supervisors felt that he was unable to do his job because of his cancer").
Cinelli claimed that his employer fired him because it perceived him as being unable to
work because he had non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. See id. at *3. The court correctly rea-
soned that "even though Cinelli does not suffer from a per se disability, if he is able to
establish that his employer regarded his cancer as substantially limiting his ability to work,
then his ADA claim should survive summary judgment." Id. at *3.
502. The Court declined to decide whether HIV infection is a per se disability. Bragdon,
118 S. Ct. at 2207 ("In view of our holding, we need not address the second question
presented, i.e., whether HlV infection is a per se disability under the ADA."); see also supra
note 444 and accompanying text.
503. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2169.
504. 1995 EEOC TECHNICAL ASsISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 83, at II-§ 902.4.
505. See Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 1597, 1600 (1999).
506. See id. at 1602 (noting that there is an "appearance of conflict that arises from the
language of the two statutes"); see also supra notes 417-420 (explaining the apparent con-
flict between the SSDI and the ADA).
507. Id. at 1604.
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2. The Individualized Inquiry of Whether an Individual is Substan-
tially Limited Must Consider Mitigating and Corrective Measures.-The
Supreme Court clearly stated that "the determination of whether an
individual is disabled should be made with reference to measures that
mitigate the individual's impairment." ' Although this position se-
verely restricts the ability of individuals with relatively minor impair-
ments that are easily correctable, such as myopia and relatively minor
medical conditions that are easily controlled by medication, such as
hypertension, it has less impact on most cancer survivors. Most can-
cers are not easily controlled by medication or by corrective devices.
With the exception of relatively benign, early-stage cancers, most ma-
lignancies require extensive medical treatment, such as surgery, radia-
tion, and chemotherapy. 0
The Court acknowledged that, even with corrective measures that
are able to reduce the degree of an individual's impairment, the indi-
vidual may, nonetheless, remain substantially limited in a major life
activity.510 Many cancer survivors take such corrective measures, the
most common of which are radiation and chemotherapy, 5 11 which, in
some situations, do not sufficiently improve the survivors' health to
alleviate the substantial limits imposed by cancer.
Sutton correctly requires lower federal courts to consider nega-
tive, as well as positive consequences of mitigating measures.51 2 Can-
cer survivors encounter many side effects of the cancer itself, as well as
of cancer treatment.51 3 The most common symptoms and side effects
of cancer and its treatment are pain, fatigue, problems related to nu-
trition and weight management, hair loss, low blood counts, skin con-
508. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2143 (1999).
509. See Ganz, supra note 57, in CANCER SURVIVOR's ALMANAC, supra note 2, at 9 ("Tradi-
tionally, cancer has been treated with surgery, radiation, chemotherapy, or combinations
of the three.").
510. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149 (noting that "one has a disability under [42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2) (A)] if, notwithstanding the use of a corrective device, that individual is substan-
tially limited in a major life activity").
511. See CANCER FACTS & FIGuREs-1999, supra note 12, at 8-17 (listing common treat-
ment for various forms of cancer).
512. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146 (explaining that the effects of mitigating measures
"both positive and negative-must be taken into account when judging whether [an ADA
claimant] is 'substantially limited' in a major life activity").
513. The EEOC Manual contemplates the negative side effects of cancer. It explicitly
states that cancer survivors are entitled to reasonable modifications in their work schedules
to accommodate negative side effects of cancer treatment. Only employees who have a
disability are entitled to accommodations. The Manual states that a modified work sched-
ule is an example of an accommodation appropriate for a cancer survivor who requires
medical leave because of the negative side effects of chemotherapy. See EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL, § 915.002.
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ditions, nerve damage, memory and concentration loss, respiratory
problems, sexual dysfunction, and fertility problems. 11 4 Long-term
51 5
and late-effects 516 include heart muscle injury, coronary artery disease,
lung tissue injury, kidney damage, nervous system injury, blood and
immune system problems, early menopause, endocrine problems, in-
fertility, and secondary cancers.517 Courts should consider as disabled
survivors who experience these types of negative side effects.
Some cancer survivors, however, have no substantial limitations
during or after treatment. A cancer survivor who is successfully
treated without substantial limitation, such as long-term effects, or
who is in treatment but the side effects of treatment do not substan-
tially limit, does not have a disability. Such an individual must argue
that he or she has a record of a disability or is regarded as being
disabled.
3. The EEOC Regulations are Down, but Not Out.-In its five ADA
cases, the Supreme Court has expressed a love/hate relationship with
the EEOC regulations that implement the ADA. The Court appar-
ently sees no contradiction between its holdings in Bragdon and in Sut-
ton, just as it has allowed its seemingly conflicting opinions in Bowers v.
Hardwick5 8 and Romers v. Evans5" 9 to "co-exist side-by-side. ' ' 520 Essen-
tially, the Court relied upon the regulations when they supported the
Court's conclusion and dismissed the regulations as "an impermissible
interpretation of the ADA' 521 when they conflicted with the Court's
desired outcome. In Bragdon, the Court explained the importance of
agency regulations and found that the Justice Department's regula-
514. See Ganz, supra note 57, in CANCER SURVIVOR'S ALMANAC, supra note 2, at 12-23
(listing common side effects most often associated with cancer and its treatment).
515. See id. at 23 (defining long-term effects as "known or expected problems that may
occur with some frequency in individuals who have received certain treatments: for exam-
ple, the risk of infection after splenectomy or infertility after certain chemotherapy
drugs").
516. See id. at 23-24 (defining late effects as "secondary conditions that arise as a result of
having received certain cancer treatments: for example, leukemia secondary to alkylating
agent therapy or congestive heart failure many years after treatment with anthracycline
chemotherapy").
517. See id. at 24-27 (listing possible long-term and late-effects of cancer treatment).
518. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
519. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
520. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Age of Mixed Results: Why Judges Owe Us an Account of Their
Reasons, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 28, 1999, at 43, 47 (reviewing CAss L. SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999) (discussing how the
Court upheld a Georgia anti-sodomy law in Bowers, yet ten years later, struck down Colo-
rado's anti-gay rights amendment in Romerwithout explaining the relationship between the
two decisions).
521. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146 (1999).
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tions to implement the public accommodation provisions of Title III
of the ADA, which support the Court's holding, "are entitled to defer-
ence."522 Indeed, the Court cited to its long-standing principle that
administrative regulations "constitute a body of experience and in-
formed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly result for
guidance."5 23 Exactly one year later, however, the Court, in Sutton ex-
plicitly rejected the EEOC and the Justice Department guidelines that
require a determination of disability to be made without regard to
mitigating measures, and declined to consider what deference other
EEOC guidelines are due.524
Lower federal courts should defer to regulations where appropri-
ate to resolve individual determinations of disability because the
Court explicitly struck only the "mitigating measures" language of the
regulations, while it endorsed or discussed without endorsement
other sections of the regulations. The Court's rejection of the "miti-
gating measures" language, however, invites lower federal courts to
examine more closely whether the specific regulatory language at is-
sue in an individual case survives Chevron scrutiny.525 For example, in
a post-Sutton decision, the Fifth Circuit rejected the language in the
EEOC's Interpretive Guidance that describes "former cancer patients"
as a group of individuals who have a record of impairment because
the language conflicts with the individualized inquiry mandate:
The EEOC relies on its interpretive regulation, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1620.2, for its position that the ADA "protects former can-
cer patients from discrimination on the basis of their prior
medical history." The broad position obviously cannot be
the rule in the wake of Sutton, which emphasizes both the
ADA's requirement of individualized inquiry and a focus on
the actual effects of the impairment. In other words, it is not
enough for an ADA plaintiff to simply show that he has a
record of a cancer diagnosis; in order to establish the exist-
ence of a "disability" under § 12102(2) (B), there must be a
record of an impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the ADA plaintiff's major life activities.5 26
522. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 646 (1998) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
523. Id. at 642 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)).
524. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146 (declining to decide what deference the EEOC regula-
tions are due because both parties accepted the validity of the regulations).
525. See supra note 468 (discussing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
526. EEOC v. RJ. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 655 (5th Cir. 1999). For a more com-
plete discussion of the viability of the EEOC regulations to the ADA after Sutton, see Bar-
bara Hoffman, Reports of Its Death Were Greatly Exaggerated: The EEOC Regulations That Define
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4. An Individual is Regarded as Having an Impairment if an Em-
ployee Misperceives the Employee's Impairment.-The Court has made it
more difficult for individuals to prove that their employers regard
them as disabled. The Court ruled that the "regarded as" prong re-
quires that the employer has a misperception about the employee's
impairment.527 In reasoning that invites employers to discriminate,
the Court then further restricted this prong by holding that the em-
ployer does not have a misperception if its decision is based on a legit-
imate job criteria that is merely a limitation, but not a "substantial
limitation."5 28 This logic does little to alleviate the Catch-22 because it
allows employers to select hiring criteria based on "limiting, but not
substantially limiting, impairments [that] make individuals less than
ideally suited for a job. '5 29 This loophole will allow employers to re-
strict job opportunities to cancer survivors by imposing employment
criteria that safely falls within these cracks.
5. The Court's Hostility to the ADA Invites Summary Judgment
Abuse.-Perhaps the most damaging aspect of the Supreme Court's
ADA opinions is the majority's contempt for the ADA and its regula-
tions when they fail to support the Court's goals. The Court blurs the
line between determining whether an individual has a disability and
determining whether one is qualified.53 ° In an effort to reach a seem-
ingly reasonable conclusion-that airlines and trucking companies
may exclude pilots and drivers who do not meet safety-justified vision
standards-the Court is too eager to find that these plaintiffs do not
have a disability.531 Instead, the Court should have conceded that
Disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act After Sutton v. United Air Lines, 9 TEMP.
POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2000).
527. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149-50 (stating that for individuals to satisfy the "regarded
as" definition of a disability it is necessary that "a covered entity [who] entertain[s] mis-
perceptions about the individual.., must believe either that one has a substantially limit-
ing impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantially limiting impairment
when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting").
528. See id. at 2150 (noting that, similarly, "an employer is free to decide that physical
characteristics or medical conditions that do not rise to the level of an impairment... are
preferable to others" because characteristics that do not rise to the level of an impairment
are not covered by the ADA).
529. Id.
530. This is the same misapplication of ADA procedures that the Eleventh Circuit made
in Gordon v. Hamm in that Court's eagerness to reverse a jury verdict for the plaintiff. See
supra notes 156-173 (discussing the Gordon decision).
531. To succeed under an ADA claim, a plaintiff must be a "qualified individual with a
disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994) (emphasis added). The ADA defines a qualified indi-
vidual with a disability as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Furthermore, for the purpose of deter-
mining whether an individual is qualified, the ADA requires courts to give consideration
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they have a disability, but found them to be unqualified based on le-
gitimate hiring criteria.53 2 The Court's approach tempts lower federal
courts to abuse summary judgment to block legitimate ADA claims by
cancer survivors, as well as other individuals with disabilities.
V. How TO AVOID THE CATCH-22: LESSONS FOR PLAINTIFFS
The results of ADA claims brought by cancer survivors, as well as
the Supreme Court's five ADA opinions, offer other potential plain-
tiffs lessons to increase their chances of surviving defendants' inevita-
ble summary judgment motions. Plaintiffs who plead all of the
relevant parts of the definition of disability and who demonstrate how
the regulations and legislative history of the ADA relate to their indi-
vidual circumstances are more likely to convince a court that their
cancer is a disability under the ADA.
A. Plead Three-Part Definition of Disability
The ADA defines disability with three alternative definitions: "(A)
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 533
"to the employer's judgment as to what functions of ajob are essential, and if an employer
has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the
job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job." Id.
Rather than reach the question of whether the plaintiffs in Sutton were "qualified" as
"global airline pilots," the Court constricted the definition of a "disability," thereby dispos-
ing of the suit without confronting the question of whether the plaintiffs were qualified.
See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151 (noting that "[b]ecause the position of global airline pilot is a
single job, this allegation does not support the claim that respondent regards petitioners as
having a substantially limiting impairment"). As Justice Stevens noted in his dissenting
opinion, the issue of whether an individual is disabled is merely a threshold question for
determining whether the individual is covered by the ADA. See id. at 2154 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); supra notes 466, 470-472 (explaining Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion).
532. As Justice Stevens asserts in his dissent, the majority in Sutton addressed the wrong
issue:
This case, in other words, is not about whether petitioners are genuinely qualified
or whether they can perform the job of an airline pilot without posing an undue
safety risk. The case just raises the threshold question whether petitioners are
members of the ADA's protected class. It simply asks whether the ADA lets peti-
tioners in the door .... Inside that door lies nothing more than basic protection
from irrational and unjustified discrimination because of a characteristic that is
beyond a person's control. Hence, this particular case, at its core, is about
whether, assuming that petitioners can prove that they are "qualified," the airline
has any duty to come forward with some legitimate explanation for refusing to
hire them because of their uncorrected eyesight, or whether the ADA leaves the
airline free to decline to hire petitioners on this basis even if it is acting purely on
the basis of irrational fear and stereotype.
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2156-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
533. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (emphasis added).
[VOL. 59:352
2000] BETWEEN A DISABILITY AND A HARD PLACE
1. Disability.--Cancer survivors whose cancer substantially limits
a major life activity should plead that they have a disability.5"4 This
task is easiest for survivors who can demonstrate how their cancer sub-
stantially limits a major life activity other than work, such as walking or
reproduction,53 5 because those plaintiffs who plead that their disabil-
ity limits only their work seldom prevail.5" 6
A complaint should detail how that individual's cancer specifi-
cally limits a major life activity to educate a court that may itself misun-
derstand the plaintiffs abilities because of its own ignorance or
misconceptions about cancer.537 Plaintiffs should claim that their
cancer itself, or the negative side effects of treatment, limits as many
major life activities as possible other than work as can be supported by
the evidence.538
For those who have little choice but to claim that their cancer
limits their ability to work, their dilemma is to avoid the Catch-22 by
showing that the cancer substantially limits "the ability to perform a
class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes, 539 while still
534. Although many cancer survivors consider themselves "too healthy" to be disabled,
plaintiffs' attorneys should not allow the semantics of personal advocacy and self-esteem to
hamstring litigation strategy.
535. Cf 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (1999) ("If an individual is substantially limited in any
other major life activity, no determination should be made as to whether the individual is
substantially limited in working.").
536. See Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the Scope of Disa-
bility Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 107, 135 (1997) (noting
that "claims in which plaintiffs have only alleged a substantial limitation in the major life
activity of working have been almost universally rejected"). For example, "working" was
the only major life activity for which Phyllis Ellison claimed a substantial limitation. See
Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 190 (5th Cir. 1996); supra notes 124-155
and accompanying text. Moreover, the Supreme Court has expressed its contempt to in-
cluding "work" as a major life activity. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139,
2151 (noting that there may be conceptual difficulties with including work as a major life
activity); supra notes 457-490 and accompanying text.
537. For example, Paul Hirsch's claim failed, in part, because he did not sufficiently
illustrate how his cancer substantially impaired a major life activity. See Hirsch v. National
Mall & Serv., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 977,981-82 (N.D. Ill. 1997); supra note 182 and accompany-
ing text.
538. Major life activities include "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). The
Supreme Court expressly held that reproduction is a major life activity. See Bragdon, 524
U.S. at 638 (stating that "[r]eproduction falls well within the phrase 'major life activity'"
(citation omitted)). Because fertility problems are a significant side effect of many cancers
and their treatments, survivors should allege that their fertility is substantially limited
where the evidence supports such a claim.
539. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j). For a detailed discussion of how courts interpret the
.substantially limits" language, see Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection
from Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition
of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REv. 409, 585 (1997).
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maintaining that they are "qualified" 4 ' to perform theirjobs. A can-
cer survivor need not show that he or she is
totally unable to work in order to be considered substantially
limited in the major life activity of working. An individual is
substantially limited in working if the individual is signifi-
cantly restricted in the ability to perform a class ofjobs or a
broad range of jobs in various classes, when compared with
the ability of the average person with comparable qualifica-
tions to perform those same jobs.541
Thus, for example, a cancer survivor whose job requires lifting, among
other duties, objects above her head and who, because of
lymphedema resulting from a mastectomy, can no longer lift heavy
objects above her head, has a disability because she is restricted in the
ability to perform the class ofjobs that require certain types of lifting.
She is "otherwise qualified" for her job, however, because she can still
perform the essential functions of her job.542
2. Record of a Disability.-Most cancer survivors can establish that
they have a record of a disability. The Supreme Court has unequivo-
cally held that hospitalization is sufficient to establish substantial limi-
tation of a major life activity. 43 Furthermore, the regulations
explicitly protect "former cancer patients from discrimination based
540. A "qualified individual" is one who "satisfies the prerequisites for the position" and
who "can perform the essential functions of the position held or desired, with or without
reasonable accommodation." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(m).
541. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j).
542. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(m).
543. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987) (concluding
that the plaintiffs impairment, which "was serious enough to require hospitalization," is
"more than sufficient [under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973] to establish that one or more
of her major life activities were substantially limited by her impairment"). Some courts,
however, have declined to interpret Arline to mean that any record of hospitalization is
sufficient to establish a record of a substantially limiting impairment because the Supreme
Court did not specify how long or serious the hospitalization must be to satisfy this term.
See Elizabeth Crawford, Comment, The Court's Interpretations of a Disability Under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act: Are They Keeping Our Promise to the Disabled ?, 35 Hous. L. REv. 1207,
1236-37 (1998) (noting that, because the Supreme Court offered no details regarding the
length of plaintiffs stay in the hospital or the severity of her condition, the "Sixth and
Seventh Circuits have held that it would be absurd to interpret Arline as holding that any
hospital stay creates a record of an impairment and thereby qualifies the individual for
ADA.. . coverage").
Ironically, the often ADA-hostile Fifth Circuit relied on Sutton to recognize that a
thirty-day hospital stay for cancer treatment could establish a record of an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity. See EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 655-
56 (5th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that during the plaintiffs hospitalization, he "could walk,
see, hear, speak, breathe, lift, and learn, and yet his ability to work might still have been
substantially affected . . .; [h]is long hospital stay and his isolation from others, results of
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on their prior medical history."54 4 Most cancer survivors are hospital-
ized at some point during their cancer history, either for staging, sur-
gery, chemotherapy, bone marrow transplantation, or other
significant medical treatment.545 Even many of those survivors who
have avoided hospitalization throughout their treatment, but have
otherwise been substantially limited, can cite to the regulations that,
as "former cancer patients," they have a record of a substantially limit-
ing condition.
3. Regarded as Having a Disability.-The third part of the ADA's
definition of a disability covers individuals whose employers regard
their impairment as limiting a major life activity. 546  Congress in-
tended that this definition include individuals whose impairment
"does not substantially limit major life activities" 54 7 but whose employ-
ers treat their impairments as substantially limiting. Unlike the first
two parts of the definition of a disability, the "regarded as" language
shifts the inquiry from the employee's condition to the employer's
perceptions. 548 Post-Sutton, cancer survivors must demonstrate how.
their employers have a misperception about their cancer or its ef-
fects. 54" Furthermore, survivors must show that the employers' al-
leged discriminatory actions are based on their belief that the
survivors' cancer or its effects substantially limit a major life activity.550
Cancer survivors should be protected by the "regarded as" lan-
guage in two situations: (1) the employer "mistakenly believes that"
an individual's cancer is "a physical impairment that substantially lim-
its one or more major life activities," and (2) the employer "mistak-
the treatment Boyle undertook to treat his impairment, may also be considered as the
cause of such limitation").
544. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k).
545. See generally Natalie Davis Spingarn & Nancy H. Chasen, Working with Your Doctor and
Hospital System: Becoming a Wise Consumer, in CANCER SuRVtVOR's ALMANAC, supra note 2, at
31, 43 (stating that "most [cancer] survivors do spend some time as inpatients [in hospi-
tals], particularly at the beginning of treatment").
546. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (stating that an individual is "disabled" if he or she is "re-
garded as having ... a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of such individual").
547. S. REP. No. 101-116, 23 (1989), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERI-
CANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, supra note 67, at 97.
548. Congress intended courts to infer that an employer who "cannot articulate a non-
discriminatory reason for the employment action ... is acting on the basis of 'myth, fear or
stereotype.'" 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(1) (1998).
549. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2150 (1999) (noting that the
employer must mistakenly believe (1) that the individual has a substantially limiting im-
pairment that he or she does not in fact have or (2) that the individual's impairment,
which is not in fact substantially limiting, is substantially limiting).
550. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (defining "discrimination" within the context of the
ADA).
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enly believes that" an individual is substantially limited by his or her
cancer or its treatment, even though in fact, the survivor is not so
limited. Survivors can meet this burden with a variety of evidence that
illustrate an employer's stereotypes and fears about cancer. 55' For ex-
ample, employers or co-workers who make disparaging comments
about an employee's cancer history evidence the stereotyping attitude
designed to be addressed by this prong.552 Additionally, employers
that have different medical criteria for cancer survivors may errone-
ously regard all cancers as substantially limiting, without making the
necessary individualized assessment of the employee in question.553
Moreover, where an employer cannot articulate a nondiscriminatory
reason for treating a cancer survivor differently from other workers,
plaintiffs should allege that "myth, fear or stereotype "55 motivated
the job action.
B. Demonstrate a Link Between the Regulations and the
Plaintiffs Situation
Plaintiffs should not assume that courts will understand how their
cancer history is protected by the ADA. They should argue that, post-
Bragdon,55 courts must defer to the Justice Department regulations
551. Even with clear evidence that an employer has discriminated against an employee
because of a disability, some plaintiffs have struggled to prevail. For a discussion of ADA
cases brought under the "regarded as" prong prior to the Supreme Court's decisions, see
Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the "Regarded As"Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional
Intent, 42 VILL. L. REv. 587 (1997). Mayerson argued that courts have failed to apply this
prong correctly for two reasons. Mayerson stated:
First, many courts are, in effect, requiring plaintiffs to prove actual substantial
limitation in order to fall under the "regarded as" prong. This approach nullifies
the third prong of the "regarded as" definition. Second, courts are allowing an
employer to successfully argue that it did not perceive the plaintiff as substantially
limited in working, but instead perceived the employee as unable to meet only
the employer's particular stringent medical criteria. Courts are putting the often
impossible burden on the plaintiff to show that the defendant perceived the
plaintiff to be limited in working beyond the job involved in the litigation.
Id. at 590 (internal footnotes omitted).
552. See, e.g., Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 192-93 (5th Cir. 1996)
(noting that Ellison's supervisor made comments about Ellison's breasts as not worth sav-
ing and told co-workers to "[flollow Phyllis" because she was "glowing").
553. See, e.g., Olmeda v. New York State Dep't of Civil Serv., No. 96 Civ. 7557 (HB), 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 345, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1998) (considering an ADA claim brought by
an individual who was denied employment as a parole officer until he could present a
letter or certification from his doctor stating that his leukemia was in remission and would
not interfere with his ability to work).
554. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(1).
555. The Supreme Court explicitly held that the Justice Department's regulations to
implement the public accommodation provisions of Title III "are entitled to deference."
436
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that interpret Title III56 of the ADA. Additionally, post-Sutton, courts
should consider the guidance of the EEOC guidelines that interpret
the employment provisions in Title I, with the sole exception of the
"mitigating measures" language.55 7 Cancer survivors then must draw
an explicit link between the EEOC regulations, as well as the legisla-
tive history, and the facts of their cases. They should allege that they
are substantially limited in as many different major life activities as can
be supported by the evidence.558
Whether cancer is a disability under the ADA must be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis.559 Although the regulations state that
some impairments, "such as HIV infection, are inherently substantially
limiting,"56 survivors should not claim that cancer is a per se disability
under the ADA.5 61 First, Congress intended the term disability to be
defined "with respect to an individual." '562 Second, the regulations re-
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 646 (1998). For a discussion of how courts may regard
EEOC regulations post-Bragdon, see Colker, supra note 121, at 160.
556. Congress authorized the Justice Department to issue regulations to implement the
public accommodation provisions of Title III. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (1994); see also Brag-
don, 524 U.S. at 646 (observing that the Justice Department's regulations are entitled to
deference).
557. The EEOC Interpretive Guidelines state that "[tlhe determination of whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case
basis, without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic
devices." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j). Subsequent to the publication of these guidelines,
however, the Supreme Court rejected the EEOC's interpretation of the ADA. The Court
held that "the determination of whether an individual is disabled should be made with
reference to measures that mitigate the individual's impairment." Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2143 (1999).
558. One commentator suggested that "claims in which plaintiffs have only alleged a
substantial limitation in the major life activity of working have been almost universally re-
jected. Thus, some disabling conditions are not recognized because they are only consid-
ered in the context of working." Locke, supra note 536, at 135.
559. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
560. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20). Some argue that certain impairments, such as HIV,
should be per se disabilities under the ADA. See, e.g., Carlis & McCabe, supra note 10, at
614 (arguing that "Congress surely did not intend individuals with HIV, symptomatic or
asymptomatic, to fall outside the [ADA's] protection").
561. The Supreme Court declined to consider whether HIV is a per se disability because
it concluded that Sidney Abbott's HIV infection was a disability. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at
641-42. Professor Lanctot argued that courts' failures to reject the concept of per se disabili-
ties results from the ad hoc decision making and prejudice fostered by case-by-case analysis
disability under the ADA. See Catherine J. Lanctot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and Per Se Preju-
dice: How Individualizing the Determination of "Disability" Undermines the ADA, 42 VILL. L. REv.
327, 329 (1997); see also Crawford, supra note 543, at 1211 (noting the inconsistencies in-
herent in case-by-case analysis of the ADA's definitions); Michael Puma, Note, Respecting the
Plain Language of the ADA: A Textualist Argument Rejecting the EEOC's Analysis of Controlled
Disabilities, 67 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 123, 124 (1998) (characterizing the court's methods of
determining "whether an individual is disabled under the ADA as inconsistent").
562. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1984).
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ject a "laundry list" of disabilities because "[t]he determination of
whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the
name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on
the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual."563 Third,
cancer is not one impairment, but a term given to more than 100
significantly different diseases, from the relatively minor564 to the
nearly always fatal. 565 "Although most of us think of cancer as a single
disease, it is actually a family of more than 100 different types, all char-
acterized by uncontrolled growth and spread of abnormal cells. 56 6
Its effect on an individual depends on many factors, including the pri-
mary site of the cancer, stage of the disease, age and health of the
individual, effect of treatment, 567 and the individual's psychosocial
condition.56 As Professor Colker noted, the term disability is "highly
factual in nature and, as such, proper jury fodder, '56 9 because a fact
finder must evaluate how an impairment substantially limits an indi-
vidual's major life activities. The Supreme Court, which has yet to rec-
ognize a per se disability under the ADA, is unlikely to view such a
varying and complex disease as cancer as a per se disability.570
CONCLUSION
In 1983, Paul Tsongas was a powerful United States Senator from
Massachusetts. Then suddenly, at the age of forty-two and with three
young daughters, he was diagnosed with lymphoma. After his doctors
told him that he had an average life expectancy of eight years,571 he
decided to quit the Senate and work as an attorney in private practice.
The thought of looking for a job, saddled with a medical prognosis
that made the evening news, brought Senator Tsongas many restless
nights:
563. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j).
564. For example, some cancers, such as localized prostate cancer, have a 100% five-year
relative survival rate. See CANCER FAcTs & FIGuREs-1998, supra note 12, at 15.
565. For example, pancreatic cancer is almost always fatal. The one-year relative survival
rate for pancreatic cancer is 18%, while the five-year rate is only 4%. See id. at 14.
566. HOLLEB, supra note 21, at xviii.
567. The most common cancer treatments include surgery, radiation, chemotherapy,
hormone therapy, and bone marrow transplantation. See CANCER FAcTs & FIGuRES-1998,
supra note 12, at 8-17.
568. The EEOC's regulations recognize that diseases like cancer "may be disabling for
particular individuals but not for others, depending on the stage of the disease or disorder,
the presence of other impairments that combine to make the impairment disabling or any
number of other factors." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20).
569. Colker, supra note 121, at 133.
570. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 642 (declining to hold that HIV infection is a per se
disability).
571. See PAUL TSONGAS, HEADING HOME 59-60 (1984).
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About three o'clock or so I woke up in a total fright. I had
been dreaming that I was wandering along the Beltway
outside Washington trying to find the Raytheon plant that
was located somewhere in those rolling hills. I was applying
for a job after being turned down everywhere else. I had to
find the plant to submit my resume, but I was hopelessly lost.
My cancer had rendered me unemployable, and my family
was going to be destitute. 72
Senator Tsongas' nightmare illustrates the employment hurdles
cancer survivors face during and after their struggles with cancer.
When passed in 1990, the ADA appeared to be survivors' best oppor-
tunity to remedy cancer-based employment discrimination. Yet, too
many courts have failed to apply the letter and intent of the ADA to
cancer-based employment discrimination. Lower federal courts have
demonstrated widely divergent abilities to understand the impact of
cancer on an individual's major life activities and to assess accurately
employers' motivations.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's five ADA opinions are un-
likely to alleviate the Catch-22 in which some federal courts place can-
cer survivors. The Supreme Court has strayed afar from the relatively
straightforward issues presented in Sutton and unnecessarily nibbled
on the ADA's protections with language that invites further summary
judgment abuse by lower courts. Only with careful pleading and de-
tailed arguments, can cancer survivors mitigate their chances of being
caught in the Catch-22.
572. Id. at 132.
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